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ARTICLES 
THE TRANS PANIC DEFENSE REVISITED 
Cynthia Lee*  
ABSTRACT 
Violence against transgender individuals in general, and trans women of color 
in particular, is a significant problem in the United States today. When a man is 
charged with murdering a transgender woman, a common defense strategy is to 
assert what is called the trans panic defense. The trans panic defense is not a tra-
ditional criminal law defense. Nor, despite its name, is it recognized as a stand- 
alone defense. Rather, trans panic is a defense strategy associated with the prov-
ocation or heat of passion defense. A murder defendant asserting trans panic will 
claim that the discovery that the victim was a transgender female—an individual 
who identifies as a woman but was thought to be male when born—provoked him 
into a heat of passion, causing him to lose his self-control. If the jury finds that 
the defendant was actually provoked into a heat of passion and that the ordinary 
man in the defendant’s shoes would have been so provoked, it can acquit him of 
murder and find him guilty of a lesser offense. 
This Article starts by discussing the problem of violence against transgender 
individuals in the United States today. It then focuses upon a particular manifes-
tation of this violence—cases in which a man kills a transgender woman with 
whom he was intimate or to whom he was attracted, is arrested and charged with 
a criminal homicide, and then asserts a trans panic defense. 
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Next, this Article offers several reasons why the trans panic defense strategy is 
deeply problematic. First, the trans panic defense appeals to negative stereotypes 
about transgender individuals. Second, it legitimizes the enforcement of norms of 
masculinity and heterosexuality through violence. Third, it inappropriately vali-
dates bias against transgender individuals when we live in a pluralistic society 
that should be tolerant and accepting of all individuals. 
The Article then addresses the normative question of what should be done to rec-
tify the harms rendered when a defendant charged with murder asserts a trans panic 
defense. In the past, the Author was reluctant to support proposals to legislatively 
ban the trans panic defense. She felt that the best way to defeat the trans panic 
defense was not to ban it, but to allow it to be aired and then have a strong prosecu-
tor explain to the jury why it should be rejected. She also argued that it was crit-
ically important to eradicate the underlying structures of masculinity that encourage 
violence against transgender women to reduce the risk of such violence taking place 
and to undermine the effectiveness of the trans panic defense. She opined that the 
best way to achieve these goals was to educate both the public and the jury about 
the difficulties transgender individuals face just trying to exist in society and make 
the existence of bias against transgender individuals salient to the jury. 
While the Author still believes in the importance of education, she now feels 
education alone is insufficient to ensure that juries reject the trans panic defense. 
The Article explains the Author’s shift in position and concludes by examining 
recently enacted legislative bans on the trans panic defense and offering concrete 
suggestions on how legislative reform in this arena could be strengthened.   
INTRODUCTION 
On August 17, 2013, James Dixon was walking on Frederick Douglass 
Boulevard in Harlem with some friends when he spotted Islan Nettles, an attractive 
transgender woman.1 
James C. McKinley, Jr., Man’s Confession in Transgender Woman’s Death is Admissible, Judge Rules, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 2, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/02/nyregion/mans-confession-in-transgender-womans- 
death-is-admissible-judge-rules.html [https://perma.cc/KJF6-8QRB]; James C. McKinley Jr., Manslaughter 
Charges in Beating Death of Transgender Woman in 2013, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 3, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2015/03/04/nyregion/manslaughter-charges-in-beating-death-of-transgender-woman-in-2013.html?module=inline 
[https://perma.cc/946R-NY5X]; Kenrya Rankin, James Dixon to Serve 12 Years for Killing Islan Nettles, 
COLORLINES (Apr. 20, 2016), https://www.colorlines.com/articles/james-dixon-serve-12-years-killing-islan- 
nettles [https://perma.cc/WX3G-U4TF].
Dixon crossed the street and began chatting with Nettles, 
asking her for her name and where she was from.2 
Yanan Wang, The Islan Nettles Killing: What the Trial Means to a Transgender Community Anxious for a 
Reckoning, WASH. POST (Apr. 4, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2016/04/04/ 
the-islan-nettles-killing-what-the-trial-means-to-a-transgender-community-anxious-for-a-reckoning/?utm_term= 
.4022685c4e96 [https://perma.cc/74TB-S3BZ].
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mocking him for flirting with Nettles, saying, “that’s a guy.”3 Dixon’s demeanor 
suddenly changed. Angrily, Dixon demanded to know if Nettles “was a man” 
before punching and knocking her to the ground.4 Dixon’s attack “left the 21-year- 
old African American comatose, her face battered beyond recognition.”5 Nettles 
died five days later from head injuries she suffered after hitting the concrete.6 
Initially, Dixon admitted that he was the person who had attacked Nettles.7 In 
explaining why he punched Nettles, Dixon told police, “I just didn’t want to be 
fooled,” suggesting that Nettles’ misrepresentation of her sex had provoked him.8 
See Shayna Jacobs, Murder Suspect Said His ‘Manhood’ Was Threatened When He Found Out He Was 
Hitting on Transgender Woman, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Apr. 1, 2016), https://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/nyc- 
crime/transgender-slay-suspect-manhood-threatened-article-1.2585915 [https://perma.cc/4J7H-TJBB] (quoting 
Dixon’s confession to the police). 
His explanation echoes a familiar theme of trans panic that suggests that by hold-
ing herself out as female, the transgender woman culpably tries to trick straight 
men into having sex with her. It reinforces the trope of the transgender female as a 
deceitful interloper, trying to pass as female in order to capture unwitting hetero-
sexual men. Dixon’s comments also suggested Nettles was at fault for her own 
death, even though Dixon was the one who initiated the conversation, and it 
appears that she did nothing to provoke the attack except for being a transgender 
woman.9 
After he was arrested, Dixon changed his story and told the media he was not 
the person responsible for Nettles’ death, saying, “I’m really sorry for the family’s 
loss, but they got the wrong guy. . . . I didn’t kill anyone.”10 He also stated, “I can 
tell the difference between a man and a woman. . . . I don’t have anything against 
gay people or transgender people. . . . I don’t just go pick fights with random people 
I don’t know. That’s not me.”11 
In March 2015, Dixon was charged with first-degree manslaughter.12 Initially, 
he pleaded not guilty to all the charges, intending to go to trial.13 Later, Dixon pled 
guilty to second-degree manslaughter and first-degree assault. 14 He was sentenced 
to twelve years in prison.15 
3. Id. 
4. Rankin, supra note 1. 
5. Wang, supra note 2. 
6. Rankin, supra note 1. 
7. Wang, supra note 2. 
8. 
9. According to her friends and family, Nettles had just started being open about her transgender identity 
before she was killed. Wang, supra note 2. Her death was particularly tragic because after years of living in 
poverty, Nettles had finally gotten a job in retail, was starting her own fashion line, and had moved into her own 
apartment. Id. 




14. Rankin, supra note 1. 
15. Id. 
2020]                                THE TRANS PANIC DEFENSE REVISITED                                1413 
The underlying impetus for Dixon’s loss of self-control seems to have been 
Dixon’s fear of being seen as gay.16 Recall that just before he attacked Nettles, 
Dixon heard his friends mocking him for hitting on a guy. Dixon’s friends obvi-
ously considered Nettles, a transgender woman, to be a man. By attacking Nettles, 
Dixon could demonstrate that he was not attracted to her—at least not once he real-
ized that she was a transgender female. Dixon may have felt it especially important 
to prove that he was not attracted to Nettles because just a few days earlier, he 
had hit on two other transgender women, and his friends had mocked him for 
doing so.17 
Violence against transgender individuals—particularly transgender women of 
color—is a significant problem today.18 
See Michelle Chen, Transgender Rights are Under Siege in Trump’s America, THE NATION (Dec. 19, 
2019), https://www.thenation.com/article/transgender-rights-trump-supreme-court [https://perma.cc/LH2N- 
Z4PQ]. Hate motivated violence against transgender individuals is on the rise. Id. (citing CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF 
HATE & EXTREMISM, CALI. STATE UNIV., SAN BERNARDINO, REPORT TO THE NATION: HATE CRIMES RISE IN U.S. 
CITIES AND COUNTIES IN TIME OF DIVISION & FOREIGN INTERFERENCE 31 (May 2018), https://www.csusb.edu/ 
sites/default/files/2018%20Hate%20Final%20Report%205-14.pdf (reporting that “[t]he 2017 increase in hate 
crime from 229 to 254, was driven in part by the 23 crimes targeting the transgender community, which 
increased by 187 percent”)). Some have even said that transgender individuals, particularly trans women of 
color, “experience rates of violence much higher than any other population in the United States.” See Aimee 
Wodda & Vanessa R. Panfil, “Don’t Talk to Me About Deception”: The Necessary Erosion of the Trans* Panic 
Defense, 78 ALB. L. REV. 927, 930 (2015) (citing JAIME M. GRANT ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER 
EQUAL., INJUSTICE AT EVERY TURN: A REPORT OF THE NATIONAL TRANSGENDER DISCRIMINATION SURVEY 36– 
37 (2011), https://www.thetaskforce.org/injustice-every-turn-report-national-transgender-discrimination-survey/ 
[https://perma.cc/T3PF-YRFJ]).
In 2018, at least twenty-six transgender 
individuals were killed in the United States.19 
See Doubly Victimized: Reporting on Transgender Victims of Crime, GLAAD, https://www.glaad.org/ 
blog/glaad-calls-increased-and-accurate-media-coverage-transgender-murders-0 [https://perma.cc/7BY6-UCB3] 
(last visited June 26, 2019) (listing the names of twenty-six transgender homicide victims in 2018, including 
Roxana Hernandez, a thirty-three year-old trans woman of color, who reportedly died while in the custody of 
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) after fleeing violence in Honduras); see also HUMAN RIGHTS 
CAMPAIGN, A NATIONAL EPIDEMIC: FATAL ANTI-TRANSGENDER VIOLENCE IN AMERICA IN 2018 (2018) 
[hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, A NATIONAL EPIDEMIC] (“At the end of 2017, we mourned the loss of 29 
[transgender and gender-expansive] people—the highest number ever recorded.”); HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, 
VIOLENCE AGAINST THE TRANSGENDER COMMUNITY IN 2019, https://www.hrc.org/resources/violence-against- 
the-transgender-community-in-2019 [https://perma.cc/9PCG-NSTQ] (reporting that there were twenty-six 
transgender homicide victims in 2018) (last visited June 25, 2019). 
This statistic suggests that two or 
more transgender individuals were killed each month. The vast majority—twenty- 
five of these twenty-six homicide victims (96%)—were transgender women.20 
Twenty-three of the twenty-six transgender homicide victims in 2018 (approxi-
mately 85%) were trans women of color.21 The actual number of transgender vic-
tims of homicide was probably higher than the number reported because many 
16. Dixon admitted “that he felt his ‘manhood’ was threatened by his streak of unknowingly hitting on gals 





20. Doubly Victimized, supra note 19 (providing that of the twenty-six transgender victims of homicide in 
2018 listed, twenty-five were trans women). 
21. Id. (providing that of the twenty-six transgender victims of homicide listed on GLAAD’s webpage, 
twenty-three were trans women of color). 
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police officers often record the victim’s biological sex, rather than their gender 
identity, on the police report, especially when the victim has not fully transitioned 
or the victim’s driver’s license includes only their biological sex.22 And fatal 
attacks—those that end in death—tell just part of the story. Each year, many trans-
gender individuals are violently attacked in assaults that do not end in death.23 
This Article shines a spotlight on a particular manifestation of violence against 
transgender women: when a cisgender24 man kills a transgender woman and asserts 
a trans panic defense. Part I discusses the widespread discrimination, harassment, 
and violence faced by transgender men and women in the United States today. 
This is not a new phenomenon. Transgender individuals have faced discrimination, 
harassment, and violence for many years, but verbal and physical attacks on trans-
gender individuals seem to have become much more frequent since the election of 
President Donald Trump.25 
Part II describes and critiques a criminal defense strategy that is commonly 
known as the “trans panic” defense. It shows how this strategy, invoked primarily 
by male defendants charged with murdering transgender women, seeks to capital-
ize on stereotypes about transgender individuals as sexual deviants and sexual 
predators. The use of this defense strategy is also problematic because of the mes-
sage it sends about transgender lives. 
Part III addresses the normative question of what should be done to deal with 
the problems identified in Part II. In the past, I did not support legislative bans on 
gay or trans panic defense strategies. As a former criminal defense attorney, I was 
reluctant to place limitations on an accused’s right to present a defense. Given our 
adversarial system of justice, I also felt, despite my personal belief that trans panic 
is a reprehensible defense strategy and should be rejected by jurors, that it was best 
to allow defense attorneys to argue trans panic and have prosecutors combat the 
defense in open court. 
I now believe legislative bans on the trans panic defense strategy are a necessary 
step in the fight against violence against transgender individuals. Part III explains 
my shift in position and why I now believe education as well as legislative bans on 
the trans panic defense strategy are imperative. It then considers potential objec-
tions to legislatively banning the trans panic defense.   
22. Andrea L. Wirtz et al., Gender-Based Violence Against Transgender People in the United States: A Call 
for Research and Programming, 19 TRAUMA, VIOLENCE & ABUSE 1, 1, 4 (2018) (noting that because “there are 
no national surveillance systems that track murders of trans people and . . . trans victims of violence are often 
misgendered by police and news media,” statistics on homicides of transgender individuals likely underestimate 
the true rate of homicide). 
23. See infra Part I.B. 
24. The word “cisgender” (“cis” for short) is used in this Article to describe individuals whose gender identity 
matches their biological sex. See Cynthia Lee & Peter Kwan, The Trans Panic Defense: Masculinity, 
Heteronormativity, and the Murder of Transgender Women, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 77, 90 (2014). 
25. See infra Part III.A. 
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Part IV examines recent efforts to legislatively ban gay and trans panic defense 
strategies.26 
AM. BAR ASS’N H.D. RES. 113A, at 1, 9, 13–14 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013), https://lgbtbar.org/wp-content/ 
uploads/2014/02/Gay-and-Trans-Panic-Defenses-Resolution.pdf [https://perma.cc/9XWX-5MLU].
It discusses the ten legislative bans on gay and trans panic defenses 
that have been enacted to date—in California in 2014, Illinois and Rhode Island 
in 2018, Nevada, New York, Hawaii, Connecticut, and Maine in 2019, and 
most recently, New Jersey and the state of Washington in early 2020. I also exam-
ine three pending bills, two introduced in the District of Columbia and another 
introduced in the U.S. Congress by Senator Edward Markey (D-MA) and 
Representative Joe Kennedy (D-MA). While most of the statutory prohibitions fol-
low the California legislation, there are several significant differences amongst the 
various proposals. Part IV discusses these differences and offers concrete sugges-
tions as to how legislative reform in this arena can be strengthened. 
I. VIOLENCE AGAINST TRANSGENDER INDIVIDUALS 
An estimated 1.4 million people identify as transgender in the United States.27 
Bill Chappel, 1.4 Million Adults Identify as Transgender in America, NPR (June 30, 2016), https://www. 
npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/06/30/484253324/1-4-million-adults-identify-as-transgender-in-america-study- 
says [https://perma.cc/89K9-KWP2]; ANDREW FLORES ET AL., WILLIAMS INST., HOW MANY ADULTS IDENTIFY AS 
TRANSGENDER IN THE UNITED STATES? 3 (June 2016), https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/ 
How-Many-Adults-Identify-as-Transgender-in-the-United-States.pdf (noting that “[a]n estimated 0.6% of adults, 
about 1.4 million, identify as transgender in the United States”); Jan Hoffman, Estimate of U.S. Transgender 
Population Doubles to 1.4 Million Adults, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/01/ 
health/transgender-population.html [https://perma.cc/S4Z7-PSTP]. This is significantly higher than the estimated 
transgender population in the United States five years earlier. See Lisa Langenderfer-Magruder et al., Experiences 
of Intimate Partner Violence and Subsequent Police Reporting Among Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, and 
Queer Adults in Colorado: Comparing Rates of Cisgender and Transgender Victimization, 31 J. INTERPERSONAL 
VIOLENCE 855, 856–57 (2016) (noting that nearly 700,000 or 8% of the approximately nine million LGBTQ 
Americans in the United States identify as transgender (citing GARY J. GATES, WILLIAMS INST., HOW MANY 
PEOPLE ARE LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL AND TRANSGENDER? 6 (April 2011), https://escholarship.org/uc/item/ 
09h684x2 [https://perma.cc/2CWQ-7REF])). A Harris Poll conducted on behalf of GLAAD in 2017 found that 
12% of millennials identify as transgender or gender nonconforming. See GLAAD, ACCELERATING ACCEPTANCE 
2017: A HARRIS POLL SURVEY OF AMERICANS’ ACCEPTANCE OF LGBTQ PEOPLE 3 (2017), https://www.glaad.org/ 
files/aa/2017_GLAAD_Accelerating_Acceptance.pdf.
According to the National Center for Transgender Equality, “transgender” is a 
term for “people whose gender identity is different from the gender they were 
thought to be at birth.”28 
NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL., FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT TRANSGENDER PEOPLE 1 
(July 9, 2016), https://transequality.org/issues/resources/frequently-asked-questions-about-transgender-people 
[https://perma.cc/A8S2-QQXH].
The 2015 U.S. Transgender Survey similarly notes that 
“the term ‘transgender’ is often used to describe people whose gender identity or 
expression differs from what is associated with the gender they were thought to be 
at birth.”29 
NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL., THE REPORT OF THE 2015 TRANSGENDER SURVEY 40 (2015), 
http://www.ustranssurvey.org [https://perma.cc/Z6RK-LL6X]; see also HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, A TIME TO 
ACT: FATAL VIOLENCE AGAINST TRANSGENDER PEOPLE IN AMERICA IN 2017 5 (2017), https://assets2.hrc.org/ 
files/assets/resources/A_Time_To_Act_2017_REV3.pdf (noting that the term “transgender” is a term commonly 
used “to describe people whose gender identity is different from what is typically associated with the sex 
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assigned to them at birth (i.e., the sex listed on their birth certificate)”); Jessica A. Clarke, They, Them, and 
Theirs, 32 HARV. L. REV. 894, 897–98 (2019) (noting that the term “transgender” is commonly used as “[a]n 
umbrella term for people whose gender identity and/or gender expression differs from what is typically 
associated with the sex they were assigned at birth”). Some have defined the term “transgender” more broadly. 
See, e.g., Dean Spade, Resisting Medicine, Re/modeling Gender, 18 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 15, 16 n.2 (2003) 
(explaining that “[t]ransgender and trans are both political terms that have emerged in recent years to indicate a 
wide variety of people whose gender identity or expression transgress the rules of binary gender”); Rebecca L. 
Stotzer, Violence Against Transgender People: A Review of United States Data, 14 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT 
BEHAV. 170, 171 (2009) (noting that the term “transgender” is an umbrella term that includes “cross-dressers, 
transsexuals, genderqueer youth, drag queens” and “anyone who bends the common societal constructions of 
gender”). The terms “binary gender” and “gender binary” are used to describe the fact that most people tend to 
think of sex and gender in binary terms—one is either a man or a woman or one is female or male—with nothing 
in between. See Julie A. Greenberg, Defining Male and Female: Intersexuality and the Collision between Law 
and Biology, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 265, 275 (1999). Janet Dolgin observes that a binary approach to gender is “deeply 
embedded in Western culture.” Janet Dolgin, Discriminating Gender: Legal, Medical, and Social Presumptions 
About Transgender and Intersex People, 45 SW. L. REV. 61, 62, 66 (2017) (noting that in contrast to this 
presumption that one is either male or female, “more than one percent of people are born intersex,” “a condition 
in which a person’s biological sex markers are not all clearly male or female” (quoting Julie A. Greenberg, 
Health Care Issues Affecting People with an Intersex Condition or DSD: Sex or Disability Discrimination?, 45 
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 849, 855 (2012) (citing GLAAD Media Reference Guide—Transgender Glossary of Terms, 
GLAAD, http://www.glaad.org/reference/transgender [https://perma.cc/AMU3-NFVT]))). Clarke notes that “not 
all nonbinary people identify as transgender[.]” Clarke, They, Them, and Theirs, supra note 29, at 897–98 (2019). 
Terry Kogan has characterized transgender individuals as people who feel “trapped or imprisoned” in a body that 
does not reflect their true gender identity. Terry S. Kogan, Transsexuals and Critical Gender Theory: The 
Possibility of a Restroom Labeled “Other”, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 1223, 1225 (1997). Some trans people might resist 
this characterization, claiming that they feel trapped in a society that treats gender as binary. I thank my 
colleague, Jeremy Bearer-Friend, for sharing this insight with me. 
to be male at birth. A transgender man lives as a man, but was thought to be female 
when he was born. Some people do not have an exclusively male or female gender, 
including those who identify as having no gender or more than one gender, and 
may use a variety of terms to describe themselves, such as non-binary.30 
While the terms “sex” and “gender” are often used interchangeably, in some 
contexts they are treated as distinct concepts, with “sex” referring to an individu-
al’s physical attributes31 and “gender” referring to the way an individual presents 
himself or herself to the world.32 As Frank Valdes has noted, “sex” refers to the 
“physical attribute[s] of humans” while “gender” refers to the “cultural dimensions 
derived from and determined by sex.”33 Along these lines, a transgender individu-
al’s gender identity differs from their biological sex. 
Gender identity “should not be confused with sexual orientation.”34 Sexual ori-
entation refers to whether one is sexually attracted to members of the opposite sex 
(heterosexual orientation), members of the same sex (gay or lesbian), or members  
30. THE REPORT OF THE 2015 TRANSGENDER SURVEY, supra note 29, at 40. 
31. Lee & Kwan, supra note 24, at 87. 
32. See Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation of “Sex,” 
“Gender,” and “Sexual Orientation” in Euro-American Law and Society, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 204 (1995). 
33. Id. at 6 n.5–6. 
34. Lee & Kwan, supra note 24, at 88. 
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of the opposite sex and members of the same sex (bisexual).35 A transgender indi-
vidual can be heterosexual, gay or lesbian, or bisexual.36 
Violence against trans individuals in general, and trans women in particular, is 
more widespread than most people realize. This Part provides an overview of the 
extent to which trans individuals experience both fatal and non-fatal violence. 
A. Transgender Individuals as Victims of Homicide 
Statistics on homicides of transgender individuals across the United States are 
not readily available because the federal government did not start collecting data 
based on gender identity until recently.37 
See Stotzer, supra note 29, at 176 (noting in 2009 that “[t]he federal government currently does not 
include gender identity in legislation covering hate crimes—neither in sentence-enhancements nor in mandated 
tracking of hate crimes in the Uniform Crime Reports”); Christine Hauser, Transgender Woman Shot Dead in 
Motel is 7th Killed in U.S. This Year, Rights Advocates Say, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2018), https://www.nytimes. 
com/2018/03/30/us/transgender-woman-killed-baton-rouge.html [https://perma.cc/EH82-GAB2]. The FBI did 
add gender identity to its annual Hate Crimes Incident Report in 2012. See Jordan Blair Woods & Jody L. 
Herman, Anti-transgender Hate Crime, in THE ROUTLEDGE INT’L HANDBOOK ON HATE CRIME 280 (Nathan Hall 
et al. eds., 2015). This report, however, covers all hate crime incidents, not just those resulting in death. 
Moreover, the statistics that do exist 
likely do not reflect the true numbers of transgender homicide victims. Police 
reports often describe transgender homicide victims by their biological sex, rather 
than their gender identity, which leads to underreporting of the actual number of 
crimes of violence committed against transgender individuals.38 Indeed, the prac-
tice of calling a person by the name they were given at birth and refusing to recog-
nize the transgender individual’s gender identity is so commonplace that the 
transgender community has a name for it: “deadnaming,” a name with a double 
meaning when a transgender individual is the victim of a criminal homicide.39 
As Lucas Waldron and Ken Schencke explain: “The transgender community has a word for calling a trans 
person by the name they no longer use, one that conveys a double meaning when it involves murder. It’s known 
as ‘deadnaming.’” Lucas Waldron & Ken Schwencke, Deadnamed, PROPUBLICA (Aug. 10, 2018), http://www. 
propublica.org/article/deadnamed-transgender-black-women-murders-jacksonville-police-investigation [https:// 
perma.cc/8N6D-DLTU].
Given the lack of data collection on homicides involving transgender victims by 
the federal government, a number of private organizations concerned about the 
rights of transgender individuals have stepped up to fill the void. The Human 
Rights Campaign, for example, has been monitoring the killings of transgender 
people since 2013. It reports that between January 2013 and November 2018, at 
least 128 transgender individuals were the victims of fatal violence.40 One hundred 
and ten of these homicide victims (approximately 86%) were transgender persons 
of color, including ninety-five black individuals and fourteen Latinos or Latinas.41 
38. Hauser, supra note 37 (“[T]ransgender homicide victims are often identified by the police using the names 
and genders they were assigned at birth, a practice known as misgendering.”). 
39. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. at 88 n.33. 
37. 
 
40. HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, A NATIONAL EPIDEMIC, supra note 19, at 61–62. 
41. Id. at 62. 
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One hundred fifteen of these transgender homicide victims were transgender 
women.42 In other words, nearly nine in every ten of the transgender homicide vic-
tims between January 2013 and November 2018 were transgender women.43 
As reflected below, transgender women and transgender persons of color consti-
tute the vast majority of transgender individuals who are killed in the United States 
each year. Since their very being rests at the intersection of race and gender iden-
tity, transgender women of color appear to be at greatest risk of being the victims 
of fatal violence aimed at the transgender community. 
1. Homicides Involving Transgender Victims in 2018 
According to two sources, at least twenty-six transgender or gender non-con-
forming individuals were killed in 2018.44 These statistics suggest that in each 
month in 2018, two or more transgender individuals were killed somewhere in the 
United States. The vast majority—twenty-five of these twenty-six homicide vic-
tims (96%)—were transgender women.45 Twenty-three of these twenty-six trans-
gender homicide victims in 2018 (approximately 85%) were trans women of 
color.46 
2. Homicides Involving Transgender Victims in 2017 
In 2017, the last year for which complete statistics were available at the time 
this Article was written, more transgender people were killed than in any year in at 
least a decade.47 At least twenty-nine transgender individuals were killed in the 
United States in 2017, the highest number ever recorded up until that time.48 These 
statistics suggest that in each month in 2017, at least two transgender individuals 
were killed somewhere in the United States. As noted above, many more transgen-
der individuals were probably killed than reported, but their deaths may not be 
reflected in these figures because the police officer on the scene of the homicide 
may not have realized that the victim was a transgender individual or may have  
42. Id. 
43. Id. At least twenty-one of these transgender homicide victims were killed by intimate partners. Id. at 63. 
44. See HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, VIOLENCE AGAINST THE TRANSGENDER COMMUNITY IN 2019, supra note 
19 (reporting that there were at least twenty-six transgender or gender non-conforming homicide victims in 
2018); Doubly Victimized, supra note 19 (listing the names of twenty-six transgender homicide victims in 2018, 
including Roxana Hernandez, a thirty-three year-old trans woman of color, who reportedly died while in the 
custody of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) after fleeing violence in Honduras). 
45. Doubly Victimized, supra note 19 (indicating that of the twenty-six transgender victims of homicide in 
2018 listed, twenty-five were trans women). 
46. Id. (noting that of the twenty-six transgender victims of homicide listed on GLAAD’s webpage, twenty- 
three were trans women of color). 
47. HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, A TIME TO ACT, supra note 29, at 3. 
48. HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, A NATIONAL EPIDEMIC, supra note 19, at i (“At the end of 2017, we mourned 
the loss of 29 [transgender and gender-expansive] people—the highest number ever recorded.”). 
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simply refused to acknowledge the victim’s chosen gender identity by recording 
the victim’s biological sex, rather than their chosen gender identity, as their gender 
on the police report.49 
3. Homicides Involving Transgender Victims in 2016 
According to the National Coalition of Anti-Violence Programs (NCAVP), 
aside from the forty-nine lives lost at the Pulse Nightclub in June 2016, there were 
twenty-eight anti-LGBTQ homicides in 2016.50 Nineteen of these twenty-eight 
homicides (68%) involved transgender or gender nonconforming victims.51 As in 
other years, the vast majority of these homicides, seventeen of the nineteen killings 
(89%) of transgender individuals in 2016, involved transgender women of color. 52 
The Human Rights Campaign, which also compiles statistics on violence against 
transgender individuals, more conservatively reported that there were at least 
twenty-three homicides involving transgender victims in 2016 and that the vast 
majority of these victims—nineteen of the twenty-three—were transgender 
women.53 
4. Homicides Involving Transgender Victims in 2015 
In 2015, there were at least twenty-two homicides involving transgender vic-
tims.54 Almost every single one of these homicides—twenty-one of the twenty- 
two—involved a transgender female victim.55 
5. Homicides Involving Transgender Victims in 2014 
In 2014, there were at least thirteen homicides involving a transgender victim.56 
All of these homicides involved a transgender female victim.57 
49. Andrea L. Wirtz et al., Gender-Based Violence Against Transgender People in the United States: A Call 
for Research and Programming, 19 TRAUMA, VIOLENCE & ABUSE 1, 1, 4 (2018) (noting that because “there are 
no national surveillance systems that track murders of trans people and . . . trans victims of violence are often 
misgendered by police and news media,” statistics on homicides of transgender individuals likely underestimate 
the true rate of homicide). 
50. NAT’L COAL. OF ANTI-VIOLENCE PROGRAMS, A CRISIS OF HATE: A REPORT ON LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, 
TRANSGENDER AND QUEER HATE VIOLENCE HOMICIDES IN 2017 6 (2017) (reporting seventy-seven hate-inspired 
homicides involving LGBTQ victims in 2016, including the forty-nine lives lost in the shooting at the Pulse 
nightclub in Orlando, Florida in June 2016). 
51. Id. at 7. 
52. Id. at 8. 
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6. Homicides Involving Transgender Victims in 2013 
In 2013, there were at least nineteen homicides involving a transgender victim.58 
The overwhelming majority of these homicides—seventeen of the nineteen— 
involved a transgender female.59 
The information discussed above has been summarized in the table below.                   
Table 1: Homicides in the United States Involving Transgender Victims (2013–2018)60 
Year Total # of 
Transgender 
Homicide Victims 
# of Female 
Transgender 
Homicide Victims 
# of Transgender 
Homicide Victims 
of Color  
2013   19   17   17 
2014   13   13   11 
2015   22   21   19 
2016   23   19 20 (17 transgender 
women of color) 
2017   29   24   24 
2018   26   25 23 (23 transgender 
women of color)  
B. Transgender Individuals as Victims of Other Forms of Violence 
Information about other forms of violence against transgender individuals is 
also limited. Just as with homicides, the limited information available may not be 
accurate due to misgendering and underreporting. Additionally, transgender vic-
tims are often reluctant to report their victimization to the police out of fear of  
58. Id. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. For the 2017 statistics, see id. at i, 64 (“At the end of 2017, we mourned the loss of 29 [transgender and 
gender-expansive] people—the highest number ever recorded.”). For the 2018 statistics, see HUMAN RIGHTS 
CAMPAIGN, VIOLENCE AGAINST THE TRANSGENDER COMMUNITY IN 2019, supra note 19 (reporting that there 
were twenty-six transgender or gender non-conforming homicide victims in 2018); Doubly Victimized, supra 
note 19 (listing the names of twenty-six transgender homicide victims in 2018, including Roxana Hernandez, a 
thirty-three year old trans woman of color, who reportedly died while in the custody of U.S. Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement (ICE) after fleeing violence in Honduras; and noting that of the twenty-six transgender 
victims of homicide in 2018 listed, twenty-five were trans women, twenty-three were transgender persons of 
color, including twenty-two trans women of color). 
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being revictimized.61 
As Jordan Blair Woods and Jody Herman observe, transgender and gender non-conforming individuals 
may not report hate crimes to police because: (1) “they may fear that law enforcement officers and departments 
will mishandle or ignore their reports,” (2) “they may fear that law enforcement officers will only further 
victimize them for being transgender or gender non-conforming,” (3) they “may fear that reporting will cause the 
perpetrators to retaliate against them,” and (4) they may not report “to avoid drawing attention to their gender 
identities.” Woods & Herman, supra note 37, at 280–81; see also Jan S. Redfern, Nationwide Survey of Attitudes 
of Law Enforcement Personnel Towards Transgender Individuals, 4 J.L. ENFORCEMENT 1, 2 (2014) (citing TALIA 
BETTCHER ET AL., CITY OF LOS ANGELES HUMAN REL. COMM’N’S TRANSGENDER WORKING GROUP, 
RECOMMENDED MODEL POLICIES AND STANDARDS FOR THE L.A. POLICE DEPARTMENT’S INTERACTIONS WITH 
TRANSGENDER INDIVIDUALS 11, 14 (2010), and JAIME M. GRANT ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL., 
INJUSTICE AT EVERY TURN: A REPORT OF THE NATIONAL TRANSGENDER DISCRIMINATION SURVEY 162 (2011), 
https://www.transequality.org/sites/default/files/docs/resources/NTDS_Report.pdf) (noting that the results of 
two surveys “reveal a general lack of trust of law enforcement by the transgender community”)); see also 
ANDREA J. RITCHIE, INVISIBLE NO MORE: POLICE VIOLENCE AGAINST BLACK WOMEN AND WOMEN OF COLOR 
(2017) (examining ways in which black women, indigenous women, and other women of color, including trans 
women of color, experience racial profiling, police violence, and immigration enforcement). 
As Stephen Rushin and Jenny Carroll note, there is a “long 
and well-documented history of police officers in the United States mistreating the 
trans community.”62 
The information that is available suggests that transgender individuals experi-
ence a great deal of discrimination, harassment, and physical violence.63 In 2011, 
the National Center for Transgender Equality and the National Gay and Lesbian 
Task Force published the National Transgender Discrimination Survey, then con-
sidered the most comprehensive survey on discrimination against the trans com-
munity in the United States.64 6,450 transgender and gender non-conforming 
adults across the United States participated in this survey.65 
JAIME M. GRANT ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL., INJUSTICE AT EVERY TURN: A REPORT 
OF THE NATIONAL TRANSGENDER DISCRIMINATION SURVEY 2 (2011), https://www.transequality.org/sites/default/ 
files/docs/resources/NTDS_Report.pdf.
Ninety percent of the 
participants reported experiencing harassment, mistreatment, or discrimination at 
work for being transgender.66 Fifty-seven percent of the participants had experi-
enced serious family rejection for being transgender.67 Twenty-six percent 
reported suffering physical assaults and ten percent reported suffering sexual 
assaults for being transgender or gender nonconforming.68 
61. 
62. Stephen Rushin & Jenny Carroll, Bathroom Laws as Status Crimes, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 20–24 (2017) 
(discussing thirteen studies that surveyed trans individuals about their experiences with law enforcement abuse 
outside of the custodial setting). 
63. The absence of laws banning gender identity discrimination in many jurisdictions contributes to the 
difficulties transgender individuals encounter in employment, public housing, and interactions with police. See 
David B. Cruz, Transgender Rights After Obergefell, 84 UMKC L. REV. 693, 695 (2016) (noting that many 
people in the United States live in jurisdictions that do not ban gender identity discrimination, which “can make 
it especially challenging for transgender persons to secure employment, receive equal treatment in a range of 
public accommodations, and avoid police harassment”). 
64. Jordan Blair Woods et al., Latina Transgender Women’s Interactions with Law Enforcement in Los 
Angeles County, 7 POLICING 379, 381 (2013). 
65. 
 
66. Id. at 56. 
67. Id. at 88. 
68. Id. at 80. 
1422                            AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW                            [Vol. 57:1411 
In 2015, the National Center for Transgender Equality published an updated 
survey. The 2015 U.S. Transgender Survey is “the largest survey examining the 
experiences of transgender people in the United States.”69 27,715 transgender 
individuals (both adults and youth) participated.70 Thirteen percent reported that 
they had been subjected to a physical attack just within the past year.71 When 
asked about the probable reason for being attacked and who attacked them, nine 
percent responded that they were physically attacked specifically because of 
their transgender status.72 Among transgender individuals who came out to their 
families, ten percent of respondents reported that a family member acted vio-
lently towards them because of their transgender status.73 Five percent reported 
being physically attacked by strangers in public because of their transgender 
status.74 
When asked how many times they were physically attacked within the past year, 
forty-five percent reported they were attacked once, twenty-five percent were 
attacked twice, thirteen percent were attacked three times, and sixteen percent 
were attacked four or more times.75 
Respondents were also asked to specify how they were attacked.76 Appro- 
ximately three-quarters of the transgender individuals who had been physically 
attacked within the year “reported that someone had grabbed, punched, or choked 
them.”77 Twenty-nine percent reported that someone “threw an object at them, like 
a rock or a bottle.”78 Three percent reported being attacked with a gun.79 
Transgender women of color, particularly black and Latina women, “were nearly 
four times as likely to report that they were attacked with a gun.”80 
Sexual violence against transgender individuals is also a pervasive problem. 
Nearly half of the respondents reported having been sexually assaulted at some 
point in their lifetime.81 When asked who committed the sexual assault against 
them, nearly one-third reported that they had been sexually assaulted by a 
69. THE REPORT OF THE 2015 TRANSGENDER SURVEY, supra note 29, at 4. 
70. Id. at 18. 
71. Id. at 202. It appears respondents were only asked whether they had experienced a physical attack during 
the past year, not whether they had experienced a physical attack at any time during their lifetime. 
72. Id. at 203. 
73. Id. at 71. 
74. Id. at 203. 






81. Id. at 205 (noting “[n]early half (47%) of respondents have been sexually assaulted at some point in their 
lifetime”). This included “unwanted sexual contact, such as oral, genital, or anal contact, penetration, forced 
fondling, [and] rape.” Id. The 2015 Transgender Survey also found that “transgender men (51%) and non-binary 
people with female on their original birth certificate (58%) [were] more likely to have been sexually assaulted, in 
contrast to transgender women (37%) and non-binary people with male on their original birth certificate (41%).” 
Id. The term “non-binary” is “used by some to describe people whose gender is not exclusively male or female, 
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stranger.82 More than a third reported “that a current or former partner had sexually 
assaulted them.”83 One-quarter reported they had been sexually assaulted by a 
relative.84 
The 2015 survey also found a significant amount of discrimination, harassment, 
and physical violence directed against transgender youth. The vast majority (77%) 
of trans youth who were either open about their gender identity or were perceived 
as transgender while in elementary, middle, or high school (K-12) experienced one 
or more negative experiences, such as verbal harassment, physical or sexual vio-
lence, or prohibitions against dressing according to their gender identity.85 The sur-
vey also found that transgender students in higher education experience a 
significant amount of verbal, physical, or sexual harassment. Of those surveyed, 
approximately one in every four transgender students in higher education reported 
some form of verbal, physical, or sexual harassment in college or vocational school 
because of their status as a transgender individual.86 
II. THE TRANS PANIC DEFENSE 
The term “trans panic defense” describes a criminal defense strategy in which a 
male defendant charged with murdering a transgender female victim will claim 
that the discovery that the victim was biologically male was so upsetting that he 
panicked and lost his self-control.87 The defendant will further claim he should be 
acquitted of murder and instead convicted of a lesser offense, such as voluntary 
manslaughter.88 Trans panic arguments typically are used to bolster a provocation 
defense, but have also been used to support mental defect defenses, such as tempo-
rary insanity or diminished capacity.89 
The defendant might argue that he temporarily became insane upon learning that the victim was born male 
or he might claim that he lacked the specific intent to kill required for murder because learning that the victim 
was born male diminished his mental capacity. For example, in one case out of Fresno, California, a twenty- 
three-year-old man named Estanislao Martinez stabbed the victim, a Latina transgender female, twenty times 
with a pair of scissors after discovering the victim was biologically male. RIKI WILCHINS & TANEIKA TAYLOR, 
GENDER PUB. ADVOC. COAL., 50 UNDER 30: MASCULINITY AND THE WAR ON AMERICA’S YOUTH, A HUMAN 
RIGHTS REPORT 11 (2006). Apparently, Martinez met Joel Robles, whom Martinez thought was born female, on a 
blind date and went back to Martinez’s apartment to engage in sexual activity. Man Gets Four Years in Prison 
for Transgender Slaying, FOX NEWS (Oct. 1, 2005), https://www.foxnews.com/story/man-gets-four-years-in- 
prison-for-transgender-slaying [https://perma.cc/GSP3-YU7V]. In court, Martinez’s lawyer argued that his client 
realized Robles was a man after they engaged in some sexual activity. Id. His client then flew into a rage, and 
“the panic (his client) felt was a sort of temporary insanity brought on by the shock of realizing he had been 
duped by a transgender man.” Id. Martinez’s attorney argued that this rage meant that what his client did was not 
In rare cases, a defendant may attempt to 
including those who identify as having no gender, [as] a gender other than male or female, or [as] more than one 
gender.” Id. at 40. 
82. Id. at 206. 
83. Id. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. at 131–32. 
86. Id. at 136. 
87. See Lee & Kwan, supra note 24, at 77. 
88. Id. 
89. 
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use a trans panic argument in connection with a self-defense claim.90 
In State v. Camacho, No. A-5189-07T4, 2010 WL 3218888 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 16, 2010), for 
example, according to the defendant’s statement to police, the victim was dressed in feminine attire and offered 
the defendant twenty dollars to have sex. See JORDAN BLAIR WOODS ET AL., WILLIAMS INST., MODEL 
LEGISLATION FOR ELIMINATING THE GAY AND TRANS PANIC DEFENSES 12 (2016), https://williamsinstitute.law. 
ucla.edu/research/transgender-issues/model-legislation-for-eliminating-the-gay-and-trans-panic-defenses/. After 
entering the victim’s apartment, the victim undressed. Id. The defendant claimed he got angry when he saw the 
victim’s genitals and thought the victim was going to grab a knife the defendant had in his jacket, so he stabbed 
and killed the victim. Id. The defendant was found guilty of first-degree murder. Id. On appeal, the defendant 
argued that his trial attorney was ineffective for, among other things, failing to request an instruction on self- 
defense and imperfect self-defense. Id. The appellate court rejected the defendant’s ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim. Id. 
Because the 
most common way trans panic arguments operate is within the structure of the 
defense of provocation, I focus on how trans panic fits within the doctrinal site of 
the provocation defense. I start by providing an overview of the defense of 
provocation. 
A. The Defense of Provocation 
The defense of provocation, also known as the heat of passion defense, is a par-
tial defense to murder.91 If the jury finds that the defendant was provoked into a 
heat of passion by legally adequate provocation, it can acquit the defendant of mur-
der and instead convict him of voluntary manslaughter, a lesser crime with a corre-
spondingly lighter sentence than the sentence for murder.92 
“Legally adequate provocation” is a legal term of art. At early common law, 
legally adequate provocation existed if and only if the defendant fell within one of 
the following categories: “(1) an aggravated assault or battery, (2) the observation 
of a serious crime against a close relative, (3) an illegal arrest, (4) mutual combat, 
or (5) catching one’s wife in the act of adultery.”93 Only these categories of 
provocative acts were recognized at early common law as legally adequate 
provocation.94 
murder. Id. Martinez was allowed to plead guilty to voluntary manslaughter, and while he could have been 
sentenced to eleven years, he was instead sentenced to four years in prison. Id. Three years were for the voluntary 
manslaughter charge and an additional year was added for using scissors as a weapon. See Wodda & Panfil, 
supra note 18, at 954–55. 
90. 
91. CYNTHIA LEE, MURDER AND THE REASONABLE MAN: PASSION AND FEAR IN THE CRIMINAL COURTROOM 
25 (NYU Press 2003). A partial defense is one in which the defendant is acquitted of the charged offense but 
found guilty of a lesser offense. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 16.01, at 193 n.2 
(Carolina Academic Press, 8th ed. 2018) (noting that “[s]ome defenses result in the defendant’s conviction of a 
lesser offense [and] are . . . described as ‘partial defenses’”). 
92. DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 91, § 31.07[A], at 501 (noting that “[a]t common 
law, an intentional homicide committed in ‘sudden heat of passion’ as the result of ‘adequate provocation’ 
mitigates the offense to voluntary manslaughter”). 
93. CYNTHIA LEE & ANGELA HARRIS, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 343 (4th ed. 2019) (explaining 
the circumstances under which one could claim the provocation mitigation under the early common law’s 
categorical approach); see also DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 91, § 31.07[B][2][a], at 
502. 
94. DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 91, §31.07[B][2][a], at 502 (noting that 
“[c]ommon law courts developed a small and fixed list of categories that met this standard [of constituting 
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The early common law’s rigid categorical approach to provocation came under 
increasing criticism at least in part because it was thought unfair to male murder 
defendants who could not meet its stringent requirements.95 In the late 1800s, 
many jurisdictions began to abandon the early common law approach to provoca-
tion, replacing it with an approach that employed a reasonableness requirement to 
determine which types of provocation were legally adequate.96 In most jurisdic-
tions today, legally adequate provocation exists if the hypothetical reasonable per-
son in the defendant’s shoes would have been97 provoked into a heat of passion.98 
adequate provocation]”); LEE & HARRIS, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 93, at 343 (“Only 
these categories of provocative acts were recognized at early common law as adequate provocation[.]”). 
95. LEE, MURDER AND THE REASONABLE MAN, supra note 91, at 24 (“Not only was the early categorical 
approach seen as unfair to unmarried men who claimed they were provoked into killing their unfaithful fiancées 
or girlfriends, it was also thought to be unfair to married men who learned of their wives’ adultery through third 
parties or through their wives’ own confessions.”). The early categorical approach was also very unfair to wives 
charged with murdering their unfaithful husbands after catching them in the act of adultery, since the last 
category only applied to husbands who killed their unfaithful wives after catching them in the act of adultery. But 
this unfairness to female defendants did not move courts to abandon the categorical approach. Id. (“Eventually, 
the early common law’s highly rigid categorical approach to provocation came under increasing criticism, not 
because it was seen as unfair to women who killed their unfaithful husbands, but because it was thought unfair to 
male murder defendants who could not meet the early common law’s stringent requirements.”). 
96. LEE, MURDER AND THE REASONABLE MAN, supra note 91, at 25 (noting that “[f]or a defendant to receive 
the provocation mitigation, the jury must find that (1) the defendant was actually provoked into a heat of passion, 
(2) the reasonable person in the defendant’s shoes would have been so provoked, (3) the defendant did not cool 
off, and (4) the reasonable person in the defendant’s shoes would not have cooled off”); see also DRESSLER, 
UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 91, § 31.07[B][2][b][i], at 503 (noting that adequate provocation 
under modern law may be found if the provocation “would render any ordinarily prudent person for the time 
being incapable of that cool reflection that otherwise makes it murder” or “might render ordinary men, of fair 
average disposition, liable to act rashly or without due deliberation or reflection, and from passion, rather than 
judgment”) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
97. There appears to be some debate over whether the modern test focuses on whether the reasonable person 
“would have” been provoked into a heat of passion or whether it simply requires that the reasonable person 
“could have” been provoked into a heat of passion. Most of the available sources suggest the question is whether 
the reasonable person “would have” been provoked. Id.; see also In re Standard Jury Instructions In Criminal 
Cases—Report No. 2013-02, 137 So.3d 995, 997–98 (Fla. 2014) (authorizing changes to Florida’s standard jury 
instructions, which state that adequate provocation requires that “a reasonable person would have lost normal 
self-control and would have been driven by a blind and unreasoning fury”) (emphasis added); State v. Herrick, 30 
A.3d 1285, 1291 (Vt. 2011) (affirming jury instructions that “‘[a]dequate provocation’ refers to the degree of 
provocation that would cause a reasonable person to lose self-control and to act without thinking”) (emphasis 
added); People v. Pouncey, 471 N.W.2d 346, 389 (Mich. 1991) (“In addition, the provocation must be adequate, 
namely, that which would cause the reasonable person to lose control.”) (emphasis added). A few courts have 
used the word “might” to describe the test, supporting the view that the test is whether the reasonable person 
“could have” been provoked. See, e.g., Dandova v. State, 72 P.3d 325, 332 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003) (“Loosely 
speaking, a provocation was adequate if it was ‘such as might naturally induce a reasonable [person] in the 
passion of the moment to lose self-control and commit the act on impulse and without reflection.’”) (emphasis 
added) (citation omitted); State v. Tucker, No. W2000-02220-CCA-R3CD, 2002 WL 31624933, at *14 (Tenn. 
Crim. App. Nov. 20, 2002) (affirming jury instruction where the judge instructed that “[a]dequate provocation is 
one that excites such anger as might obscure the reason or dominate the volition of an ordinary reasonable man”) 
(emphasis added). 
98. DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 91, § 31.07[B][2][b][i], at 503. This test is often 
called the modern reasonable person test, although it is sometimes referred to as the modern common law test to 
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The critical question in provocation cases is whether the provocation was legally 
adequate or reasonable.99 However, as Jonathan Witmer-Rich notes, legal scholars 
have struggled for years to articulate principled standards to assess the reasonable-
ness or adequacy of the provocation.100 
An alternative formulation of the provocation defense was proposed in 1962 by 
the American Law Institute (“ALI”). Under the ALI’s Model Penal Code 
(“MPC”), a killing that would otherwise be murder constitutes manslaughter if the 
killing “is committed under the influence of extreme mental or emotional 
disturbance for which there is reasonable explanation or excuse.”101 Unlike the 
modern reasonable person test for provocation, the MPC’s extreme mental or emo-
tional disturbance defense does not assess the adequacy of the provocation by ask-
ing whether an objectively reasonable person would have been provoked into a 
heat of passion. Rather, the MPC specifies that “reasonableness . . . shall be deter-
mined from the viewpoint of a person in the actor’s situation under the circumstan-
ces as he believes them to be.”102 In other words, the MPC expressly adopts a 
subjective approach to the reasonableness inquiry.103 Only ten to twelve states 
have adopted the MPC’s approach to provocation.104 
differentiate it from the early common law test or simply the common law test to differentiate it from the MPC 
approach to provocation. 
99. ROGER M. GOLDMAN ET AL., 4 CRIMINAL LAW ADVOCACY §68.03 (2019) (noting that “[the] provocation 
must be recognized as adequate by law”). 
100. Jonathan Witmer-Rich, The Heat of Passion and Blameworthy Reasons to Be Angry, 55 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 409, 422–37 (2018). Witmer-Rich suggests that the correct standard is one in which courts would ask 
whether the defendant’s reason for becoming extremely angry is itself blameworthy. Id. at 461. 
101. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1962). 
102. Id. 
103. The Model Penal Code’s subjective approach makes it easier for defendants claiming the mitigation to 
obtain favorable results than if they were in jurisdictions applying the modern reasonable person test for 
provocation. See Victoria Nourse, Passion’s Progress: Modern Law Reform and the Provocation Defense, 106 
YALE L.J. 1331, 1354–55 (1997). 
104. Michal Buchhandler-Raphael, Fear-Based Provocation, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 1719, 1728 (2018) (noting 
that only twelve jurisdictions have adopted the MPC’s extreme emotional disturbance defense) (citing Paul H. 
Robinson, Murder Mitigation in the Fifty-Two American Jurisdictions: A Case Study in Doctrinal Interrelation 
Analysis, 47 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 19, 25 (2014) (listing Hawaii, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, Arkansas, 
Connecticut, Delaware, Kentucky, New York, North Dakota, Oregon and Utah as the twelve states that have 
adopted something like the MPC’s extreme mental or emotional disturbance defense)). The number of states that 
utilize the MPC’s extreme emotional disturbance defense may be even fewer than twelve. It appears Nevada and 
Connecticut have switched to the modern test for provocation since legislation in these states banning the gay 
and trans panic defenses do not use the words “extreme mental or emotional disturbance” but instead use the 
words “provocation” or “heat of passion.” See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 193.225(1) (2019) (providing that an 
alleged heat of passion or provocation is not objectively reasonable “if it resulted from the discovery of, 
knowledge about or potential disclosure of the actual or perceived sexual orientation or gender identity or 
expression of the victim”); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-16 (2019) (noting that “[j]ustification . . . does not include 
provocation that resulted solely from the discovery of, knowledge about or potential disclosure of the victim’s 
actual or perceived sex, sexual orientation or gender identity or expression”). 
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B. The “Gay Panic Defense” 
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, male defendants charged with murdering gay 
men began to utilize the concept of “homosexual panic” in connection with claims 
of insanity or diminished capacity.105 These defendants would argue that the gay 
male victim’s unwanted, nonviolent sexual advance triggered in them a violent 
psychotic reaction, causing them to lose control over their mental abilities.106 Most 
of these early claims of gay panic to support a mental defect defense like insanity 
were not successful.107 
As time went on, male murder defendants charged with killing gay men started 
using the idea of homosexual panic as part of a provocation defense with more suc-
cess.108 
Id. at 500–05. The actual number of cases in which gay panic has been asserted is uncertain since most 
criminal cases end in a guilty plea. See Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 143 (2012) (noting that “[n]inety-seven 
percent of federal convictions and ninety-four percent of state convictions are the result of guilty pleas” and plea 
negotiations are shrouded in secrecy). The gay panic cases that are known are those that have received extensive 
press coverage and those that are published in court opinions. Most successful gay panic cases, however, are not 
likely to be in published court opinions. If the defendant gets the voluntary manslaughter verdict that he was 
seeking, he is not likely to appeal his conviction. The government is also unlikely to appeal because the double 
jeopardy clause prohibits the government from retrying a defendant for the same offense. Nonetheless, one 
researcher found 189 appellate criminal cases between 1952 and 2005 in which the defense referenced unwanted 
gay sexual advances—either as part of a formal trial strategy or in their description of the facts—and was 
successful in gaining the defendant a reduced sentence in 13% of these cases. See Jessica M. Salerno et al., 
Excusing Murder? Conservative Jurors’ Acceptance of The Gay-Panic Defense, 21 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 
24, 25 (2015) (citing E. Harrington, Poster, American Psychology-Law Society Conference, San Antonio, TX, 
Provocation as a Murder Defense: An Analysis of Appellate Cases Involving Homosexual or “Gay Panic” 
(March 2009)). According to another source, gay panic strategies have been asserted in at least forty-five cases 
nationwide between 2002 and 2016. See James Nichols, American Bar Association Votes to Curtail Use of ‘Gay 





These defendants would argue that a nonviolent sexual advance by their 
male victim provoked them into a heat of passion, causing them to lose control 
over their actions.109 
105. State v. Thornton, 532 S.W.2d 37, 44 (Mo. 1975) (noting that defense was arguing defendant was in a 
state of “homosexual panic” at the time of the stabbing); People v. Parisie, 287 N.E.2d 310, 313 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1972) (noting that defense was arguing insanity based on “homosexual panic”); People v. Rodriguez, 64 Cal. 
Rptr. 253, 255 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967) (noting that psychiatrist for the defense testified that defendant was acting as 
a result of acute homosexual panic brought on by his fear that the victim was molesting him). 
106. Cynthia Lee, The Gay Panic Defense, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 471, 491 (2008) (citing Duncan Osborne, 
The Homosexual Panic Defense: Are Juries Really Buying It?, LGNY NEWS (Nov. 4, 1999)). 
107. Id. at 492 (citing Robert G. Bagnall et al., Comment, Burdens on Gay Litigants and Bias in the Court 




109. Lee, The Gay Panic Defense, supra note 106, at 500–04 (discussing Schick v. Indiana, 570 N.E.2d 918 
(Ind. Ct. App. 1991), in which a male defendant successfully argued he was provoked into a heat of passion by 
his male victim’s unwanted sexual overture; and Mills v. Shepard, 445 F. Supp. 1231 (W.D.N.C. 1978), in which 
a male defendant successfully argued that he was provoked into a heat of passion by his male victim’s attempt to 
have sex with him). 
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The defendant-friendly verdicts in these early gay panic provocation cases were 
likely the product of a culture that privileged male violence over other forms of vi-
olence.110 A man who responded to a gay man’s nonviolent sexual advance with 
deadly violence was thought to be acting the way an ordinary man would react.111 
If, however, a woman had killed a man who groped her breasts and tried make a 
similar claim (i.e., “I was reasonably provoked into a heat of passion by the vic-
tim’s unwanted nonviolent sexual advance”), her claim of reasonableness would 
not have been likely to succeed given the prevailing social norms at that time. As I 
have argued in my previous scholarship, women in society were “supposed to 
accept a certain amount of unwanted male attention, and while they might frown, 
struggle, or protest, they [were] not supposed to use violence to dissuade or thwart 
men who suggest[ed] sexual interest” in these inappropriate ways.112 “[W]omen 
[were] taught to believe that a man who aggressively expresses his sexual attrac-
tion for a woman [was] merely behaving the way a man is supposed to behave”113 
and were supposed to be flattered if they were the target of unwanted male atten-
tion.114 It is not clear that this would still be the case in today’s #MeToo culture. 
Defendant-friendly verdicts were also the product of a culture that privileged 
heterosexual men over gay men. At least back then, and perhaps still today in some 
places in America, if a heterosexual man responded violently to a gay man’s sexual 
advance, he enjoyed a presumption of reasonableness.115 A heterosexual man was 
expected to become outraged if another man attempted to make a sexual advance 
upon him. If, however, a gay man were to respond violently to an unwanted non-
violent sexual advance by a woman, given societal norms privileging heterosexual-
ity, most people would probably say that he was not acting as an ordinary man 
would have acted, even if the woman’s nonviolent sexual advance was just as of-
fensive to him as a gay man’s sexual advance might be to a heterosexual man.116 
Since I have previously written at great length about the “gay panic defense,”117 
I will now turn to the trans panic defense, a close cousin of the gay panic defense. 
Trans panic is typically asserted by a male defendant charged with murdering a 
transgender female. As explained below, the defendant in a trans panic case claims 
that the discovery that the victim was a transgender person provoked him into a 
heat of passion. 
110. Id. at 510. 
111. Id. at 505. 
112. Id. at 510. 
113. Id. 
114. Id. at 510–11. 
115. Id. at 511. 
116. Id. 
117. Lee, The Gay Panic Defense, supra note 106; see also Cynthia Lee, Masculinity on Trial: Gay Panic in 
the Criminal Courtroom, 42 SW. L. REV. 817 (2013). 
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C. The Trans Panic Defense 
A murder defendant claiming trans panic typically will allege that he became 
upset and lost his ability to control his actions upon discovering that the victim was 
a transgender female. In states that follow the modern formulation of the provoca-
tion defense, the defendant must also show that a reasonable person would have 
been provoked into a heat of passion in order to receive the mitigation from murder 
to voluntary manslaughter.118 For years, courts have equated reasonableness with 
typicality, construing the reasonable person as the ordinary or typical person.119 
Consequently, the defendant claiming trans panic will argue that the ordinary man 
in his shoes would have been provoked into a heat of passion, and therefore he 
should be found not guilty of murder, but instead guilty of voluntary manslaughter. 
It is not difficult for the defendant asserting a trans panic defense to satisfy the 
requirement that he was actually provoked into a heat of passion. All the defendant 
has to do is testify that he became so upset upon discovering the victim was a trans-
gender female that he lost his self-control. If the jury believes the defendant, the 
defendant can satisfy the “actually provoked” requirement. 
It may also not be too difficult for a defendant who claims trans panic to satisfy 
the reasonableness requirement. The defendant need only convince the jury that 
the average or ordinary man would become very upset if he discovered that an indi-
vidual he had been dating or courting was not born female.   
118. See LEE, MURDER AND THE REASONABLE MAN, supra note 91, at 25 (noting that one of the requirements 
for the provocation defense is a finding that the reasonable person in the defendant’s shoes would have been 
provoked); DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 91, § 31.07[B][2][b][i], at 503 (noting that 
adequate provocation under modern law may be found if the provocation “might render ordinary men, of fair 
average disposition, liable to act rashly . . . and from passion, rather than judgment”) (internal quotations and 
citations omitted); 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 2 SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW §15.2(b) (3d ed. 2019) (“What is really 
meant by ‘reasonable provocation’ is provocation which causes a reasonable man to lose his normal self- 
control.”). 
119. Joshua Dressler, When “Heterosexual” Men Kill “Homosexual” Men: Reflections on Provocation Law, 
Sexual Advances, and the “Reasonable Man” Standard, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 726, 753 (1995) (noting 
that “[t]he Reasonable Man in the context of provocation law . . . is more appropriately described as the Ordinary 
Man (i.e., a person who possesses ordinary human weaknesses)” as opposed to an idealized human being); see 
also People v. Beltran, 56 Cal. 4th 935, 957 (2013) (noting “[p]rovocation is adequate only when it would render 
an ordinary person of average disposition ‘liable to act rashly or without due deliberation and reflection, and 
from this passion rather than from judgment’”) (emphasis added) (quoting People v. Logan, 175 Cal. 45, 49 
(1917)); Commonwealth v. Glover, 459 Mass. 836, 841 (2011) (noting that “[r]easonable provocation is 
provocation that ‘would have been likely to produce in an ordinary person such a state of passion, anger, fear, 
fright, or nervous excitement as would eclipse his capacity for reflection or restraint’”) (emphasis added) 
(quoting Commonwealth v. Walden, 380 Mass. 724, 728 (1980)). Courts tend to equate reasonableness with 
typicality not just in provocation cases, but also in self-defense cases. See Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee, Race and 
Self-Defense: Toward a Normative Conception of Reasonableness, 81 MINN. L. REV. 367, 495 (1996) (noting 
that in self-defense cases, legal decisionmakers tend to “evaluate the reasonableness of the defendant’s beliefs 
and actions by trying to determine whether the ordinary reasonable person would have believed and acted the 
way the defendant did”). 
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While such an argument might seem absurd to many people, it would likely res-
onate with many others.120 
Americans today have more negative feelings toward trans people than other groups. See German Lopez, 
We Asked US Voters About Their Views on Transgender People. Here’s What They Said, Vox (May 24, 
2016), https://www.vox.com/2016/5/24/11746086/transgender-bathrooms-poll-survey [https://perma.cc/6NFD- 
FBFP]. One in five Americans believe that transgender individuals have a mental illness. See Samantha Allen, 
Why A Lot of Americans Don’t Want To Befriend a Transgender Person, DAILY BEAST (May 19, 2017), https:// 
www.thedailybeast.com/why-a-lot-of-americans-dont-want-to-befriend-a-transgender-person?ref=scroll [https:// 
perma.cc/6TFM-VXFG].
Aimee Wodda and Vanessa Panfil recount a familiar 
scene playing out on the Jerry Springer show that supports the suggestion that the 
average cisgender heterosexual man would react with physical violence if he found 
out that the woman to whom he was attracted was a transgender female: 
A woman sits on a stage and tells a talk show host that a man who has “liked” 
many of her pictures on Instagram has wanted to meet her for a month, but it 
had not yet happened because they live in different parts of the country. He 
called the talk show in order to facilitate their meeting, and she obliged. 
However, she tells the talk show host: “But he don’t know my secret.” When 
the host asks her what it is, she replies that she is transgender, to which the au-
dience makes loud “oooooh” noises. . . . 
The talk show host brings out her admirer. The man comes out onto the stage, 
greets the host, hugs his crush, and sits down next to her. After a brief 
exchange of hellos, she says, “Well, before we go any further, I need to letchu 
know something. Umm, I haven’t really taken it seriously because we’ve only 
been talking for a month, and we live so far, I never planned on meetin’ you, 
but I’m lettin’ you know, I was born a man.” Her admirer asks the host, “Is 
she serious, Jerry?” Before even receiving an answer, he jumps onto the 
woman, his arms swinging at her, and the show’s security guards spring into 
action as the audience erupts in cheers, hoots, laughter, and applause. . . . The 
security guards pry the combatants apart and separate them to opposite sides 
of the stage. . . . 
The woman [asks]: “Why are you so mad? We didn’t sleep together.” 
He yells, “ . . . Cuz you deceived me!”121 
Wodda and Panfil note that “segments featuring a woman who was ‘born a 
man’ and is there to reveal this to a sexual or romantic partner have been popular 
on the show”122 and that “the majority of transgender guests [on the show] are met 
with scorn, derision, disgust, anger, and violence.”123 Wodda and Panfil also point 
out that this audience reaction is not that surprising given that transgender and gen-
der nonconforming individuals are often “portrayed in the media as curiosities or  
120. 
 
121. Wodda & Panfil, supra note 18, at 927–28. 
122. Id. at 928. 
123. Id. at 929. Even though some aspects of the Jerry Springer show appear to be staged, such as the on stage 
fighting between guests on the show, the show appears to be tapping into an anti-trans sentiment that a large 
proportion of the audience seems to share. Id. 
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oddities, as mentally unstable persons, and/or as predators.”124 They note that “a 
general feeling of disgust or revulsion towards gender nonconforming persons may 
be . . . a contributing factor in cases of transphobic acts of violence.”125 
While trans panic arguments are usually seen in cases in which a cisgender man 
has been charged with murder and seeks mitigation of the murder charge to volun-
tary manslaughter, a cisgender man charged with manslaughter in the death of a 
transgender woman will sometimes make a similar argument in the hopes of get-
ting mitigation to an even lesser charge. For example, in the case discussed in the 
Introduction, Dixon, the man who killed Islan Nettles, a twenty-one-year-old 
African American transgender woman,126 was charged with first-degree man 
slaughter.127 As a result of a plea agreement with the prosecution, Dixon entered a 
plea of guilty to second-degree manslaughter and first-degree assault and was sen-
tenced to twelve years in prison.128 
1. Problems with the Trans Panic Defense Strategy 
Trans panic arguments are problematic for many reasons. I briefly outline some 
of those reasons here.129 
a. The Trans Panic Defense Suggests Transgender Individuals are Sexually 
Deviant 
First, trans panic arguments reinforce negative stereotypes about trans people. 
Implicit in the trans panic argument is the idea that transgender individuals are sex-
ually deviant. A homicide case involving a gender-nonconforming victim from 
Oxnard, California reflects this view.130 Brandon McInerney was a fourteen-year- 
old male who shot and killed his fifteen-year-old classmate Larry King on 
February 13, 2008.131 King was described in news reports about the case as a gay  
124. Id. at 932; see also id. at 932 n.26 (listing films in which transgender or gender nonconforming 
individuals were portrayed as predators, including Dressed to Kill, In Dreams, Psycho, The Silence of the Lambs, 
Sleepaway Camp, etc.). 
125. Id. at 931. 
126. Rankin, supra note 1. 
127. Wang, supra note 2. 
128. Rankin, supra note 1 (noting that the judge sentenced Dixon to twelve years even though the original 
plea agreement was for a seventeen-year sentence); see also Wang, supra note 2. It is difficult to know what 
motivated the government to agree to these lesser charges. Perhaps the prosecutor feared Dixon’s trans panic 
argument might convince jurors to be lenient on him. Rather than risk a complete acquittal, the prosecutor may 
have thought it better to secure a conviction on these lesser charges. 
129. For examples and explanation of these arguments in greater depth, see Lee & Kwan, supra note 24, at 
108–19. 
130. For an insightful and comprehensive examination of the trial in the Brandon McInerney case, see J. Kelly 
Strader et al., Gay Panic, Gay Victims, and the Case for Gay Shield Laws, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 1473 (2015). 
131. Catherine Saillant, Mistrial Declared in Slaying of Gay Oxnard Teen, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2011, at AA1; 
Catherine Saillant, Trial in Killing of Gay Teen Will Test New Law, L.A. TIMES, July 21, 2011, at AA1. 
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male teenager,132 and even described himself as gay,133 
Rebecca Cathcart, Boy’s Killing, Labeled a Hate Crime, Stuns a Town, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2008), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/23/us/23oxnard.html?mtrref=www.google.com&assetType=REGIWALL 
[https://perma.cc/8YLE-C335]. As a young teenager, King may not have understood the difference between 
sexual orientation and sexual identity. See JANET MOCK, REDEFINING REALNESS: MY PATH TO WOMANHOOD, 
IDENTITY, LOVE & SO MUCH MORE 80 (2014) (noting that “a trans girl who is assigned male at birth and 
attracted to boys may call herself gay for a short time—a transitional identity on her road to self-discovery”). 
but appears to have been a 
gender-nonconforming teenager or a transgender female.134 King began wearing 
makeup and high heels to school in January 2008.135 He was also planning to 
change his name from Larry to Leticia.136 
McInerney claimed that he was provoked into a heat of passion by King’s sexu-
ally provocative actions, including asking McInerney to be his Valentine a few days 
before the shooting and blowing a kiss at McInerney the day before the shooting.137 
Id.; Jim Dubreuil & Alice Gomstyn, Was Teen Shooter Victim of Bullying, Sexual Harassment?, ABC 
NEWS (Oct. 4, 2011), https://abcnews.go.com/US/teen-shooter-victim-sexual-harassment/story?id=14663570 
[https://perma.cc/7XVL-RA8N].
McInerney told one of King’s friends that she should say goodbye to King 
because she would never see him again.138 The next day, McInerney brought a 
loaded .22 caliber handgun to school, hiding it in his backpack.139 
Calif. Teen Brandon McInerney Sentenced to 21 Years for Point-Blank Murder of Gay Classmate, CBS 
NEWS (Dec. 19, 2011), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/calif-teen-brandon-mcinerney-sentenced-to-21-years-for- 
point-blank-murder-of-gay-classmate [https://perma.cc/3GE8-Y4M4]; Jim Dubreuil & Denise Martinez- 
Ramundo, Boy Who Shot Classmate at Age 14 Will Be Retried as Adult, ABC NEWS (Oct. 5, 2011), https:// 
abcnews.go.com/US/eighth-grade-shooting-larry-king-brandon-mcinerney-boys/story?id=14666577 [https:// 
perma.cc/G5Z4-WXG9].
He went into a 
classroom where King was working on a paper, walked up behind King, then shot 
King twice in the back of the head.140 
Setoodeh, supra note 135, at 45–46; Rebecca Cathcart, Boy’s Killing, Labeled a Hate Crime, Stuns a 
Town, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/23/us/23oxnard.html [https://perma.cc/ 
2GH5-WLWJ] (reporting that on the morning of February 12, Lawrence was in the school’s computer lab when 
Brandon walked into the room with a gun and shot Lawrence in the head); Ken Corbett, A Murder Over a Girl, 
HUFF. POST (Apr. 4, 2016), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/a-murder-over-a-girl_b_9595260 [https://perma.cc/ 
S92P-A6P6] (reporting that McInerney shot King twice in the back of the head); Dubreuil & Martinez-Ramundo, 
supra note 139 (reporting that teacher Dawn Boldrin reported she was in the computer lab on the day of the 
shooting when she heard a pop, saw Brandon holding a handgun, asked him what he was doing, and Brandon 
looked at her and pulled the trigger again). 
Despite the strong evidence of premeditation and deliberation that supported a 
first-degree murder conviction, the jury could not come to an agreement.141 A 
132. Catherine Saillant & Richard Winton, Retrial in Gay Youth’s Shooting to Omit Hate Allegation, L.A. 
TIMES, Oct. 6, 2011, at A1. 
133. 
134. In this documentary film about the death of Larry King, King’s friend Aliyah says, “I don’t think that 
Larry is gay. He’s transgendered. It’s a big difference.” VALENTINE ROAD 35:24 (Bunim-Murray Production & 
Eddie Schmidt Productions 2013). 








141. Catherine Saillant, Gay Teen’s Killer Takes 21-Year Deal, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2011, at AA1 
(“McInerney’s first trial ended in a hung jury in early September, with jurors torn between murder and 
manslaughter.”). 
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majority of the jurors were persuaded by the defense’s argument that McInerney 
was reasonably provoked into a heat of passion by King’s behavior and felt man-
slaughter was more appropriate than murder.142 
See Strader et al., supra note 130, at 1493; Catherine Saillant, Mistrial Declared in Slaying of Gay 
Oxnard Teen, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 2, 2011), https://www.latimes.com/local/la-xpm-2011-sep-02-la-me-0902-gay- 
student-20110902-story.html (“Jurors deadlocked 7 to 5 in favor of voluntary manslaughter in the emotional 
two-month trial[.]”); Mistrial Declared in Killing of Gay California Student, CNN (Sept. 8, 2011), [https:// 
perma.cc/R5CB-C9CW] (“The nine-woman, three-man jury panel said its last vote resulted in seven in favor of 
finding the defendant guilty of voluntary manslaughter[.]”). 
Apparently, these jurors blamed 
King for his own death and felt King had provoked McInerney into killing him. 
One juror felt so strongly that King was at fault for his own death that she took 
the time to write to the District Attorney after the trial was over. Juror No. 11 told 
the District Attorney that she felt the prosecution of McInerney was a “witch 
hunt,” writing: 
You all know this was not a hate crime. You all know the victim had a long 
history of deviant behavior. Yes, I said deviant . . . deviant behavior. . . . [The 
defendant] reacted to being bullied and being the target of Larry King’s sexual 
harassment. There was provocation.143 
The association between transgender people and the notion of sexual deviance 
is so strong that many transgender individuals are stopped by police on suspicion 
of soliciting prostitution. In fact, this happens so frequently that those in the trans-
gender community have a name for the practice: “Walking While Trans,”144 an 
analogy to “Driving While Black,” the phrase used to refer to the commonplace 
practice of police pulling over law-abiding black people on suspicion of criminal 
activity while driving.145 
b. The Trans Panic Defense Suggests the Victim Deserved to Die 
Trans panic arguments also suggest the transgender victim deserves to die. 
While the defense of provocation is usually understood to be a partial excuse, 
142. 
143. Letter from Juror No. 11 to District Attorney Gregory D. Totten (Sept. 28, 2011) (on file with author). 
The author thanks Professor Kelly Strader of the Southwestern Law School in Los Angeles, California for 
sharing this letter. 
144. Kate Greenberg, Still Hidden in the Closet: Trans Women and Domestic Violence, 27 BERKELEY J. 
GENDER L. & JUST. 198, 214 (2012) (noting that “[m]any trans women, especially trans women of color, are 
profiled as sex workers and picked up for ‘walking while trans’ in moral sweeps by the police”); Pooja Gehi, 
Gendered (In)Security: Migration and Criminalization in the Security State, 35 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 357, 368– 
69 (2012) (noting that transgender people are often profiled by the police as criminals even when they are not 
committing any crimes and that this is commonly described as “walking while trans”). 
145. David Harris, “Driving While Black” and All Other Traffic Offenses: The Supreme Court and Pretextual 
Traffic Stops, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 544, 546 (1997) (noting that “the stopping of black drivers [by 
police officers], just to see what [they] can find, has become so common in some places that this practice has its 
own name: . . . ‘driving while black’”). Some black people have even experienced being profiled while walking. 
See Paul Butler, “Walking While Black”: Encounters with the Police on My Street, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 10, 1997, 
at 23. 
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rather than a partial justification,146 the way it is deployed in trans panic cases often 
sounds in justification.147 
A justification defense is a criminal law defense in which the defendant argues 
that he did the right thing.148 The justified defendant claims he acted the way that 
society would have wanted him to act.149 Self-defense, for example, is typically 
considered a justification defense.150 An individual who kills a person who is 
attacking him and about to kill or seriously injure him acts the way society would 
expect him to act. 
An excuse defense, in contrast, is a criminal law defense in which the defendant 
admits what he did was wrong but argues he should be excused because he is not 
morally blameworthy for his wrongful conduct.151 Duress, for example, is an 
excuse defense.152 When a person commits a crime under duress, he admits that 
what he did was wrong but claims that he did it only because someone threatened 
to seriously harm him or another innocent person.153 
146. See Mitchell Berman & Ian Farrell, Provocation Manslaughter as Partial Justification and Partial 
Excuse, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1027, 1027–28 (2011) (“[T]he dominant scholarly view holds that provocation 
is best explained and defended as a partial excuse.”); Reid Griffith Fontaine, Adequate (Non)provocation and 
Heat of Passion As Excuse Not Justification, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 27, 32 (2009) (noting “the social 
cognitive argument presumes that heat of passion is a partial excuse defense”); DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING 
CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 91, §§ 31.07(C)(1)-(2)(a), (b), at 508–09. 
147. Lee & Kwan, supra note 24, at 99–100 (arguing that the provocation defense “is better viewed as one 
that includes features of both excuse and justification”); id. at 113 (noting that defendants alleging trans panic 
seek to blame the victim for her alleged deceit). 
148. DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 91, § 17.02, at 198 (noting that “justified 
conduct is conduct that under ordinary circumstances is criminal, but which under the special circumstances 
encompassed by the justification defense is not wrongful and is even, perhaps, affirmatively desirable”). 
149. Id. (“A justified act is one that ‘the law does not condemn, [but] welcomes.’”) (citation omitted). 
150. Christopher W. Behan, When Turnabout Is Fair Play: Character Evidence and Self-Defense in Homicide 
and Assault Cases, 86 OR. L. REV. 733, 739 (2007) (“Self-defense is a classic justification defense.”); Stephanie 
Spies, Malice Aforethought and Self-Defense: Mutually Exclusive Mental States?, 91 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1027, 1028 
(2016) (noting that “self-defense has been an available justification to criminal defendants since the early ages of 
the common law”). 
151. DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 91, § 16.04, at 195 (noting that “an excuse 
centers upon the actor (i.e., [the defendant]), and tries to show that the actor is not morally culpable for his 
wrongful conduct”). 
152. Steven J. Mulroy, The Duress Defense’s Uncharted Terrain: Applying It to Murder, Felony Murder, and 
the Mentally Retarded Defendant, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 159, 167 (2006) (noting that duress is considered an 
“excuse” defense); Peter Westen & James Mangiafico, The Criminal Defense of Duress: A Justification, Not an 
Excuse—and Why It Matters, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 833, 834–35 (2003) (stating that “[v]irtually no one argues 
that modern defenses of duress . . . can be rationalized as a defense of justification”). 
153. As Wayne LaFave explains: 
A person’s unlawful threat (1) which causes the defendant reasonably to believe that the only way 
to avoid imminent death or serious bodily injury to himself or to another is to engage in conduct 
which violates the literal terms of the criminal law, and (2) which causes the defendant to engage 
in that conduct, gives the defendant the defense of duress (sometimes called compulsion or coer-
cion) to the crime in question unless that crime consists of intentionally killing an innocent third 
person.  
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Provocation is usually considered an excuse defense.154 When a defendant 
asserts a trans panic argument in support of a provocation defense, however, the 
provocation defense reflects elements of both justification and excuse.155 Instead of 
admitting that what he did was wrong, a murder defendant claiming trans panic 
blames the victim for his actions, arguing that the transgender victim’s deceit 
caused him to lose self-control.156 In arguing that the average man would lose his 
self-control if he discovered that the person he was attracted to was a transgender 
female, the defendant suggests that he acted the way society expected him to act. 
The defendant also tries to excuse his actions, suggesting that he was simply acting 
under extreme circumstances, but otherwise is not a bad person. 
A blame-the-victim approach was used at the trial of two men charged with mur-
dering a transgender female teenager, Gwen (also known as Lida) Araujo, in 
California.157 
People v. Merel, No. A113056, 2009 WL 1314822, at *6–8 (Cal. Ct. App. May 12, 2009); see also Man 
Given 11 Years in Gwen Araujo’s Death, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2006), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la- 
xpm-2006-aug-26-me-sentence26-story.html [https://perma.cc/ZCE5-DJN3].
Araujo, who was seventeen years old,158 
Carolyn Marshall, Two Guilty of Murder in Death of a Transgender Teenager, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 
2005), https://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/13/us/two-guilty-of-murder-in-death-of-a-transgender-teenager.html 
[https://perma.cc/S7Z9-KQ22]; Malaika Fraley, Gwen Araujo’s Murder 14 Years Later: Transgender Teen’s 
Killers Face Parole, EAST BAY TIMES (Oct. 14, 2016), https://www.eastbaytimes.com/2016/10/14/the-murder- 
of-gwen-araujo/ [https://perma.cc/24LV-QZUB] (“Sylvia Guerrero had never even heard the word ‘transgender’ 
until her 17-year-old daughter Gwen Araujo, born a son named Eddie, was brutally murdered.”); Man Given 11 
Years in Gwen Araujo’s Death, supra note 157 (noting that Araujo was seventeen years-old when she was 
killed). 
had been sexually intimate 
with Jose Merel and Michael Magidson, engaging in oral and anal sex with each of 
them separately.159 Merel and Magidson began to suspect that Araujo was not born 
female when she repeatedly refused their attempts to have vaginal intercourse.160 
2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 9.7 (3d ed. 2019). The “rationale of the defense of 
duress is that the defendant ought to be excused when he ‘is the victim of a threat that a person of reasonable 
moral strength could not fairly be expected to resist.’” Id. (citation omitted); see also 1 NINTH CIRCUIT CRIMINAL 
HANDBOOK § 8.04 (2019) (“In general, a duress defense asserts that while the defendant committed the act that 
constitutes the offense, it should be excused because his will was overborne by threats from another person. . . . 
[A] duress defense requires the defendant to show: (1) an immediate threat of death or serious bodily [harm]; 
(2) a well-founded fear that the threat would be carried out; and (3) that there was no reasonable opportunity to 
escape the threatened harm.”). 
154. Joshua Dressler, Provocation: Partial Justification or Partial Excuse?, 51 MOD. L. REV. 467, 469 (1987) 
(noting that the defense of provocation is usually viewed as a partial excuse). 
155. LEE, MURDER AND THE REASONABLE MAN, supra note 91, at 227–29 (arguing that the defense of 
provocation contains elements of both justification and excuse); A.J. Ashworth, The Doctrine of Provocation, 35 
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 292, 307 (1976) (arguing that the provocation defense has elements of both justification and 
excuse). 




159. Merel, 2009 WL 1314822, at *1. 
160. Id. The teens had noticed Araujo had very large hands and what appeared to be an Adam’s apple. They 
became even more suspicious that Araujo was not biologically female when they spoke with each other and 
found out Araujo had told one of them that she was menstruating to avoid having sexual intercourse with him, 
and told the other she was menstruating just two weeks later, id., even though a menstrual period usually lasts 
less than seven days. 
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One night during a party at Merel’s house,161 Magidson took Araujo into the bath-
room to try to confirm Araujo’s biological sex.162 When Araujo told Magidson not 
to touch her, Magidson left the bathroom and asked a friend, Nicole Brown, to find 
out whether Araujo was a man or a woman.163 Brown went into the bathroom 
where she felt Araujo’s groin area, then ran from the bathroom screaming that 
Araujo was a man.164 When Araujo emerged from the bathroom, Magidson put his 
arm around her throat and choked her.165 
Merel, 2009 WL 1314822, at *3; see also Daisy Hernández, “She Wanted to be Normal. We Both Did”: 
Why Gender, Sexuality, and Desire Matter, SALON (Oct. 18, 2014), https://www.salon.com/2014/10/18/ 
she_wanted_to_be_normal_we_both_did_why_gender_sexuality_and_desire_matter/ [https://perma.cc/4WTQ- 
6KJK] (reporting that Magidson dragged Araujo into the living room). 
Merel grabbed a can of food and hit 
Araujo’s head repeatedly with the can so hard that he dented it.166 According to the 
prosecution, he then left the room, came back with a frying pan, and hit Araujo 
again on the crown of her head.167 Magidson followed by punching and kneeing 
Araujo in the face; she died later that night.168 
Merel and Magidson were arrested and charged with first-degree murder.169 
They admitted to killing Araujo, but argued that the discovery that Araujo was bio-
logically male provoked them into a heat of passion.170 At trial, Magidson’s attor-
ney, Michael Thorman, argued that Magidson’s discovery that Araujo was 
biologically male and that he had unknowingly engaged in homosexual sex incited 
his revulsion and rage.171 Placing the blame for his client’s violence on Araujo and 
using the name Eddie, which was the name given to Araujo at birth, rather than 
Araujo’s preferred name, Thorman told the jury, “This crime didn’t occur because 
Mike had a bias. It happened because of the discovery of what Eddie had done.”172 
Suggesting that Araujo had deceived Magidson about her sex and thus betrayed 
him, Thorman concluded: “This is a case . . . about . . . the tragic results when that 
deception and betrayal were discovered.”173 The jury could not agree on a verdict, 
with some jurors favoring first-degree murder and others favoring second-degree 
161. Id. at *2. 
162. John M. Glionna, Keeping Focus on Victim in Retrial, L.A. TIMES, July 5, 2005, at B1. 
163. Id. 
164. Id. (reporting that Brown felt Araujo’s genitals and ran from the bathroom screaming); Merel, 2009 WL 
1314822, at *3 (stating that Brown claimed she had felt Araujo and yelled that she was a man). 
165. 
166. Merel, 2009 WL 1314822, at *3. 
167. Id. At trial, Merel testified that he did not hit Araujo with a frying pan. Telephone Conversation with 
William DuBois, Merel’s attorney (Nov. 2, 2019). 
168. Merel, 2009 WL 1314822, at *4, *8. 
169. Id. at *9. The information in the first case brought against Merel and Magidson included a hate crime 
allegation as well. Id. The jury, however, rejected the hate crime allegation “because some panelists believed that 
the defendants killed Araujo not necessarily because of her gender orientation, but simply to ‘cover up a situation 
that had gotten out of control.’” Henry K. Lee, Manslaughter Ruled Out, Araujo Juror Says, S.F. CHRON., Sept 
14, 2005, at B1. 
170. Yomi S. Wronge, Mistrial in Killing of Transgender Teen: Jury Deadlocks on Issue of Premeditation, 
SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, June 23, 2004, at A1. 
171. Vicki Haddock, ‘Gay Panic’ Defense in Araujo Case, S.F. CHRON., May 16, 2004, at E1. 
172. Id. 
173. Id. 
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murder, so the judge declared a mistrial.174 On retrial before a different jury, Merel 
and Magidson were found guilty of second-degree murder.175 
2. Motivations for the Defendant’s Violence in Trans Panic Cases 
a. The Defendant’s Fear of Being Seen as Gay 
In a trans panic case, there are several possible motivations for the defendant’s 
violent reaction, none of which should be seen as legally adequate to support a 
provocation defense.176 First, the defendant’s violence may be motivated by his 
fear of being seen as gay.177 Angela Harris, Frank Rudy Cooper, Ann McGinley, 
and others in the field of masculinity studies have observed that men in our society 
are socialized to believe that being a man means not being a woman and not being 
gay.178 Since the defendant thinks the transgender woman is a man masquerading 
as a woman, he may feel that his being attracted to a transgender female threatens 
his masculine identity by exposing him as a man who likes other men and is there-
fore gay.179 
As I have noted in the past, killing the transgender woman affirms the defend-
ant’s sense of masculinity, at least in his mind, in at least two ways. First, the de-
fendant shows others that he is disgusted with the thought of being attracted to 
another man, and therefore he cannot be gay.180 Second, the defendant demon-
strates his masculinity by acting with aggression and physical force, traits typically 
associated with masculine identity.181 
174. Wronge, Mistrial in Killing of Transgender Teen, supra note 170 (noting that in Merel’s case, two jurors 
voted in favor of first-degree murder while ten jurors voted against first-degree murder, and in Magidson’s case, 
seven jurors voted in favor of first-degree murder and five jurors voted against first-degree murder). 
175. Yomi S. Wronge, Two Found Guilty in Slaying of Teen—Mistrial Declared for Other Defendant in 
Transgender Case, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Sept. 13, 2005, at 1A. 
176. Lee & Kwan, supra note 24, at 108–19. 
177. Id. at 109–11. 
178. Angela P. Harris, Gender, Violence, Race, and Criminal Justice, 52 STAN. L. REV. 777, 786–87 (2000) 
(recognizing the argument of some queer theorists that in forming masculine identity, “not being a ‘faggot’ is as 
important to being a man as not being a woman”); Frank Rudy Cooper, Our First Unisex President?: Black 
Masculinity and Obama’s Feminine Side, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 633, 647–48 (2009) (observing that a central 
feature of masculinity is the need to denigrate those who are not considered masculine, i.e., women, gays, and 
racial minorities); Ann C. McGinley, Work, Caregiving, and Masculinities, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 703, 707 
(2011) (noting that for many men, being a man requires proving that “one is not feminine or a girl, and that one is 
not gay”). 
179. For example, in the Dixon (Islan Nettles) case discussed above, Dixon admitted that he lashed out at 
Nettles only after his friends started mocking him for flirting with a transgender person. Dixon’s fear of being 
seen as gay by his friends appears to be what provoked him to punch and kick Nettles. See supra text 
accompanying notes 7–8, 16–17. 
180. Lee & Kwan, supra note 24, at 110; see also Martha C. Nussbaum, “Secret Sewers of Vice,” Disgust, 
Bodies, and the Law, in THE PASSIONS OF LAW 19, 35–38 (Susan Bandes ed. 1999) (questioning whether “disgust 
at an attempted homosexual seduction provide(s) a legally adequate basis for mitigation” from murder to 
manslaughter). 
181. Lee & Kwan, supra note 24, at 110 (noting that some men demonstrate their masculinity by exhibiting 
physical strength and aggression). 
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The Islan Nettles case discussed in the Introduction illustrates this “fear of being 
seen as gay” motivation. Recall that James Dixon was initially attracted to Nettles, 
crossing the street to ask her for her name.182 Only after he heard his friends mock-
ing him for flirting with a “guy” did Dixon attack Nettles, beating her with such 
force that her face was battered beyond recognition.183 
The “fear of being gay” motivation was also present in the Gwen Araujo case 
discussed above.184 Jose Merel’s attorney presented testimony at trial suggesting 
that Merel became upset when he first started suspecting Araujo might have been 
born male and thought his sexual attraction to this person who might be biologi-
cally male meant he was gay.185 When his suspicions were confirmed at the party, 
Merel’s initial reaction was to vomit and then cry.186 When his brother and a friend 
tried to console him, Merel kept saying that he couldn’t believe he was gay.187 
According to Merel’s attorney, Merel was quite fond of Araujo and had developed 
a romantic attachment to her.188 
William H. DuBois, Criminal Defense Att’y, Remarks at University of California-Hastings College of 
the Law Symposium on Hate Crimes: Combating Gay & Transgender “Panic” Strategies (July 20–21, 2006). The 
author was a speaker at this Symposium and attended the panel at which Bill DuBois, Merel’s attorney, and 
Michael Thorman, Magidson’s attorney, spoke; see also Zak Szymanski, DA Convenes ‘Panic’ Conference, BAY 
AREA REP. (July 26, 2006), https://www.ebar.com/news///237163.
When he discovered that Araujo was biologically 
male, Merel experienced a “crisis of self-conception.”189 Finding out that his love 
interest had a penis made him doubt his own masculinity and heterosexuality.190 
In another case, a man named Paul Moore killed a seventeen-year-old transgen-
der woman named Nireah Johnson after discovering that she was born male.191 
Johnson and her friend, Brandie Coleman, met Moore and his friend, Curtis Ward, 
at a gas station parking lot.192 Johnson and Moore spoke briefly and exchanged 
phone numbers.193 Moore allowed Johnson to hug and kiss him on the cheek during 
this encounter.194 
182. See supra text accompanying note 2. 
183. See supra text accompanying notes 4–5. 
184. See supra text accompanying notes 157–75. 
185. People v. Merel, No. A113056, 2009 WL 1314822, at *2, *6 (Cal. Ct. App. May 12, 2009). 
186. Id. at *7. 
187. Id. at *6. 
188. 
 
189. Id.; see also Telephone Conversation with William DuBois, Criminal Defense Att’y, November (Nov. 2, 
2019) (confirming that, at Merel’s second trial, DuBois argued that Merel experienced a “crisis of self- 
conception” when he realized Araujo was born male); Szymanski, supra note 188 (DuBois stating that his client 
“experienced a personal crisis”). In his motion for a new trial on behalf of Merel, DuBois argued that his client 
“acted rashly, from passion and not from reason” and that “Merel was caused by that passion to question his 
entire self-concept. His passion was provoked by the deceased’s fraudulent and felonious conduct in sexually 
deceiving him into committing sodomy.” See Notice of Motion and Motion for New Trial, People v. Merel, No. 
134583 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. Jan. 5, 2006) (on file with author). 
190. Lee & Kwan, supra note 24, at 111. 
191. See Moore v. State, 827 N.E.2d 631 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). 
192. Id. at 634. 
193. Id. 
194. Id. 
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Three days later, around 12:51 a.m., Johnson and Coleman visited the men at 
Moore’s home.195 It is not clear why, but Moore had begun to suspect that Johnson 
was not born female.196 Before going out to meet Johnson and Coleman in the liv-
ing room, Moore, irate, upset, and holding a handgun, asked Ward whether 
“Nireah (Johnson) [was] a man or a female.”197 Ward told Moore that Johnson 
“looked like a woman to him.”198 This response did not satisfy Moore, who went 
out to the living room and proceeded to interrogate Johnson about her biological 
sex for forty minutes.199 
When Johnson went to use the bathroom, Moore followed her and discovered 
that she was biologically male.200 Remarking “[m]an, this is a boy,” Moore told his 
friend Ward that his manhood had been violated because Johnson had kissed 
him.201 Moore then asked Johnson, “What did you think, I was a faggot?”202 
Moore and Ward tied Johnson’s and her friend Coleman’s hands behind their 
backs with some wire.203 Moore put Johnson and Coleman in the back of his Jeep 
and drove to a small park where he shot and killed them.204 He then set fire to the 
Jeep with the two women inside to try to “cover his tracks.”205 
Moore’s comment, “What did you think, I was a faggot?,” shows that he feared 
others, including Ward, might think he was gay. By killing Johnson, Moore could 
demonstrate his masculinity and show Ward not only that he was not gay but also 
that he was disgusted with the thought of having been attracted to Johnson once he 
discovered that she was biologically male. Acting with brutal physical force was 
another way Moore could demonstrate his masculine identity. 
b. Enforcement of Gender Norms 
The defendant who kills a transgender woman after discovering that she is bio-
logically male may also be motivated by an extreme discomfort with gender non-
conformity.206 His act of killing may reflect his desire to enforce prevailing gender 
norms that align sex with gender and masculine identity with heterosexual 










205. Id. Moore was charged with two counts of murder, two counts of felony criminal confinement, and one 
count of felony arson. Id. at 636. After a jury trial, he was found guilty as charged and sentenced to 120 years in 
prison. Id. He appealed his conviction and sentence, but the Court of Appeals affirmed both his conviction and 
sentence. Id. at 641, 643 (concluding that “the State presented sufficient evidence from which a jury could find 
Moore guilty beyond a reasonable doubt” and that the 120-year sentence was not inappropriate “given his cold- 
blooded execution and subsequent burning of the victims”). 
206. Lee & Kwan, supra note 24, at 111. 
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orientation.207 As Aaron Norton and Gregory Herek explain, “[T]ransgender iden-
tities pose a challenge to the widespread assumptions that gender and biological 
sex are binary categories[.]”208 “Most people assume that a person born with male 
genitalia is a man and a person born with female genitalia is a woman.”209 Norton 
and Herek note that transgender individuals disrupt the “stability of both gender 
and sexual orientation categories[.]”210 Even though the transgender woman who 
enjoys sex with men is heterosexual, the defendant sees her as a gay man because 
she is biologically male. 
A number of studies suggest that men who self-identify as heterosexual are less 
positive towards gay men and homosexuality in general when they feel their mas-
culine identity is under threat. For example, in one study, heterosexual men who 
were falsely informed that their personality test scores were more typical to those 
of women than those of other men expressed more negative views of homosexual-
ity than men who had not been so informed.211 In another study, heterosexual men 
who were told that their personalities were significantly less masculine than the av-
erage man’s personality exhibited higher levels of aggression toward a gay work 
partner than heterosexual men who were told their personalities were about the 
same as the average man’s personality.212 
Given these studies, it is likely that men who self-identify as heterosexual and 
kill trans women with whom they have been sexually intimate do so in part to 
restore their sense of masculinity. For example, in one case, a thirty-two-year-old 
man named Allen Andrade killed an eighteen-year-old transgender woman named 
Angie Zapata and claimed he was provoked into a heat of passion after learning 
that Zapata was biologically male.213 
Valerie Richardson, Man Gets Life in Transgender Teen’s Death, WASH. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2009), https:// 
m.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/apr/23/man-gets-life-in-transgender-teens-death/ [https://perma.cc/QN47- 
NSKX].
Andrade met Zapata on an online dating  
207. Id. 
208. Id. (quoting Aaron T. Norton & Gregory M. Herek, Heterosexuals’ Attitudes Toward Transgender 
People: Findings from a National Probability Sample of U.S. Adults, 68 SEX ROLES 738, 740 (2012)). 
209. Lee & Kwan, supra note 24, at 111; see also Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: 
Deconstructing the Conflation of “Sex,” “Gender,” and “Sexual Orientation” in Euro-American Law and 
Society, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 20 (1995) (noting that “[t]he first common (mis)understanding . . . is the equation of 
sex . . . with ‘penis’ or ‘vagina’”). 
210. Aaron T. Norton & Gregory M. Herek, Heterosexuals’ Attitudes Toward Transgender People: Findings 
from a National Probability Sample of U.S. Adults, 68 SEX ROLES 738, 741 (2012). 
211. Robb Willer, Overdoing Gender: A Test of the Masculine Overcompensation Thesis, 118 AM. J. SOC. 
980, 993 (2013). Similarly, in another study, men who were falsely told that their personalities were more 
feminine than average expressed less positive attitudes towards feminine gay men than men who were told their 
personalities were in line with the average male personality. See Peter Glick et al., Defensive Reactions to 
Masculinity Threat: More Negative Affect Toward Effeminate (But Not Masculine) Gay Men, 57 SEX ROLES 55, 
57 (2007). 
212. See Amelia Talley & B. Ann Bettencourt, Evaluations and Aggression Directed at a Gay Male Target: 
The Role of Threat and Antigay Prejudice, 38 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 647, 674 (2008). 
213. 
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site.214 
Jim Spellman, Transgender Murder, Hate Crime Conviction a First, CNN (Apr. 23, 2009), http://www. 
cnn.com/2009/CRIME/04/22/transgender.slaying.trial/index.html [https://perma.cc/S3TT-LUSD].
Zapata invited Andrade to her apartment where they spent a few days 
together.215 When Zapata left the apartment, Andrade began looking at her photo-
graphs, which made him question whether Zapata was a woman.216 When Zapata 
returned, Andrade confronted her, asking if she was really a woman.217 
Andrade claimed that upon discovering that Zapata, with whom he had engaged 
in oral sex the night before, was biologically male, he flew into a rage.218 
See Monte Whaley, Smile Called “Provoking Act” in Transgender Case, DENVER POST (Sept. 28, 2008) 
(“Allen Andrade told his girlfriend that he ‘snapped’ when he learned the woman he had oral sex with the night 
before was biologically a man.”), https://www.denverpost.com/2008/09/18/smile-called-provoking-act-in- 
transgender-case/ [https://perma.cc/YG23-CNLF].
Andrade 
hit Zapata several times with a fire extinguisher, killing her.219 Andrade later told 
his girlfriend that Zapata was gay and “all gay things need to die,” demonstrating 
that he saw Zapata as a gay man.220 
Referencing the male first name Zapata had been given at birth, Andrade’s attor-
ney told the jury during opening statements, “When [Allen] learned Angie was in 
fact Justin and was a male, he immediately reacted to that.”221 Echoing the trope of 
the deceitful transgender individual, Andrade’s attorney continued, “[Allen] had 
been deceived and he reacted.”222 
Invoking the notion of trans panic, Andrade’s attorney told the jury that only af-
ter grabbing Zapata’s crotch did Andrade discover the truth about Zapata’s biologi-
cal sex.223 Then, he continued, when Zapata smiled at Andrade and said, “I’m all 
woman,” this caused Andrade to snap and commit murder.224 Andrade’s attorney 
further argued that any reasonable man in Andrade’s shoes would have been pro-
voked into a heat of passion, arguing that “[w]hen (Zapata) smiled at him, this was 
a highly provoking act, and it would cause someone to have an aggressive reac-
tion.”225 Because Andrade was provoked into a heat of passion by the discovery 
that Zapata was biologically male, Andrade’s attorney implored the jury to reduce 
the charge from first-degree to second-degree murder.226 
The jury, however, was not persuaded by the defense claim of trans panic, and 










221. Richardson, supra note 213. 
222. Id. 
223. Whaley, supra note 218. Prosecutor Robb Miller, however, argued that Andrade knew Zapata was 
biologically male and planned to kill her shortly after meeting her on a dating site frequented by gay, bisexual, 
and transgender singles. Richardson, supra note 213. 
224. Whaley, supra note 218. 
225. Id. 
226. Spellman, supra note 214; Whaley, supra note 218. 
227. Richardson, supra note 213. 
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was the first time a hate crime statute was successfully applied to a murder case 
involving a transgender victim, it was seen as a landmark decision.228 While all 
fifty states have enacted hate crime statutes, only twenty-one states plus the 
District of Columbia include gender identity, gender expression, transgender iden-
tity, or perceived sex or gender as protected categories.229 In jurisdictions that con-
sider transgender identity a protected class, recognizing the trans panic defense 
arguably “runs afoul of the premise and purpose of hate crimes statutes that seek to 
enhance punishment for just such a motivation.”230 
The transgender woman transgresses norms of gender by claiming a female 
identity when she was considered male at birth.231 The defendant punishes this 
transgression by killing her.232 The law, however, generally disapproves of acts of 
violence, such as bullying, that are motivated by a desire to enforce gender 
norms.233 Likewise, the law of provocation should not approve the use of violence 
to enforce gender norms by allowing a defendant to claim trans panic as legally 
adequate provocation.234 
c. The Defendant’s Belief that the Transgender Victim was Being Deceitful 
Finally, the defendant’s violence may be motivated by a belief that in not dis-
closing her biological sex, the transgender female victim was being deceitful about 
her “true” gender identity.235 The belief that transgender individuals are deceitful 
is widespread. As Dean Spade236 notes, “[t]he myth that birth-assigned gender is 
the only gender identity that can be recognized . . . motivates judicial decisions in 
228. Commenting on the fact that Andrade was found guilty of both first-degree murder and a hate crime for 
killing a transgender person, Mindy Barton, Legal Director for the Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual and Transgender 
Community Center of Colorado, noted, “This is a landmark decision.” Spellman, supra note 214. 
229. See infra Appendix (listing the states that include gender identity or expression, transgender identity, or 
perceived sex or gender as protected categories in their hate crime statutes). As noted in the Appendix, while use 
of “perceived gender” language in a hate crime statute arguably covers transgender individuals who are targeted 
because their perceived gender does not match their biological sex, it is unclear whether courts in three of these 
states (Louisiana, Mississippi, and Rhode Island) would interpret this “perceived gender” language to cover 
transgender victims. 
230. Scott D. McCoy, Note, The Homosexual-Advance Defense and Hate Crimes Statutes: Their Interaction 
and Conflict, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 629, 634 (2001) (“In the case of the homosexual-advance defense, where the 
motivation behind the criminal act is inseparable from and grounded in the actor’s homophobia, allowing the 
actor’s homophobia to excuse his conduct partially and thereby mitigate punishment runs afoul of the premise 
and purpose of hate crimes statutes that seek to enhance punishment for just such a motivation.”). 
231. Lee & Kwan, supra note 24, at 112. 
232. Id. 
233. Id. at 112–13. 
234. Id. at 113. 
235. Id. at 113 n.206. 
236. Dean Spade, who founded the Sylvia Rivera Law Project, a non-profit law collective that provides free 
legal services to transgender, intersex, and gender non-conforming people who are low-income and/or people of 
color, is an Associate Professor of Law at Seattle University School of Law. He may be the first transgender 
person to get a tenure-track law professor job. Dean Spade, Be Professional!, 33 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 71, 71 
(2010) (“I am perhaps the first transgender person to get a tenure-track law professor job, or at least no one seems 
to know of any others[.]”). 
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which courts deny legal name changes to transgender people based on the assertion 
that such a name change may allow the [transgender individual] to engage in 
fraud.”237 Spade observes that “[t]his belief that transgender people’s gender iden-
tities are fraudulent or false . . . is based in a fundamental notion that birth-assigned 
gender is the only ‘true’ gender an individual can have and that transgender iden-
tity is not recognizable or legitimate.”238 
Implicit in the trans panic defense strategy is the idea that the transgender victim 
was culpably deceitful and wrongfully misled the defendant into thinking she was 
a woman when she was really a man, thus provoking him into a heat of passion.239 
For example, in the Allen Andrade (Angie Zapata) case discussed above,240 
Andrade’s attorney argued that Andrade “had been deceived.”241 Similarly, in the 
Gwen Araujo case, Magidson’s attorney argued that the case was about “the tragic 
results when [Araujo’s] deception and betrayal were discovered.”242 
Jurors should reject the idea that a transgender woman is being deceitful by not 
disclosing her biological sex. In cases involving transgender female victims who 
had not yet undertaken sex-reassignment surgery, the defendant should have seen 
signs that the victim was transitioning from male to female, so any claim that the 
victim was trying to hide her biological sex should be viewed with skepticism.243 
Lee & Kwan, supra note 24, at 114. In the Allen Andrade (Angie Zapata) case discussed above, the 
prosecutor told jurors Andrade knew in advance that Zapata was a transgender woman because he accompanied 
her to a court hearing where she was called by her birth name, Justin. See Ernest Luning, Prosecutor: Accused 
Zapata Killer Didn’t ‘Snap’ At Transgender ‘Deception’, COLO. INDEP. (Apr. 17, 2009), https://www. 
coloradoindependent.com/2009/04/17/prosecutor-accused-zapata-killer-didnt-snap-at-transgender-deception/ 
[https://perma.cc/4T3C-6BE4].
Even a transgender woman who has fully transitioned may have legitimate reasons 
for not disclosing her biological sex to others. For instance, she may fear that 
revealing her biological sex will lead to violence.244 
Morgan Tilleman explains another reason why the suggestion that a transgender 
woman who fails to disclose her biological sex is engaging in sexual deception is 
problematic. Tilleman notes that “[t]he claim of fraud presupposes the existence of  
237. Dean Spade, Trans Formation: Three Myths Regarding Transgender Identity Have Led to Conflicting 
Laws and Policies that Adversely Affect Transgender People, 31 L.A. LAWYER 34, 36 (Oct. 2008). 
238. Id. 
239. Kate Greenberg provides examples of how trans women and gender-nonconforming women are depicted 
as fraudulent and deceitful in film and television. Greenberg, supra note 144, at 210–11; see also JOEY L. MOGUL 
ET AL., QUEER (IN)JUSTICE: THE CRIMINALIZATION OF LGBT PEOPLE IN THE UNITED STATES 73, 76 (2011) 
(discussing the trope of the deceptive transgender individual reflected in past criminal statutes that prohibited 
cross-dressing as well as comments by judges and prosecutors in criminal cases). For additional examples, see 
Lee & Kwan, supra note 24, at 113 n.206. 
240. See supra text accompanying notes 213–26. 
241. See supra text accompanying note 221–22. 
242. See supra text accompanying note 173. 
243. 
 
244. See JANET MOCK, REDEFINING REALNESS: MY PATH TO WOMANHOOD, IDENTITY, LOVE & SO MUCH 
MORE 159–61 (2014). 
1444                            AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW                            [Vol. 57:1411 
a ‘material fact that one has a duty to reveal.’”245 Tilleman continues, “A person’s 
anatomical sex is not a material fact capable of being misrepresented in most sex-
ual relationships, including those which give rise to assertions of the trans panic 
defense.”246 This is because “[e]ither the transgender person’s genitals are irrele-
vant to the sexual act or acts that do occur, or the transgender person’s genitals are 
exposed to his or her sexual partner in the course of sex acts.”247 
III. WHY LEGISLATIVE ACTION LIMITING THE TRANS PANIC DEFENSE STRATEGY IS 
NEEDED 
Not long ago, I was reluctant to support legislation banning gay and trans panic 
defense strategies. In previous scholarship, I wrote about how gay and trans panic 
defense strategies are reprehensible attempts to capitalize on stereotypes about 
LGBTQ248 
Some prefer the acronym LGBTQIAPþ, which stands for lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, 
intersex, asexual, polysexual or pansexual, and others. See LUCA PAX, QUEER ASTERIK, LGBTQIAPþ
ETIQUETTE GUIDE AND GLOSSARY OF TERMS (2016, 2017), www.queerasterisk.com.
(lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer) individuals as sexual 
deviants.249 However, as a former criminal defense attorney concerned about plac-
ing restrictions on a defendant’s right to present a defense, I expressed reasons to 
be cautious before embracing legislative bans on the use of gay or trans panic 
defense strategies.250 
245. Morgan Tilleman, (Trans)forming the Provocation Defense, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1659, 1678 
(2010) (citation omitted). 
246. Id. at 1678–79. 
247. Id. (noting that “[i]n neither the Zapata nor the Araujo case was there genital-to-genital contact or even 
exposure of the transgender [victim’s] genitals”). Tilleman notes that “the anatomical sex of an oral sex partner, 
for example, is immaterial to the contemplated sex act.” Id. at 1679. 
248. 
 
249. See Lee, The Gay Panic Defense, supra note 106, at 476 (arguing that gay panic defense strategies “are 
problematic because they reinforce and promote negative stereotypes about gay men as sexual deviants and 
sexual predators”); Lee, Masculinity on Trial, supra note 117, at 817–18 (noting that gay and trans panic 
defenses “seek to capitalize on conscious and unconscious bias against gay and trans individuals” and “reinforce 
negative stereotypes about gay men and other gender-nonconforming individuals”); Lee & Kwan, supra note 24, 
at 119 (noting that the “trans panic defense strategy is problematic because it reifies structures of masculinity and 
reinforces negative[] stereotypes about transgender individuals as sexual deviants”). 
250. Lee, The Gay Panic Defense, supra note 106, at 522–57 (articulating three broad frameworks to 
“illustrate why allowing defendants to argue gay panic better serves the dual purposes of ensuring a fair trial to 
the defendant and achieving the ends of justice that the State seeks” than precluding such arguments through a 
legislative ban); Lee & Kwan, supra note 24, at 123 (arguing “it is critical to combat the underlying structures of 
masculinity that encourage violence against transgender females in the first place to both reduce the risk of such 
violence taking place and undermine the effectiveness of the trans panic defense strategy”). Some have 
mischaracterized my work. For example, in 2013, David Allan Perkiss suggested that I think gay panic is a 
“legitimate” defense. See, e.g., David Alan Perkiss, A New Strategy for Neutralizing the Gay Panic Defense at 
Trial: Lessons from the Lawrence King Case, 60 UCLA L. REV. 778, 812 (2013) (stating that “[i]mplicitly, Lee 
recognizes that gay panic may arguably be a legitimate source of adequate provocation[,]” and arguing that 
“[t]he general position . . . that gay panic is legitimate as a legal defense has three major flaws”). I have always 
been clear that I believe the use of gay and trans panic defense strategies is problematic and that the discovery 
that one’s intimate partner is a transgender female should not be recognized as legally adequate provocation). See 
Lee, The Gay Panic Defense, supra note 106, at 476 (arguing that gay panic defense strategies are “problematic 
because they reinforce and promote negative stereotypes about gay men as sexual deviants and sexual 
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Instead of banning these defense strategies, I proposed a tool kit of strategies for 
prosecutors to combat gay and trans panic arguments.251 In large part, my resist-
ance to legislative bans on the gay and trans panic defenses was based on the 
assumption that if the prosecutor simply educated jurors about what it means to be 
a transgender person, humanized the transgender female victim, and made the bias 
against transgender individuals that is so deeply rooted in our society salient, jurors 
would do the right thing and reject the trans panic defense.252 I now realize that 
education is necessary but not sufficient to change attitudes and behavior.253 In this 
Part, I first explain my shift in position. I then examine possible objections to legis-
latively banning the trans panic defense. 
A. Explaining the Shift in My Position 
My past position was influenced in large part by empirical research showing that 
when attorneys ignore the role of racial stereotypes and fail to make race salient in 
cases involving a risk of racial bias, jurors tend to be more punitive towards black 
defendants than white defendants, all else being equal.254 This empirical research 
also demonstrates that if attorneys concerned about racial bias make the operation 
of racial stereotypes salient to jurors, jurors tend to treat similarly situated black 
and white defendants the same.255 Given this extensive research on race salience, I 
believed that if prosecutors concerned about bias against transgender individuals 
made the existence of such bias salient to jurors, jurors would treat the transgender 
predators”); id. at 555 (opining that gay panic arguments are “reprehensible”); Lee & Kwan, supra note 24, at 
108–19 (providing reasons why jurors should reject the trans panic defense). 
251. See Lee, The Gay Panic Defense, supra note 106, at 559–66 (suggesting questions that a prosecutor can 
ask during jury selection to ferret out bias on the basis of sexual orientation and suggesting that prosecutors make 
sexual orientation bias salient through gender and sexual orientation switching); Lee & Kwan, supra note 24, at 
123 (arguing that “[t]he prosecutor should try to educate jurors about what it means to be a transgender woman 
and why disclosure may have been difficult for the victim”); id. at 126–27 (arguing that “the prosecutor can seek 
to proffer expert witness testimony about the cultural structures of masculinity that may have contributed to the 
defendant’s violent acts”); id. at 127 (suggesting that prosecutors relabel the defense strategy by calling it “trans 
rage,” which suggests the defendant was acting out of anger and rage, rather than “trans panic,” which suggests 
the defendant panicked and lost his self-control). 
252. Lee & Kwan, supra note 24, at 123–25. We also argued that instead of equating reasonableness with 
typicality, the reasonableness requirement “should be understood as a normative limitation on the provocation 
doctrine.” Id. at 125. 
253. Here, I borrow from Amitha Kalaichandran who, in arguing for legislation requiring all cars to be 
equipped with a child safety alert system to prevent the deaths of children in hot cars, stated, “[o]ne of the biggest 
lessons I learned a decade ago in public-health graduate school was that education was rarely enough, on its own, 
to fundamentally change behavior. Educating the public about health was ‘necessary but not sufficient[.]’” 
Amitha Kalaichandran, Preventing Deaths in Hot Cars, WASH. POST, Aug. 15, 2019, at A17. 
254. Lee, The Gay Panic Defense, supra note 106, at 543–49. 
255. Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, White Juror Bias: An Investigation of Prejudice Against 
Black Defendants in the American Courtroom, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 201, 217 (2001); Samuel R. 
Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Race in the Courtroom: Perceptions of Guilt and Dispositional Attributions, 
26 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1367, 1373–74 (2000). 
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victim the same as they would a non-transgender victim and would reject the trans 
panic defense. 
Making race salient, however, works to reduce discrimination against black peo-
ple by jurors who endorse racially egalitarian principles.256 
Patricia Devine, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Their Automatic and Controlled Components, 56 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 5, 14 (1989) (finding that when racial stereotypes about black people were made 
salient, low-prejudice individuals tried to align their thoughts about black people with their egalitarian beliefs 
about black people). While most Americans today are implicitly biased in favor of white people and against 
black people, they embrace egalitarian principles when it comes to race, sincerely believing that black people 
and white people should be treated equally. See MARIA KRYSAN & SARAH MOBERG, UNIV. OF ILL. INSTIT. GOV’T 
& PUB. AFFAIRS, TRENDS IN RACIAL ATTITUDES (Aug. 25, 2016), https://igpa.uillinois.edu/programs/racial- 
attitudes [https://perma.cc/RQ7C-JRUV] (noting that “survey questions that tap attitudes toward the principle of 
equality are no longer included on major national surveys [because] they have become essentially universally 
accepted by white people and therefore not deemed as worth asking on surveys”); IPSOS PUB. AFF., REUTERS/ 
IPSOS/UVA CENTER FOR POLITICS RACE POLL (Sept. 11, 2017), http://www.centerforpolitics.org/crystalball/wp- 
content/uploads/2017/09/2017-Reuters-UVA-Ipsos-Race-Poll-9-11-2017.pdf (estimating that 80% of Americans 
polled strongly agreed that all races should be treated equally); see also Rachel D. Godsil, Answering the 
Diversity Mandate, 286 N.J. LAW. 44, 45 (2014) (noting that most Americans, and undoubtedly most lawyers, 
subscribe consciously to the norm that people deserve equal treatment regardless of race, and that racial 
integration is a desirable goal); Cynthia Lee, Making Race Salient: Trayvon Martin and Implicit Bias in a Not Yet 
Post-Racial Society, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1557, 1570 (2013) (“By and large, Americans embrace the egalitarian race 
norms that are enunciated in the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”); Dayna Bowen 
Matthew, Health Care, Title VI, and Racism’s New Normal, 6 GEO. J.L. & MOD. CRITICAL RACE PERSP. 3, 37 
(2014) (noting that most Americans act in accord with their implicit biases, even if these attitudes are directly 
contrary to their expressly egalitarian views on race). 
When race is made sa-
lient, jurors are reminded of their egalitarian principles and may then consciously 
try not to let racial stereotypes influence their decision making, leading to fairer 
treatment of black and white defendants.257 When race is ignored, implicit racial 
bias leads these jurors to act in racially discriminatory ways without realizing that 
they are doing so. 
In contrast to individuals with implicit racial bias who embrace racially egalitar-
ian principles, many individuals with bias against transgender individuals are not 
just implicitly biased against transgender individuals. These individuals are often 
conscious of their negative views of transgender individuals and embrace those 
views.258 
For example, many Americans believe men shouldn’t wear makeup or dress in women’s clothing. Paul 
Hiebert, America Isn’t Ready For Men in Makeup, YOUGOV (Nov. 1, 2016), https://today.yougov.com/topics/ 
lifestyle/articles-reports/2016/11/01/males-wear-makeup [https://perma.cc/M2BQ-3Q5R] (noting that most 
Americans are not comfortable with men wearing mascara or nail polish); Terri Lee Ryan, The Cross-Dresser’s 
Challenge for Acceptance, HUFFPOST (July 7, 2015), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/the-crossdressers- 
challen_b_7715416 [https://perma.cc/93GR-WYEN] (noting that many cross-dressers fear they will lose their 
jobs if their employers or clients find out they wear women’s clothing). 
In other words, they are explicitly biased against transgender individuals. 
The Trump Administration’s embrace of trans-hostile policies,259 including but 
not limited to Trump’s ban on allowing transgender individuals to serve in the 
256. 
257. Devine, supra note 256, at 14. 
258. 
259. During the 2016 presidential campaign, candidate Donald Trump spoke and acted as if he would be a 
friend to the transgender community if elected to office. For example, in April 2016, Trump said he supported the 
right of transgender people to “use the bathroom that they feel is appropriate,” and added that Caitlyn Jenner, a 
transgender female celebrity, could use whichever bathroom she wanted to use at Trump Tower. See Helena 
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Andrews-Dyer, Donald Trump says Caitlyn Jenner Can Use Whatever Bathroom She Wants at Trump Tower, 
WASH. POST (Apr. 21, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/reliable-source/wp/2016/04/21/donald- 
trump-says-caitlyn-jenner-can-use-whatever-bathroom-she-wants-at-trump-tower/ [https://perma.cc/XE2Z- 
MXRM]. After becoming President, however, Trump and his Administration made several moves to roll back 
many of the civil rights protections that transgender individuals had achieved under the Obama Administration. 
In October 2017, then U.S. Attorney General Jeff Sessions announced the Department of Justice’s decision to 
end an Obama-era policy that had protected transgender workers from employment discrimination through Title 
VII. See Sari Horwitz & Spencer S. Hsu, Sessions Ends Transgender Protection, WASH. POST, Oct. 6, 2017, at 
A3. In June 2019, the U.S. State Department instructed U.S. embassies across the world not to display the 
rainbow flag on any public-facing flagpole. See Frida Ghitis, How Trump is Abandoning LGBTQ People Over 
Pride flags, CNN (June 11, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/06/11/opinions/trump-pride-month-flag-opinion- 
ghitis/index.html [https://perma.cc/YVZ4-QC89]; Ernesto Londono, Pride Flags and Foreign Policy: U.S. 
Diplomats See Shift on Gay Rights, N.Y. TIMES (June 9, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/09/world/ 
americas/pride-flags-us-embassies.html [https://perma.cc/RCX6-HL8P]. 
The Trump Administration has also attempted to reverse Obama-era policies prohibiting discrimination on the 
basis of gender identity under the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”). See Michael Ollove, States are All Over the 
Map When it Comes to Transgender Reassignment Care, WASH. POST, July 23, 2019, at E6. Under the Obama 
Administration, “[s]ervices deemed medically necessary for some patients, such as mastectomies for women 
with breast cancer, [could not] be denied to others, such as transitioning transgender patients with gender 
dysphoria.” Id. The ACA was also interpreted to mean that medical providers could not “deny medical services 
to [an individual] just because that individual [was] transgender.” Id. In May 2019, the Trump Administration 
issued regulations enhancing protections for medical providers that refuse to provide care for transgender 
individuals for religious reasons. Id. In June 2019, the Trump Administration proposed overturning the above- 
described Obama-era policies prohibiting discrimination on the basis of gender identity under the Affordable 
Care Act. Id. Additionally, in the spring of 2017, the U.S. Department of Health & Human Services (HHS) issued 
a memorandum that indicated it was considering a proposal to redefine “sex” under Title IX as “a person’s status 
as male or female based on immutable biological traits identifiable by or before birth.” See Erica L. Green et al., 




Trump first announced his intention to ban transgender individuals from the military in three consecutive 
tweets on July 26, 2017, writing, “After consultation with my Generals and military experts, please be advised 
that the United States Government will not accept or allow . . . [t]ransgender individuals to serve in any capacity 
in the U.S. Military. Our military must be focused on decisive and overwhelming . . . victory and cannot be 
burdened with the tremendous medical costs and disruption that transgender (sic) in the military would entail. 




8ZVG-TL8L]; Matt Thompson, How to Spark Panic and Confusion in Three Tweets: Do Impulsive Twitter 
Messages from the President Count as Formal Policy Action?, ATLANTIC (Jan. 13, 2019), https://www. 
theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/01/donald-trump-tweets-transgender-military-service-ban/579655/ [https:// 
perma.cc/7F9B-ZTJF]; see also Steven Petrow, An Attack by Trump on LGBT Community, WASH. POST, July 27, 
2017, at C1. Later, Trump issued an updated order banning most transgender individuals from serving in the 
military. See Memorandum from President Donald J. Trump to Sec’y of Def. James Mattis and Sec’y of Homeland 
Sec. Kirstjen Nielsen Regarding Military Service by Transgender Individuals (Mar. 23, 2018), https://www. 
whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/presidential-memorandum-secretary-defense-secretary-homeland-security- 
regarding-military-service-transgender-individuals/ [https://perma.cc/2H2B-KYR9]. 
In contrast to the absolute ban on all transgender individuals serving in the military that he had announced 
earlier by tweet, Trump’s revised policy allows transgender service members who have not undergone gender 
reassignment surgery to stay in the military, as long as they have been stable for thirty-six consecutive months in 
their biological sex before joining the military. See Dan Lamothe, Trump Eases Transgender Service Ban 
and his rollback of Obama-era protections for transgender students 
 
260. 
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seeking to use the bathroom corresponding to their gender identity,261 
Less than two months after taking office, the Trump Administration rescinded Obama-era protections for 
transgender students seeking to use the bathroom corresponding to their gender identity. See Erica L. Green, L.G. 
B.T.Q. Students’ Rights Cases Stall Under DeVos, Report Finds, N.Y. TIMES (July 30, 2019), https://www. 
nytimes.com/2019/07/29/us/politics/gay-transgender-rights-devos.html [https://perma.cc/Z2QR-2SPR] (noting 
that “[i]n 2017, just weeks after the new administration took office, the Education and Justice Departments 
rescinded an Obama-era guidance document that informed schools that denying students access to bathrooms 
that correspond with their gender identity was a violation under Title IX, the federal law that prohibits 
discrimination in institutions that receive federal funding”); Jeremy W. Peters et al, Trump Rescinds Rules on 
Bathrooms for Transgender Students, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 22, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/22/us/ 
politics/devos-sessions-transgender-students-rights.html [https://perma.cc/8C9U-SRYJ].
has revealed 
an ugly truth about American society. A significant number of Americans today do 
not see trans people as normal human beings deserving of equal treatment, and 
many of these Americans feel some degree of hostility towards trans people.262 
See German Lopez, We Asked US Voters About their Views on Transgender People. Here’s What they 
Said., VOX (May 24, 2016), https://www.vox.com/2016/5/24/11746086/transgender-bathrooms-poll-survey 
[https://perma.cc/6NFD-FBFP] (noting that Americans hold more unfavorable views toward transgender people 
than other groups). A significant number of Americans think trans people are mentally ill. See Samantha Allen, 
Why A Lot of Americans Don’t Want To Befriend a Transgender Person, DAILY BEAST (May 22, 2017), https:// 
www.thedailybeast.com/why-a-lot-of-americans-dont-want-to-befriend-a-transgender-person?ref=scroll [https:// 
perma.cc/6TFM-VXFG] (noting that one in five Americans believe that transgender individuals have a mental 
illness); JULIA CLARK & CHRIS JACKSON, IPSOS, GLOBAL ATTITUDES TOWARD TRANSGENDER PEOPLE (2018), 
https://www.ipsos.com/en-us/news-polls/global-attitudes-toward-transgender-people [https://perma.cc/9DLZ- 
QAAY] (noting that among all the western countries, people in the United States are the most likely to believe 
that transgender people have a mental illness (32%) and the most likely to believe that transgender people are 
committing a sin (32%)); Yael Bame, 21% of Americans Believe That Being Transgender is a Mental Illness, 
YOUGOV (May 17, 2017), https://today.yougov.com/topics/relationships/articles-reports/2017/05/17/21- 
americans-believe-identifying-transgender-menta [https://perma.cc/2UDP-K493] (noting that 21% of Americans 
think that identifying as transgender is a form of mental illness); J. Lester Feder et al., This Is How 23 Countries 
Feel About Transgender Rights, BUZZFEEDNEWS (Dec. 29, 2016), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/ 
lesterfeder/this-is-how-23-countries-feel-about-transgender-rights [https://perma.cc/NP7A-8N9C] (noting that 
32% of Americans agree that one who identifies as a transgender person has a form of mental illness). 
Many of those who are explicitly biased against transgender persons have become 
emboldened by the current Administration’s trans-hostile policies to express their 
hostility openly and without fear of societal repercussion. There is some evidence 
of this in the recent spike in hate violence against transgender individuals,263 but it 
Slightly: Order Revokes Full Prohibition but Bars Many From Serving, WASH. POST, Mar. 24, 2018, at A1. In 
other words, transgender individuals may serve as long as they give up their gender identity and embrace their 
biological sex with one exception: transgender service members who were diagnosed with gender dysphoria after 
the Obama Administration ended the ban on transgender troops in 2016, but before implementation of the Trump 
ban in 2018, may continue to serve in the military in their chosen gender identity. Id. In January 2019, the U.S. 
Supreme Court decided to allow Trump’s restrictions on transgender individuals serving in the military to go into 
effect while the lawsuits against these restrictions continue in the lower courts. See Robert Barnes & Dan 
Lamothe, Supreme Court Lets Trump’s Restrictions on Transgender Troops Take Effect, WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 
2019, at A4. Two months later, the Pentagon announced that the military would begin enforcing President 
Trump’s restrictions on transgender troops in the military on April 12, 2019. See Paul Sonne & Ann E. Marimow, 




263. CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF HATE & EXTREMISM, CAL. STATE UNIV., SAN BERNARDINO, REPORT TO THE 
NATION: HATE CRIMES RISE IN U.S. CITIES AND COUNTIES IN TIME OF DIVISION & FOREIGN INTERFERENCE 
(2018) (reporting that “[t]he 2017 increase in hate crime from 229 to 254, was driven in part by the 23 crimes 
targeting the transgender community, which increased by 187 percent”); Dawn Ennis, American Medical 
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Association Responds To ’Epidemic’ Of Violence Against Transgender Community, FORBES (June 15, 2019), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/dawnstaceyennis/2019/06/15/american-medical-association-responds-to-epidemic- 
of-violence-against-transgender-community/#346970aa510b [https://perma.cc/U3DZ-S2SC] (noting that “[t]he 
American Medical Association is taking a public stand to stem what it calls ‘the epidemic of violence against the 
transgender community, especially the amplified physical dangers faced by transgender people of color’”). 
is not merely fringe elements who are openly expressing hostility towards trans-
gender individuals. Hostility toward the transgender community is also reflected in 
the remarks of suburban parents opposing policies that would allow transgender 
youth to use the bathroom that corresponds to their gender identity.264 
When the President endorses policies that discriminate against transgender indi-
viduals,265 individuals who are biased against transgender individuals are assured 
that their anti-trans bias is normal and nothing to be ashamed about. As Professor 
Dean Spade notes, “When transphobia gets bolstered by signals from the federal 
government, low-level enforcers of gender norms feel even more license to humili-
ate and exclude trans people.”266 
Dean Spade, Right-Wing Fantasies About Gender are Killing Trans People, TRUTHOUT (Oct. 22, 
2018), https://truthout.org/articles/right-wing-fantasies-about-gender-are-killing-trans-people/ [https://perma.cc/ 
X7KH-M56V].
Even before Trump became President of the United States, explicit anti-trans 
bias was manifested by those invoking the safety of women and girls as a reason to 
prohibit transgender females from using women’s restrooms.267 The bathroom 
safety argument perpetuates the stereotype of the transgender individual as a sex-
ual predator, suggesting that an individual who was thought to be male when born 
but self-identifies as a girl, and wants to use the girls’ restroom or locker room, is 
really just a man (or boy) wanting to sexually assault women (or girls).268 
264. See G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 716 (4th Cir. 2016). 
265. Not everyone agrees that the Trump Administration is hostile to the trans community. In August 2019, 
Robert Kabel, the chairman, and Jill Homan, the vice chairwoman, of the Log Cabin Republicans—the nation’s 
original and largest organization representing LGBT conservatives—published an op-ed in the Washington Post, 
in which they claimed President Trump defends LGBTQ rights. Robert Kabel & Jill Homan, Trump Defends 
LGBTQ Rights. He Has Our Endorsement, WASH. POST, Aug. 16, 2019, at A19. This op-ed prompted several 
members of the Log Cabin Republicans to leave the group. Colby Itkowitz, Top Official Resigns After LGBTQ 
Groups’s Trump Endorsement, WASH. POST, Aug. 28, 2019, at A18. 
266. 
 
267. See Shayna Medley, Not in the Name of Women’s Safety: Whole Woman’s Health as a Model for 
Transgender Rights, 40 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 441, 443 (2017) (noting that anti-trans bills “almost universally 
claim to serve an interest in women’s health and safety” and often “come in the form of fear-mongering 
campaigns about sexual assault in bathrooms, suggesting that transgender people are sexual predators and that 
cisgender men will abuse non-discrimination laws to assault women in the bathroom”); see also Rushin & 
Carroll, supra note 62, at 42 (arguing that some proposed bathroom laws, prohibiting transgender individuals 
from using the bathroom that corresponds with their gender identity, effectively criminalize noncriminal conduct 
inextricably linked to the status of being trans and thus violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel 
and unusual punishment). 
268. Laura Portuondo, The Overdue Case Against Sex-Segregated Bathrooms, 29 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 465, 
492 (2018) (noting that “[i]nvocations of women’s safety as a justification for sex-segregated bathrooms feature 
prominently in briefs and complaints in the transgender litigation context”). Portuondo notes that in one lawsuit 
“challenging the Obama Administration’s trans-inclusive Title IX guidance, . . . a group of self-described 
‘radical feminists’ asserted that allowing transgender women into women’s bathrooms would undermine the 
‘safety offered by restrooms’ and would lead to an ‘increased risk of sexual assault.’” Id. (citing Complaint ¶¶ 
30, 32, Women’s Liberation Front v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. 1:16-cv-00915 (D.N.M. Aug. 11, 2016)). 
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Portuondo also notes that “North Carolina Governor McCrory asserted the ‘safety of women and children’ as a 
primary motivation for the state’s Bathroom Bill in Carcaňo.” Id. (citing Carcaňo v. McCrory, 203 F. Supp. 3d 
615, 645 (M.D.N.C. 2016)); see also Tim Madigan, What Happened When a Room Full of Texas Parents Took 
on Transgender Bathrooms, WASH. POST (May 11, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/ 
wp/2016/05/11/transgender-students-rights-the-debate-becomes-loud-and-heated-in-texas/ [https://perma.cc/ 
MCR5-GACQ] (noting that hundreds came to a meeting in Fort Worth, Texas to express their views on school 
district guidelines intended to accommodate the needs of transgender students, with many expressing their 
opposition to allowing transgender students to use the bathroom corresponding with their gender identity). For an 
examination of the history behind sex segregation in public restrooms that emphasizes the risk of sexual assault 
and need for privacy perspective, see W. Burlette Carter, Sexism in the ‘Bathroom Debates’: How Bathrooms 
Really Became Separated by Sex, 37 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 227, 227 (2018) (challenging two “widely-embraced 
theories about how public intimate spaces . . . first became separated by sex” and arguing that these theories 
“offer a narrative that oppresses women” and ignores women’s struggles with sexual assault and sexual 
harassment). 
Members of the Trump Administration have reinforced the stereotype of the 
transgender individual as sexual predator by invoking the risk-of-sexual-assault- 
in-the-bathroom argument despite the lack of evidence that bathroom use by trans 
individuals increases the risk of assault.269 
Rushin & Carroll, supra note 62, at 41 (“Even if one adopts the position . . . that states may seek to 
regulate conduct linked to a status that produces social harm, there is no evidence that bathroom use by trans 
individuals actually produces such harm) (citing Bryan Tannehill, Debunking Bathroom Myths, HUFF. POST 
(Nov. 28, 2016), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/debunking-bathroom-myths_b_8670438).
For example, during the 2016 Trump 
presidential campaign, Vice President Mike Pence argued that in deciding whether 
to allow transgender students to use the bathroom that corresponds to their gender 
identity, states should protect the “safety and privacy of children,”270 
Sam Williamson, Note, G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester County School Board: Broadening Title IX’s 
Protections for Transgender Students, 76 MD. L. REV. 1102, 1125 (2017) (citing Anugrah Kumar, Mike Pence to 
James Dobson: Trump Will Resolve Birth Control Mandate, Transgender Bathroom Issues, CHRISTIAN POST 
(Oct. 5, 2016), http://www.christianpost.com/news/mike-pence-james-dobson-trump-birth-control-mandatetrans- 
gender-bathroom-170485/ [https://perma.cc/S36G-SJFS].
terms often 
used by those who seek to prevent transgender students from using the restrooms 
consistent with their identity.”271 Steve Bannon, who would soon become 
President Trump’s Chief Strategist,272 
Meghan Keneally, A Timeline of Trump and Bannon’s Turbulent Relationship, ABC NEWS (Jan. 5, 
2018), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/timeline-trump-bannons-turbulent-relationship/story?id=52137016 
(noting that “Trump announced that Bannon had joined the campaign as the new CEO” on August 16, 2016 and 
that Bannon was forced to resign from his position with the White House on August 18, 2017). 
spoke out against Target when the company 
announced in April 2016 its decision to allow trans individuals to use the bathroom 
corresponding to their gender identity.273 
Continuing to Stand for Inclusivity, TARGET (Apr. 19, 2016), https://corporate.target.com/article/2016/ 
04/target-stands-inclusivity [https://perma.cc/UFB7-YFF8] (announcing that they “welcome transgender team 
members and guests to use the restroom or fitting room facility that corresponds with their gender identity”); see 
also Williamson, supra note 270, at 1125 (citing HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, DONALD TRUMP: OPPOSES 
NATIONWIDE MARRIAGE EQUALITY (2016), http://www.hrc.org/2016RepublicanFacts/donald-trump-opposes- 
nationwide-marriage-equality [https://perma.cc/T2R9-BR98] (noting that Steve Bannon “publicly advocated 
against allowing transgender people to use bathrooms consistent with their gender identity by preying on fears 
about daughters using the same bathroom as men”)). 
In May 2016, Bannon opined on his 
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decent, hard-working people who don’t want their four-year-old daughter to have 
to go into a bathroom with a guy with a beard in a dress.”274 
Miranda Blue, Anti-LGBT Activists ‘Testing’ Target By Sending Men Into Women’s Rooms, RIGHT WING 
WATCH (May 2, 2016) https://www.rightwingwatch.org/post/anti-lgbt-activists-testing-target-by-sending-men- 
into-womens-rooms/ [https://perma.cc/4TRC-TFDJ]; Rhuaridh Marr, Trump: Steve Bannon has “Lost his 
Mind”, METRO WEEKLY (Jan. 3, 2018) https://www.metroweekly.com/2018/01/trump-steve-bannon-lost-mind/ 
[https://perma.cc/S2KE-7QBZ].
In September 2019, 
Ben Carson, Trump’s Secretary of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), 
expressed concern at a meeting with HUD staff about transgender women “trying 
to infiltrate homeless women’s shelters,” referring to them as “big, hairy men” and 
lamenting that “society no longer seems to know the difference between men and 
women.”275 
Tracy Jan & Jef Stein, Carson’s Remarks on Gender at Meeting Rankle Staffers, WASH. POST (Sept. 20, 
2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2019/09/19/hud-secretary-ben-carson-makes-dismissive- 
comments-about-transgender-people-angering-agency-staff/ [https://perma.cc/VP44-2U5R] (noting also that 
when he was running for President, Ben Carson referred to transgender people as “abnormal”); Tracy Jan, As 
Democrats Call for His Resignation, HUD Secretary Ben Carson Defends His Controversial Comments 
About Transgender People, WASH. POST (Sept. 20, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2019/ 
09/20/democrats-call-his-resignation-hud-secretary-ben-carson-defends-his-controversial-comments-about- 
transgender-people/ [https://perma.cc/SJ9Q-WTXJ].
Just as President Trump’s racist rhetoric276 
Unlike previous Presidents, Donald Trump has regularly engaged in what many have called racist 
rhetoric targeting immigrants and racial and ethnic minorities, from suggesting that most immigrants from 
Mexico are criminals and rapists, see Katie Reilly, Here Are All the Times Donald Trump Insulted Mexico, TIME 
(Aug. 2016), https://time.com/4473972/donald-trump-mexico-meeting-insult/ [https://perma.cc/BKF8-DCWR], 
and that a judge of Mexican descent could not fairly adjudicate a case involving Trump, see Z. Byron Wolf, Read 
this: How Trump Defended Criticism of Judge for Being ’Mexican’, CNN (Apr. 20, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/ 
2017/04/20/politics/donald-trump-gonzalo-curiel-jake-tapper-transcript/index.html [https://perma.cc/US77- 
7TJV], to telling four progressive Congresswomen of color to go back to where they came from, suggesting that 
they were foreigners from other countries when three of the Congresswomen were born in the United States and 
all four were American citizens. See Allan Smith, Trump Says Congresswomen of Color Should ’Go Back’ and 
Fix the Places They ’Originally Came From’, NBC NEWS (July 14, 2019), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/ 
donald-trump/trump-says-progressive-congresswomen-should-go-back-where-they-came-n1029676. In July 
2019, Trump attacked then Congressman Elijah Cummings, a vocal critic of Trump, tweeting that the African 
American’s district—which includes Baltimore—was “disgusting” and a “rat and rodent infested mess.” 
Ledyard King, ‘Don’t Just Come and Criticize’: Elijah Cummings Defends Baltimore in Face of Trump’s 
insults, USA TODAY (Aug. 3, 2019), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2019/08/03/elijah- 
cummings-defends-baltimore-trump-attacks-during-park-event/1909733001/; P.R. Lockhart, How Trump Used 
a Centuries-Old Racist Trope to Attack Baltimore, VOX (July 29, 2019), https://www.vox.com/identities/2019/ 
7/29/20746188/donald-trump-elijah-cummings-baltimore-rat-infested-racism [https://perma.cc/58AH-F3DJ]. 
Trump has embraced harsh immigration policies, aimed at stopping Mexicans and others from Central and 
South America from coming across the border. See Andy J. Semotiuk, Immigrants Troubled By Trump’s New 
Immigration Policy Restrictions, FORBES (Aug. 23, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/andyjsemotiuk/2019/ 
08/23/immigrants-troubled-by-trumps-new-immigration-policy-restrictions/#5b3bc0013b34 [https://perma.cc/ 
364J-PA69]; Michael D. Shear et al., Trump’s Policy Could Alter the Face of the American Immigrant, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 14 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/14/us/immigration-public-charge-welfare.html 
[https://perma.cc/PFT8-8SH8]. Not everyone sees Trump’s rhetoric as racist. See Meredith Dost et al., Is 
President Trump’s Rhetoric Racist? It Depends on Whom You Ask, WASH. POST (Aug. 12, 2019), https:// 
beta.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/08/12/is-president-trumps-rhetoric-racist-it-depends-whom-you-ask/ 
[https://perma.cc/32MK-QK5Y] (noting that Americans disagree on whether Trump’s rhetoric is racist). 
has emboldened many with similar 
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Trump’s supporters apparently like his inflammatory rhetoric. See Astead W. Herndon, With the Faithful at 
Trump’s North Carolina Rally: ‘He Speaks Like Me,’ N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 11, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2019/09/10/us/politics/trump-voters-supporters-policies.html [perma.cc/382Y-ARGQ] (noting that “[i]n 
conversations with more than a dozen attendees before and after [Trump’s September 9, 2019 North Carolina] 
rally, they made clear that their support for the president was not in spite of his inflammatory rhetoric, but 
because his chosen targets often match their own”). 
policies have emboldened individuals with negative views about trans people to 
say trans-hostile things and to act out in trans-hostile ways
As Bobbi Strang, President of the District of Columbia’s Gay and Lesbian Activists Alliance, observed 
“[e]verywhere people are feeling empowered to say and act according to their worst impulses.” See Michael E. 
Miller, In 2018, They All Became the Victims of a Record Year of Hatred in D.C., WASH. POST, Aug. 26, 2019, at 
Al, A12 (“Many people who track hate crimes see a connection between Trump’s ugly political rhetoric aimed at 
immigrants and people of color and what has been unleashed in communities across the country.”); see also 
Tessa Berenson, Donald Trump’s Own Words Undermine His Case After El Paso Shooting, TIME (Aug. 5, 2019), 
https://time.com/5644433/donald-trump-el-paso-shooting-words/ [https://perma.cc/2SLD-KY68] (noting that 
many Democrats blamed Trump’s racist rhetoric for the El Paso shooting); Libby Nelson, “Why We Voted for 
Donald Trump”: David Duke Explains the White Supremacist Charlottesville Protests, VOX (Aug. 12, 2017) 
https://www.vox.com/2017/8/12/16138358/charlottesville-protests-david-duke-kkk [https://perma.cc/NPT2- 
W9GA] (noting that former KKK Grand Wizard David Duke proclaimed, “We are going to fulfill the promises 
of Donald Trump” at the neo-Nazi and alt-right rally in Charlottesville, Virginia in August 2017); Richard 
Parker, When Hate Came to El Paso, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 4, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/04/opinion/ 
el-paso-shooting.html [https://perma.cc/A4JY-SL3V] (opining that “the El Paso massacre . . . was the inevitable 
byproduct of the Trump era’s anti-immigrant, and anti-Latino invective, which with its pervasive, vile racism has 
poisoned our nation”). 
.
For example, in May 2018, Jazmina Saavedra, a Republican running for Congress, 
posted a live Facebook video of a confrontation she had with a transgender female at 
a Denny’s restaurant in Los Angeles.278 
LA Congressional Candidate Posts Video of Denny’s Bathroom Confrontation, ABC7 NEWS (May 18, 
2018), https://abc7.com/politics/la-congressional-candidate-posts-video-of-dennys-bathroom-confrontation/ 
3489200/ [https://perma.cc/DP2T-PAKE].
Saavedra told reporters that the incident 
“started when a waitress told her there was a man who said he was a woman using 
the women’s restroom.”279 Saavedra went into the restroom with her cellphone and 
confronted the transgender woman who was inside one of the bathroom’s stalls, ask-
ing (while videotaping herself), “Why you use the ladies’ room?”280 The transgender 
woman responded by saying, “You’re invading my privacy.”281 Saavedra confronted 
the transgender woman again when she left the restroom.282 Showing her lack of 
understanding regarding the difference between gender identity and sexual orienta-
tion, Saavedra justified her actions as representative of not just her views but of the 
views of the other customers as well, telling reporters, “This is so stupid . . . this [has] 
nothing to do about gay or nothing. This is about how myself [sic] and the other cus-
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not regret anything she said in her video.284 
Id.; see also Michelle Gant, Congressional Candidate Confronts Transgender Woman at Denny’s for 
Using Women’s Bathroom, FOX NEWS (May 18, 2018), https://www.foxnews.com/food-drink/congressional- 
candidate-confronts-transgender-woman-at-dennys-for-using-womens-bathroom [https://perma.cc/C3LP-R273]; 
Diana Stancy Correll, GOP House Candidate Live Streams Herself Challenging Transgender Woman for Using 
Women’s Restroom, WASH. EXAMINER (May 17, 2018), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/news/gop-house- 
candidate-live-streams-herself-challenging-transgender-woman-for-using-womens-restroom [https://perma.cc/ 
JNF3-W7EY]. Fortunately, Saavedra did not succeed in her attempt to be elected to the U.S. Congress. See 
California Election Results: 44th House District, N.Y. TIMES (June 11, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
elections/results/california-house-district-44-primary-election [https://perma.cc/4FKF-B83A]. Nanette Barragan, a 
Democrat, won that election with 65.9% of the votes. Id. Saavedra captured 10.1% of the votes. Id. 
It is rare for an individual to videotape themselves confronting a transgender 
person in the bathroom as Saavedra did. Indeed, many harassing incidents trans 
people experience are not even reported in the mainstream news media, but this 
does not mean that they are not occurring.285 
As Kendra Johnson, the Executive Director of NC Equality, noted after two women mocked and groped 
a transgender female who was trying to use the women’s restroom, “Incidents like this are really common, but 
unfortunately, many transgender and non-gender-conforming folks don’t have the resources or the ability to 
actually pursue any sort of support through law enforcement.” Robert Richardson, After Incident at Raleigh Bar, 
LGBTQ Advocates Say Assaults Too Common, CBS17 (Jan. 9, 2019), https://www.cbs17.com/news/local-news/ 
wake-county-news/after-incident-at-raleigh-bar-lgbtq-advocates-say-assaults-too-common/1694626461 [https:// 
perma.cc/86P9-JPVA].
I happened to find out about another 
such incident from a fellow female law professor colleague when I told her that I 
was writing this Article. In February 2018, my colleague took a transgender 
woman friend out for a bachelorette pub crawl two nights before her friend’s wed-
ding. When they got to a lesbian bar in New York City, the bouncer refused to let 
the transgender bride-to-be in. “She can’t come in,” the bouncer said, pointing to 
the bride-to-be. Astounded that this would happen at a lesbian bar, the law profes-
sor asked the bouncer, “Why not?” Looking at the bride-to-be’s driver’s license, 
which had been legally changed to show her sex as female, the bouncer responded, 
“It says she’s female and she’s not.” Incredulous, the law professor asked, “What 
do you mean?” Oddly (or perhaps not so oddly), the bouncer replied, “Just blame 
Trump because I voted for him.”286 
Conversation with a colleague at 2019 SEALS Annual Meeting, Boca Raton, Florida (July 29, 2019). 
That this incident took place at a lesbian bar is surprising but reflects a sad reality. Not all within the LGBTQ 
community welcome transgender individuals into that community. Some radical feminists believe that 
“transgender activism . . . harms women, and lesbians in particular” by contributing to “lesbian erasure”—the 
notion that “lesbians are systematically ‘erased’ and ignored within male-dominated LGBTQ activism and 
mainstream media[.]” Julie Compton, ‘Pro-lesbian’ or ‘Trans-exclusionary’? Old Animosities Boil into Public 
View, NBC NEWS (Jan. 14, 2019), https://www.nbcnews.com/feature/nbc-out/pro-lesbian-or-trans-exclusionary- 
old-animosities-boil-public-view-n958456 [https://perma.cc/M5K8-TYT6]; see also Phaylen Fairchild, A Letter 
to the Lesbians Who Hate Me, MEDIUM (July 17, 2019), https://medium.com/@Phaylen/a-letter-to-the-lesbians- 
who-hate-me-32dcafc0893 [https://perma.cc/6HJK-7JPP]. Some radical feminists reject the existence of 
transgender identity and believe “advancements in transgender rights will come at the expense of women’s rights 
and threaten the safety and sanctity of women-only spaces.” Samantha Schmidt, Conservatives Find Unlikely Ally 
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Some individuals who are explicitly biased against trans people have felt 
emboldened to go beyond mere words, expressing their hostility in actions. For 
example, on December 9, 2018, two women in their thirties “taunted, groped, and 
exposed themselves” to a twenty-nine-year-old transgender woman in the bath-
room of a North Carolina bar.287 
Michael Brice-Saddler, Two Women Charged with Sexually Assaulting a Transgender Woman in a North 
Carolina Bar Bathroom, WASH. POST (Jan. 9, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2019/01/09/two- 
north-carolinians-charged-with-sexually-assaulting-transgender-woman-bar-bathroom [https://perma.cc/LM98- 
XPK8].
The two women continued to harass the transgen-
der woman at the bar, despite the bartender’s repeated requests to stop.288 One of 
the women asked the transgender woman whether she had a penis.289 
Id. The two women were arrested and charged with sexual battery and second-degree kidnapping. Id. 
This incident occurred in the wake of highly controversial legislative action. In 2016, the North Carolina 
legislature passed legislation requiring people to use the public restroom that corresponds with the sex listed on 
their birth certificate rather than their gender identity. Id. North Carolina’s bathroom bill adversely affected the 
transgender community because North Carolina only permits individuals who have undergone sex-reassignment 
surgery to change the sex listed on their birth certificate. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-118(b)(4) (2019). North 
Carolina’s controversial bathroom bill (“H.B. 2”) led many to boycott North Carolina. See ‘Bathroom Bill’ to 
Cost North Carolina $3.76 Billion, CNBC (Mar. 27, 2017), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/03/27/bathroom-bill-to- 
cost-north-carolina-376-billion.html [https://perma.cc/3MWB-9WEG]. After losing a lot of business because of 
H.B. 2, the North Carolina legislature repealed H.B. 2 in 2017 and replaced it with legislation preventing local 
governments from passing ordinances to protect LGBT individuals. See Brice-Saddler, supra note 287; Jason 
Hanna et al., North Carolina Repeals ‘Bathroom Bill’, CNN (Mar. 30, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/03/30/ 
politics/north-carolina-hb2-agreement/index.html [https://perma.cc/72BM-FZ4Y].
A skeptic might say these incidents are isolated and just anecdotal evidence of 
anti-trans bias, but when considered along with the statistics discussed in Part I, it 
is hard to see these as anything other than a larger pattern of harassment, discrimi-
nation, and violence against the trans community. If a juror thinks that trans people 
are abnormal, that juror is not likely to be persuaded by prosecutorial appeals to 
see the trans victim as a vulnerable person who had good reasons to be reluctant to 
disclose that she was born with male genitalia. All the education in the world will 
not encourage an individual who is explicitly biased against transgender individu-
als to see the victim in a trans panic case as an ordinary human being who did noth-
ing to provoke the defendant other than being a transgender person.290 
B. Possible Objections to Legislatively Banning the Trans Panic Defense 
Before examining the legislative bans that been enacted thus far, I will address 
potential objections to legislatively banning the trans panic defense. Many of these 






290. Making bias salient didn’t work in the Brandon McInerney case. See Mallory M. Craig-Harim, 
Subverting the Perverted Practice of Provocation: Eliminating Modern Day Uses of LGBT Panic Defenses, 27 
TUL. J.L. & SEXUALITY 33, 34 n.2, 45 (2018) (coining the term “LGBT panic defenses” to encompass both gay 
panic and trans panic and pointing out that making LGBT biases salient did not help in the Brandon McInerney 
case); see also supra text accompanying notes 130–43. 
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1. Objection One: Even with a Legislative Ban, the Defendant Can Still Take 
the Stand and Get the Trans Panic Argument Before the Jury 
One potential objection to a legislative ban on the trans panic defense is that the 
defendant in a criminal case has a constitutional right to testify in his defense291 
and thus get the trans panic argument before the jury. Even in a jurisdiction where 
the trans panic defense strategy has been legislatively banned, a defendant claim-
ing trans panic can take the stand and tell the jury that he was so upset when he 
found out that the victim was a transgender individual that he lost his self- 
control.292 Even though the defendant would be barred from arguing that it was 
objectively reasonable for him to be provoked by this discovery, the defendant 
would still be able to tell the jury that he was in fact provoked into a heat of passion 
by the discovery that the victim was a transgender woman. Male jurors who would 
themselves be upset if they found out that they had been sexually intimate with or 
romantically attracted to a transgender woman, and female jurors who think trans-
gender people are deviant and abnormal might sympathize with the defendant and 
feel he should not be punished for murder. As I have previously noted, “[j]urors 
who are not already sensitive to the violence and discrimination leveled against the 
transgender community may be reluctant to condemn the defendant who claims he 
was provoked into a heat of passion by the discovery that the individual with 
whom he was intimate was biologically male.”293 
It is true that even with a legislative ban on the trans panic defense, a defendant 
could present the idea that he acted out of “trans panic” before the jury.294 
However, while such testimony would help the defendant satisfy the first element 
of a provocation defense—that the defendant was actually provoked into a heat of 
passion—it would not satisfy the second element—that there was legally adequate 
provocation in a jurisdiction with a legislative ban on the trans panic defense.295 To 
receive the provocation mitigation to voluntary manslaughter, a defendant would 
also have to convince the jury that the reasonable person in his shoes would have 
been provoked into a heat of passion.296 If a legislative ban were in place stating 
291. Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 49 (1987). 
292. Lee & Kwan, supra note 24, at 122 (“Fourth, the defendant has a constitutional right to testify, so even if 
the legislature were to enact a ban on trans panic defense arguments, the defendant would still have a 
constitutional right to tell his side of the story, and his story could include mention that he got tremendously upset 
upon discovering that his intimate partner was biologically male.”). 
293. Id. 
294. While criminal defendants have a right to testify in their own defense, many do not exercise this right 
because if they take the stand and testify, the government has a right to admit evidence of prior convictions that 
otherwise would be inadmissible. See FED. R. EVID. 609. 
295. See supra text accompanying notes 96–98. 
296. See supra text accompanying note 98. Which party bears the ultimate burden of proving (or disproving) 
the elements of the provocation defense depends on how legislators in the State in question drafted the 
provocation statute. Compare Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 691–92, 703–04 (1975) (finding that Maine law 
violated Due Process in placing the burden of establishing the provocation defense by a preponderance of the 
evidence on the defendant), with Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 206–07 (1997) (holding that New York 
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that an alleged provocation is not reasonable if it resulted from the discovery of the 
victim’s gender identity, the jury would not be able to lawfully return a voluntary 
manslaughter verdict. The only way a jury could return a voluntary manslaughter 
verdict for a defendant in such a jurisdiction would be by engaging in jury 
nullification.297 
A legislative ban prohibiting the trans panic defense would remove the jury’s 
ability to lawfully return a voluntary manslaughter conviction. The jury would 
have to engage in jury nullification if it wanted to give the defendant claiming trans 
panic a break. Since existing research suggests most juries try to follow the law 
and do not engage in jury nullification, the likelihood that a jury in a trans panic 
case would flout the law and acquit defendants who claim trans panic is small.298 
2. Objection Two: A Legislative Ban Would Violate the Defendant’s Due 
Process Right to Present a Defense 
Another potential objection to a legislative ban on the trans panic defense is that 
such a ban would infringe upon the defendant’s due process right to present a  
law, which placed the burden of proving extreme emotional disturbance on the defendant, comported with Due 
Process because such a showing would not “serve to negative any facts of the crime which the State is to prove in 
order to convict of murder”). To suggest, as the U.S. Supreme Court has done, that the provocation defense is a 
case-in-chief defense under which the provoked defendant is asserting that he lacked the mens rea for murder, 
and therefore the prosecution should bear the burden of disproving the elements of provocation, is not persuasive. 
In many provocation cases, the provoked killer fully intended to kill the victim and is simply arguing that his 
actions are understandable and should be partially excused given the circumstances, not that he lacked the mens 
rea required for murder. 
297. Jury nullification refers to the jury’s power to acquit a defendant even in the face of overwhelming 
evidence of guilt. See Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice 
System, 105 YALE L.J. 677, 700 (1995) (explaining the concept of jury nullification). There is little recent 
research on how often juries engage in jury nullification. This is probably because as a general matter, juries 
cannot be forced to talk about or explain their verdicts. See FED. R. EVID. 606(b) (subject to few exceptions, 
“[d]uring an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify about any statement made 
or incident that occurred during the jury’s deliberations; the effect of anything on that juror’s or another juror’s 
vote; or any juror’s mental processes concerning the verdict or indictment”); Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. 
Ct. 855, 864–67 (2017) (discussing Rule 606(b) and explaining that recognized exceptions to this “no- 
impeachment rule” are narrow). The available research, however, suggests that jury nullification probably occurs 
in only 4% of the few criminal cases that go to trial. See Jack Boeglin & Zachary Shapiro, A Theory of 
Differential Punishment, 70 VAND. L. REV. 1499, 1511 (2017) (noting that “while the frequency with which jury 
nullification occurs is notoriously difficult to calculate, the best estimates are that nullification occurs in only 
about four percent of criminal cases, and less than ten percent of criminal cases come in front of a jury in the first 
place” (citing Aaron McKnight, Jury Nullification as a Tool to Balance the Demands of Law and Justice, 2013 
B.Y.U. L. REV. 1103, 1109 (2014))). 
298. Since the very first ban on gay and trans panic defenses was enacted in 2014 and several of the existing 
bans were enacted the year this Article was being written, it is unclear whether juries in these jurisdictions are 
engaging in jury nullification in gay panic and trans panic cases. Most likely, the legislative bans that have been 
enacted thus far are encouraging defendants who might otherwise assert a gay or trans panic defense to plead 
guilty since their chances of success at trial are substantially diminished in a jurisdiction with a legislative ban in 
place. 
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defense.299 The U.S. Supreme Court has addressed whether limiting a defendant’s 
right to present a defense in other contexts violates due process, and its answer is a 
resounding no.300 
For example, in Montana v. Egelhoff,301 the Court considered a due process 
challenge to a Montana statute that barred the consideration of voluntary intoxica-
tion by jurors “in determining the existence of a mental state that is an element of 
the offense.”302 The defendant argued that the Montana statute violated his due 
process right to present evidence in his defense.303 
A plurality of the Court, in an opinion written by Justice Antonin Scalia, rejected 
the Montana Supreme Court’s conclusion that the statute violated due process.304 
Justice Scalia started by noting that the Montana Supreme Court based its decision on 
“the proposition that the Due Process Clause guarantees a defendant the right to pres-
ent and have considered by the jury ‘all relevant evidence to rebut the State’s evidence 
on all elements of the offense charge.’”305 This proposition, Justice Scalia explained, 
was not correct because a defendant’s right to present evidence is not absolute.306 
The plurality acknowledged that the Due Process Clause does place some limits 
on states attempting to restrict a defendant’s right to present a defense,307 but 
299. In Chambers v. Mississippi, the Supreme Court stated that “[t]he right of an accused in a criminal trial to 
due process is, in essence, the right to a fair opportunity to defend against the State’s accusations.” 410 U.S. 284, 
294 (1973). 
300. See Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 56 (1996); Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 779 (2006). I find 
these cases troubling because I think a defendant should have a nearly absolute right to present a defense, 
particularly if the defendant is asserting a case-in-chief defense, i.e. one in which the defendant alleges that the 
government has failed to prove an element of the charged offense. See Lee & Kwan, supra note 24, at 84 
(arguing that banning a case-in-chief defense is “problematic since the prosecution bears the burden of proving 
every essential element of the charged offense”). Case-in-chief defenses are commonly called failure-of-proof 
defenses. See 2 WAYNE LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW. § 9.1(a)(1) (3d ed. 2018) (defining a “failure of 
proof” defense as “one in which the defendant has introduced evidence at his criminal trial showing that some 
essential element of the crime charged has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt”). A defendant asserting a 
gay or trans panic defense tied to the doctrine of provocation, however, is not asserting a case-in-chief defense. 
The defendant is not alleging that he lacked the mens rea or any other element of the charged offense. 
Provocation is usually considered an affirmative defense, as opposed to a case-in-chief defense. See Reid G. 
Fontaine, Adequate (Non)Provocation and Heat of Passion as Excuse Not Justification, 43 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 27, 29 (2009) (noting that “[a] majority of United States jurisdictions recognize . . . heat of passion as an 
affirmative, partial defense to murder”); 21 AM. JURIS. 2D CRIM. L. § 177 (2019) (describing an affirmative 
defense as “one that admits the doing of the act charged, but seeks to justify, excuse, or mitigate it,” and 
distinguishing “simple defenses,” which attempt to negate an element of the offense). 
301. 518 U.S. 37 (1996). 
302. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-203 (2019). 
303. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. at 39–40 (“We consider in this case whether the Due Process Clause is violated by 
Montana Code Annotated § 45-2-203, which provides, in relevant part, that voluntary intoxication ‘may not be 
taken into consideration in determining the existence of a mental state which is an element of [a criminal] 
offense.’”). 
304. Id. at 56. 
305. Id. at 41–42 (citation omitted). 
306. Id. at 42. 
307. Id. at 42–43. 
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observed that “the defendant asserting such a limit must sustain the usual heavy 
burden that a due process claim entails[.]”308 Justice Scalia explained: 
Preventing and dealing with crime is much more the business of the States 
than it is of the Federal Government, and . . . we should not lightly construe 
the Constitution so as to intrude upon the administration of justice by the indi-
vidual States. . . . [I]t is normally within the power of the State to regulate pro-
cedures under which its laws are carried out, . . . and its decision in this regard 
is not subject to proscription under the Due Process Clause unless it offends 
some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our peo-
ple as to be ranked as fundamental.309 
In other words, a defendant alleging a due process violation must show that the 
state has offended a “fundamental principle of justice.”310 The plurality found that 
the defendant failed to show that the rule prohibiting defendants from introducing 
evidence of voluntary intoxication offended a principle of justice “so rooted in the 
tradition and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.”311 
Important to the plurality’s conclusion was this country’s long common law tra-
dition of disallowing defendants from offering evidence of voluntary intoxication 
in their defense.312 Even though courts in the nineteenth century “carve[d] out an 
exception to the common law’s traditional across-the-board condemnation of the 
drunken offender, allowing a jury to consider a defendant’s intoxication when 
assessing whether he possessed the mental state needed to commit the crime 
charged, where the crime was one requiring a ‘specific intent,’”313 the plurality 
noted that “one-fifth of the States either never adopted [this] ‘new common-law’ 
rule . . . or [later] abandoned it.”314 The fact that many states retained or reinstated 
the original common law rule prohibiting defendants from offering evidence of 
voluntary intoxication in their defense convinced the plurality that the more recent 
common law rule that allowed defendants to present such evidence to negate the 
mens rea was not a fundamental principle of justice.315 
The plurality also rejected the Montana Supreme Court’s interpretation of a 
statement in Chambers v. Misssissippi that “the right of an accused in a criminal 
trial to due process is, in essence, the right to a fair opportunity to defend against 
308. Id. at 43. 
309. Id. (quoting Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201–02 (1977)) (internal quotations and citations 
omitted). 
310. Id. 
311. Id. at 47–48 (“It is not the State which bears the burden of demonstrating that its rule is ‘deeply rooted,’ 
but rather respondent who must show that the principle of procedure violated by the rule (and allegedly required 
by due process) is ‘so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental’ . . . 
[t]hat showing has not been made.”). 
312. Id. at 44–45 (noting extensive evidence of a lengthy common law tradition of rejecting intoxication as a 
defense). 
313. Id. at 46. 
314. Id. at 48. 
315. Id. at 49. 
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the State’s accusations.”316 The plurality confined the Chambers decision to the 
facts and circumstances of that case and found that it did not establish a new princi-
ple of due process.317 
Ten years later, in 2006, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected another defendant’s 
argument that a rule precluding him from offering evidence of mental illness to 
negate the mens rea of the charged offense violated his due process right to present 
evidence in his defense. In Clark v. Arizona, a defendant charged with first-degree 
murder for shooting and killing a police officer conducting a traffic stop challenged 
the constitutionality of an amendment to Arizona’s insanity rule, disallowing 
defense evidence of mental illness to negate the mens rea.318 Echoing its reasoning 
in Egelhoff, the Court rejected the defendant’s due process challenge, holding 
“there is no violation of due process under Chambers and its progeny, and no cause 
to claim that channeling evidence on mental disease and capacity offends any 
‘principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to 
be ranked as fundamental.’”319 
If a defendant charged with murdering a transgender woman were to challenge 
the constitutionality of a legislative ban on the trans panic defense, he would bear 
the burden of showing that the right to present evidence supporting a trans panic 
defense “was so deeply rooted at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment (or per-
haps has become so deeply rooted since) as to be a fundamental principle which 
that Amendment enshrined.”320 It is unlikely that a defendant would be able to 
meet that burden. As Jordan Blair Woods notes, the trans panic defense, a rela-
tively new concept, is much less deeply rooted in this nation’s traditions and con-
science than the voluntary intoxication defense, which dates back to the 1800s.321 
316. 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973). 
317. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. at 51–52. To support this interpretation, the plurality quoted the following language 
from Chambers v. Mississippi: 
In reaching this judgment, we establish no new principles of constitutional law. Nor does our hold-
ing signal any diminution in the respect traditionally accorded to the States in the establishment 
and implementation of their own criminal trial rules and procedures. Rather, we hold quite simply 
that under the facts and circumstances of this case the rulings of the trial court deprived Chambers 
of a fair trial.  
Id. at 52 (quoting Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302–03) (emphasis added). 
318. 548 U.S. 735, 743–46 (2006). 
319. Id. at 779 (citation omitted). On March 23, 2020, the Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause 
does not require states to provide a specific test for insanity. See Kahler v. Kansas, 589 U.S. ___ (2020) (rejecting 
due process challenge to Kansas rule prohibiting criminal defendants from asserting insanity defense). 
320. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. at 48 (“The burden remains upon respondent to show that the ‘new common-law’ 
rule—that intoxication may be considered on the question of intent—was so deeply rooted at the time of the 
Fourteenth Amendment (or perhaps has become so deeply rooted since) as to be a fundamental principle which 
that Amendment enshrined.”). 
321. See WOODS ET AL., MODEL LEGISLATION FOR ELIMINATING THE GAY AND TRANS PANIC DEFENSES, supra 
note 90, at 1, 19–20 (explaining why the gay and trans panic defenses are not fundamental principles of justice 
protected by the Due Process Clause). 
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Therefore, it is unlikely that the Supreme Court would find that a legislative ban on 
the trans panic defense violates a defendant’s due process rights. 
3. Objection Three: A Legislative Ban is an Improper Attempt to Legislate 
Social Attitudes 
A third potential objection is that a legislative ban on the trans panic defense 
strategy is an attempt to legislate social attitudes. Underlying this argument is the 
assumption that the law should follow rather than lead social attitudes.322 
While the law often follows social attitudes,323 it is not uncommon for the law to 
lead rather than follow. For example, in the 1970s and 1980s, feminists success-
fully pushed for reform of rape laws.324 Even though social attitudes at that time 
about the way women should behave in matters involving sex differed significantly 
from social attitudes today,325 many legislatures eliminated the resistance require-
ment, which required proof that the victim resisted the sexual assault to her 
utmost.326 Some legislatures also eliminated the corroboration requirement, which 
required corroborating evidence such as torn clothing, bruises, and scratches.327 
The law of rape changed well before social attitudes changed and these changes 
had a profound influence on social attitudes about appropriate sexual behavior.328 
Indeed, changes in the law of rape over forty years ago probably helped pave the 
way to today’s #MeToo movement.329 
322. Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee, Race and Self Defense: Toward a Normative Conception of Reasonableness, 81 
MINN. L. REV. 367, 381–83, 90 (1996) (discussing debate over whether the criminal law should adhere to a non- 
instrumentalist approach that focuses on the defendant’s culpability or an instrumentalist approach that utilizes 
the criminal law to achieve broader social ends). 
323. For example, some have argued that the U.S. Supreme Court’s rulings in the recent marriage equality 
cases were the result of changes in social attitudes about heterosexuality and homosexuality. See Marco 
Morini, Same-Sex Marriage and Other Moral Taboos: Cultural Acceptances, Change in American Public 
Opinion and the Evidence from the Opinion Polls, 11 EUR. J. AM. STUD. 1, 10 (2017) (arguing that Obergefell 
“was the product of the decades of activism that made the idea of gay marriage seem plausible and right”). 
324. See Aya Gruber, Rape, Feminism, and the War on Crime, 84 WASH. L. REV. 581, 591–92 (2009) 
(describing the work of second-wave feminists in the 1970s and 80s to “reform rape law and educate the public 
about sexual assault stereotypes”); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Reforming the Law of Rape, 35 LAW & INEQ. 335, 337 
(2017) (noting that in the 1970s “[s]trong feminist organizations and rape-survivor advocacy groups joined with 
the general tough-on-crime movement” to push for reform of rape law). 
325. For an excellent examination of social attitudes and expectations regarding sexual activity between men 
and women at that time, see Jeannie Suk, “The Look in His Eyes”: The Story of Rusk and Rape Reform, in 
CRIMINAL LAW STORIES 171–211 (Foundation Press 2013); see also Gruber, supra note 324, at 630–34 
(describing how gender norms have shifted under third-wave feminism). 
326. See Gruber, supra note 324, at 593; Martha Chamallas, Consent, Equality, and the Legal Control of 
Sexual Conduct, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 777, 799 (1988) (explaining that the “requirement that the victim prove 
actual physical resistance in order to negate consent has been modified or rejected in most jurisdictions”). 
327. See Gruber, supra note 324, at 593; Chamallas, supra note 326, at 799 n.101 (explaining that eliminating 
the requirement that the victim’s testimony be corroborated was another significant feminist reform). 
328. Chamallas, supra note 326, at 799 (noting that feminist reform of rape laws “generated a deeper 
understanding” around issues such as consent). 
329. See Alison Gash & Ryan Harding, #MeToo? Legal Discourse and Everyday Responses to Sexual 
Violence, 7 LAWS 1 (2018) (arguing that changes in rape law brought rape out of the private realm); see also 
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Amanda Chatel, Should We Forgive Men Who Are Accused Of Sexual Assault If They Apologize, YOURTANGO 
(Jan. 26, 2018), https://www.yourtango.com/2018310185/should-we-forgive-men-who-are-accused-sexual- 
assault-if-they-apologize [https://perma.cc/2WAS-52FM] (suggesting that society should not forgive men who 
have engaged in sexual assault even if they apologize); Debra Soh, Do the Men of #MeToo Deserve to be 
Forgiven, THE GLOBE & MAIL (Sept. 6, 2018), https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-do-the-men- 
of-metoo-deserve-to-be-forgiven/ [https://perma.cc/XLG8-36G2] (noting that while most people say men guilty 
of a #MeToo moment do not deserve forgiveness or a second chance, there is a double standard at work under 
which celebrities tend to be forgiven and are given a second chance).  
A related objection is that a legislative ban on the trans panic defense strategy is 
an attempt to use the criminal law to legislate morality. Such attempts are problem-
atic, especially in light of the constantly shifting and culturally contingent nature 
of morality.330 While I agree with the sentiment underlying this objection—that 
the criminal law should not be used to legislate morality—a legislative ban on the 
trans panic defense is not an attempt to legislate morality. Such a ban is not trying 
to tell the defendant what he should or should not be doing in his private life. 
Rather, it is telling the jury that as a matter of law, it is not objectively reasonable 
to be provoked into a heat of passion by the discovery that another person is a 
transgender individual. 
Rather than an attempt to legislate morality, a ban on the trans panic defense is 
better understood as an attempt by the legislature to use the power of the law to 
express condemnation for certain behaviors. This is an accepted and traditional 
function of the criminal law.331 When a legislature chooses to ban the trans panic 
defense, it is simply making a normative judgment about what constitutes legally 
adequate provocation, as other legislatures have done before.332 
A legislative ban would send a clear message to the jury that in the legislature’s 
eyes, it is not reasonable to get so upset that one uses physical violence against a 
transgender woman upon discovering that her biological sex does not match her gen-
der identity. A legislative ban would also ensure that jurors reject trans panic argu-
ments far more effectively than a prosecutor’s appeals to the jury’s sense of fairness. 
4. Objection Four: If a Legislature Bans Trans Panic, It May Ban Other 
Equally Reprehensible Uses of the Provocation Defense 
A fourth possible objection might be called the slippery slope objection. The 
concern here is that if a legislature bans the trans panic defense, then it may ban 
330. Indeed, I raised this concern in my prior scholarship. See Lee & Kwan, supra note 24, at 121 (“Using the 
criminal law to dictate morality is deeply problematic given the constantly shifting and culturally contingent 
nature of morality.”). 
331. See Henry M. Hart Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 404–05 (1958) 
(explaining that “judgment of community condemnation . . . accompanies and justifies” imposition of criminal 
sanctions). See generally Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2044 
(1996) (noting that “criminal law is a prime arena for the expressive function of law”). 
332. See infra text accompanying notes 335–36 (discussing Maryland’s legislative ban on defendants arguing 
that the discovering of a spouse having sexual intercourse with another person constitutes legally adequate 
provocation and Minnesota’s legislative ban on defendants arguing that hearing a crying baby constitutes legally 
adequate provocation). 
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other reprehensible arguments linked to the provocation defense.333 For example, a 
legislature that bans the trans panic defense might feel as a matter of principle that 
it must also pass legislation barring male defendants from arguing that they were 
reasonably provoked into a heat of passion by the discovery of their spouse having 
sexual intercourse with another person. Arguably, just as the defendant asserting a 
trans panic defense seeks to reinforce negative stereotypes about trans individuals, 
a defendant asserting a provocation defense under these circumstances is trying to 
reinforce stereotypes about the proper role of women. 
My response to this argument is that even before legislatures started banning the 
gay and trans panic defenses, some legislatures had already categorically banned 
other uses of the provocation defense. For example, Maryland amended its crimi-
nal code in 1997 to bar defendants from arguing that the discovery of their spouse 
engaged in sexual intercourse with another constituted legally adequate provoca-
tion.334 
See H.R. 754, 1997 Reg. Sess. (Md. 1997) (amending the Maryland criminal code to add a section 
establishing that spousal adultery does not constitute provocation); Kimberly Wilmot-Weidman, After a 3-Year 
Fight, Murder is Finally Murder in Maryland, CHI. TRIB. (Nov. 23, 1997), https://www.chicagotribune.com/ 
news/ct-xpm-1997-11-23-9711230114-story.html [https://perma.cc/7Z4L-PM9F] (reporting that Maryland 
passed a revised law in May 1997 to remove spousal adultery as a mitigating factor to lessen a murder charge to a 
manslaughter charge); see also MD. CODE ANN. CRIM. LAW § 2-207(b) (2019) (providing that “[t]he discovery of 
one’s spouse engaged in sexual intercourse with another does not constitute legally adequate provocation for the 
purpose of mitigating a killing from the crime of murder to voluntary manslaughter even though the killing was 
provoked by that discovery”). 
Similarly, Minnesota amended its criminal code in 1988 to bar defendants 
from arguing that a crying baby constitutes legally adequate provocation.335 
Indeed, we have a long history in the United States of cabining the types of argu-
ments that defendants claiming provocation can make. As explained above, at 
early common law, courts recognized only five categories of legally adequate 
provocation.336 A defendant who did not fit within one of these five categories 
could not assert a provocation defense.337 Even after states abandoned the early 
common law approach to provocation, most retained the mere words rule, which 
333. In my prior scholarship, I expressed the concern that “if a legislature can categorically ban defendants 
from making trans panic arguments because it believes such arguments are morally reprehensible, it could 
categorically ban other defense arguments on moral grounds as well.” Lee & Kwan, supra note 24, at 121. 
334. 
335. See 1988 Minn. Laws 670–71, ch. 604, H.F. no. 10 (amending the Minnesota criminal code to “provide[] 
that the crying of a child does not constitute provocation”); see also MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.20(1) (2019) 
(providing that “[w]hoever . . . intentionally causes the death of another person in the heat of passion provoked 
by such words or acts of another as would provoke a person of ordinary self-control under like circumstances” is 
guilty of manslaughter in the first-degree “provided that the crying of a child does not constitute provocation”). 
336. See supra notes 93–94 and accompanying text (noting that at early common law, one could only receive 
the mitigation from murder to voluntary manslaughter if one fell within one of the following categories: “(1) an 
aggravated assault or battery, (2) the observation of a serious crime against a close relative, (3) an illegal arrest, 
(4) mutual combat, or (5) catching one’s wife in the act of adultery.”). 
337. See 2 WHARTON’S CRIMINAL LAW § 157 (15th ed. 2019) (“In order to reduce a homicide from murder to 
voluntary manslaughter, there must be provocation, and such provocation must be recognized by the law as 
adequate.”); Joshua Dressler, Rethinking Heat of Passion: A Defense in Search of a Rationale, 73 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 421, 428, 430 (1982) (giving examples of what would and would not constitute legally adequate 
provocation). 
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prevents defendants from arguing that mere words provoked them into a heat of 
passion.338 In most jurisdictions today, mere words do not constitute legally 
adequate provocation.339 
Legislative limitations on the provocation defense did not start with the recent 
legislative bans on gay and trans panic defenses. The history of the provocation 
defense reveals that the doctrine has always been a site for categorical inclusion 
and exclusion. 
5. Objection Five: A Legislative Ban on the Trans Panic Defense Would Force 
the Jury to Make an All-or-Nothing Choice and Lead to More Acquittals or 
Hung Juries 
A fifth possible objection to legislatively banning the trans panic defense is that 
taking away the voluntary manslaughter option would force the jury to make an 
all-or-nothing choice.340 If members of the jury are biased against trans people and 
therefore inclined to sympathize with the defendant claiming trans panic, they 
might choose to acquit the defendant rather than convict him of murder.341 
While it is true that jurors who sympathize with the defendant might want to find 
him not guilty of murder, the jury would have no legal basis to acquit the defendant 
if the legislature has banned the trans panic defense. The jury would have to ignore 
the law and engage in jury nullification if it wanted to find the defendant not guilty of 
murder. The available research, however, suggests that juries nullify in only about 
four percent of all criminal cases, suggesting that most jurors take their duty to follow 
the law seriously and would not acquit if the law precluded such a verdict.342 
A related concern is that a legislative ban on the trans panic defense might lead 
to more hung juries if jurors cannot agree on whether to convict the defendant of 
murder.343 In jurisdictions without a ban, juries can at least compromise and return 
338. 40 AM. JURIS. 2D HOMICIDE § 51 (2019) (“Mere words . . ., no matter how insulting or abusive, will not 
provide such provocation so as to reduce a homicide from murder to manslaughter.”); Buchhandler- 
Raphael, Fear-Based Provocation, supra note 104, at 1730–31 (“Most jurisdictions, however, exclude the 
[provocation] defense in cases involving words alone, without the deceased’s additional provocative action, no 
matter how offensive or insulting these words might have been to the specific defendant.”). 
339. See Dolores A. Donovan & Stephanie M. Wildman, Is the Reasonable Man Obsolete: A Critical 
Perspective on Self-Defense and Provocation, 14 LOY. L. A. L. REV. 435, 447 (1981) (explaining that 
“[a]uthorities agree that mere angry words” do not constitute legally adequate provocation). Cf. People v. Berry, 
556 P.2d 777, 782 (Cal. 1976) (finding that the trial court erred in refusing to give the jury an instruction on heat 
of passion provocation even though the defendant was largely provoked by his wife’s verbal admission that she 
had engaged in sexual relations with another man). 
340. Lee & Kwan, supra note 24, at 121 (“[A] legislative ban on trans panic arguments would force the jury to 
make an all-or-nothing choice.”). 
341. Id. (noting that “[i]n a jurisdiction where jurors are likely to sympathize with the defendant claiming gay 
or trans panic, a ban could result in more victories for defendants claiming trans panic, since jurors who believe 
murder is too harsh would not be permitted to find the defendant guilty of the lesser offense of manslaughter”). 
342. Id. at 120 (discussing jury nullification). 
343. Id. at 122 (noting that “[a]n all-or-nothing choice may also result in more hung juries since there is less 
room for compromise when the only choices are a murder conviction or a complete walk for the defendant”). 
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a verdict of guilty on voluntary manslaughter, but in a jurisdiction where the only 
option is a murder conviction or an acquittal, juries are less likely to come to agree-
ment. Jurors who sympathize with the defendant might be unwilling to convict the 
defendant of murder and jurors who think the defendant was not reasonably pro-
voked likely might be unwilling to acquit the defendant. 
As for the possibility of more hung juries, juries in trans panic cases might fail 
to reach agreement and hang even without a legislative ban. Even though there 
was no legislative ban on the trans panic defense in California at the time, the first 
jury in the Gwen Araujo case discussed above hung because some jurors felt the 
defendants should be convicted of murder while others sympathized with the 
defendants and felt voluntary manslaughter was the more appropriate charge.344 
Similarly, the jury in the Larry King case hung even though there was no legisla-
tive ban in place at the time because some jurors felt a guilty verdict on murder 
was appropriate while others felt murder was too harsh and that voluntary man-
slaughter was more appropriate.345 
6. Objection Six: A Legislative Ban Would Drive the Trans Panic Defense 
Underground, Enabling It to Be More Effective 
Another possible objection to a legislative ban is that it would push the conver-
sation about trans panic underground and allow jurors implicitly biased against 
trans individuals to simply act on their biases. This is a legitimate concern but is 
not ultimately persuasive because I am not arguing in favor of a legislative ban to 
the exclusion of education and vigilance on the part of prosecutors. I am arguing 
for both education and legislative action. Prosecutors still need to make the jury 
aware of the defense’s attempt to appeal to implicit and explicit anti-trans bias 
even if a legislative ban on trans panic is in place. 
7. Objection Seven: A Legislative Ban Is Not Needed Since Most Juries Reject 
the Trans Panic Defense 
Another possible objection is that a legislative ban on the trans panic defense is 
not needed because in most of the recent cases where it was asserted, the jury 
rejected the defense.346 While it may be true that juries rejected the trans panic 
defense in most of the recent trans panic cases that we know about, there are prob-
ably many more trans panic cases that are not known or publicly reported. Not 
only is it the case that most criminal trials take place in courtrooms throughout the 
country without any press coverage, most criminal cases are not even tried in open 
344. See Glionna, supra note 162 (explaining that jurors were “deadlocked over whether the slaying was 
premeditated and therefore first-degree murder”). 
345. See supra text accompanying notes 141–42 (discussing the fact that the jury hung in this case). 
346. See Wodda & Panfil, supra note 18, at 942–57, 968 (acknowledging that “most attempts to use the trans* 
panic defense have been defeated in court”). 
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court. The vast majority of criminal cases end in a guilty plea before a trial even 
takes place.347 
Moreover, we know that at least some jurors will find the trans panic defense 
persuasive, and all it takes is one juror to hang a jury. A juror is likely to find the 
trans panic defense persuasive if that juror feels a sense of moral outrage when 
transgender individuals express their gender identity. 
A recent study found that conservative jurors are significantly less punitive in 
cases where the defendant claimed to have acted out of “gay panic” compared to 
cases where the defendant did not assert a gay panic defense.348 The authors of this 
study theorized that conservative jurors feel less moral outrage towards a defend-
ant who kills a gay man who makes a sexual advance because the gay male vic-
tim’s behavior violates their moral values.349 If this type of leniency by 
conservative jurors occurs in gay panic cases, it is also likely to occur in trans panic 
cases where the sense of moral outrage might be even greater since gays and les-
bians have achieved a higher degree of acceptance in today’s society than trans 
people.350 
See Samantha Schmidt, Americans’ Views Flipped on Gay Rights. How Did Minds Change so Quickly?, 
WASH. POST (June 7, 2019), https://beta.washingtonpost.com/local/social-issues/americans-views-flipped-on- 
gay-rights-how-did-minds-change-so-quickly/2019/06/07/ae256016-8720-11e9-98c1-e945ae5db8fb_story.html 
[https://perma.cc/734U-82AU] (noting that “[a]s recently as 2004, polls showed that the majority of Americans—60 
percent—opposed same-sex marriage, while only 31 percent were in favor, according to the Pew Research Center” 
and that “[t]oday, those numbers are reversed: 61 percent support same-sex marriage, while 31 oppose it”). In 
contrast, recent polls show that Americans have more negative views about trans people than other groups. See supra 
note 120 (discussing societal attitudes toward trans people). Despite these changes in social attitudes, being a gay man 
married to another man is still viewed with disfavor in some parts of the country. See Trip Gabriel, As Buttigieg 
Courts Black Voters, His Sexuality is a Hurdle, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2019, at A22, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/ 
10/27/us/politics/pete-buttigieg-south-carolina.html [https://perma.cc/R2CL-S67C] (pointing out that Pete Buttigieg’s 
being a man married to another man is not well favored in the South). Jordan Blair Woods observes that prior to the 
mid-1970’s, when many states had sodomy laws on the books that were primarily enforced against gays, LGBT 
people involved in the criminal justice system were largely seen as deviant sexual offenders. Today, in contrast, 
LGBT individuals are largely viewed as innocent victims of hate crimes. Jordan Blair Woods, LGBT Identity and 
Crime, 105 CAL. L. REV. 667, 705 (2017). 
8. Objection Eight: A Legislative Ban is Only Effective at Banning the Trans 
Panic Defense if the Case Goes to Trial 
Finally, one might argue that a legislative ban on the trans panic defense is 
unlikely to be effective since upwards of ninety-four percent of all criminal cases 
are resolved by plea bargain as opposed to a trial.351 Under this objection, a 
347. See Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 143 (2012) (observing that “[n]inety-seven percent of federal 
convictions and ninety-four percent of state convictions are the result of guilty pleas”). 
348. See Salerno et al., supra note 108 (finding that conservative jurors were significantly less punitive when a 
male murder defendant charged with killing a gay man claimed he acted out of gay panic as compared to when 
the defendant did not claim gay panic). 
349. Id. at 27. 
350. 
351. Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 143 (2012) (observing that “[n]inety-seven percent of federal 
convictions and ninety-four percent of state convictions are the result of guilty pleas”). 
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legislative ban is a prohibition on a particular trial strategy, and therefore would 
only work if the case goes to trial. 
While it is true that a legislative ban on the trans panic defense aims to limit a 
particular defense strategy at trial, a ban would also likely encourage defendants to 
plead guilty and thus help prosecutors secure convictions. Indeed, if the legislative 
ban recently passed in New York had been in effect in 2013, James Dixon, the man 
who killed Islan Nettles upon discovering her transgender status, may have been 
charged with murder rather than first-degree manslaughter in the first place, and 
may have then agreed to plead guilty to first-degree manslaughter rather than 
second-degree manslaughter. 
Despite these objections, many legislatures have begun the process of enacting 
legislative bans on gay and trans panic defense strategies. The next Part outlines 
several of these bans. 
IV. LEGISLATIVE BANS ON GAY AND TRANS PANIC DEFENSES 
This Part starts with the American Bar Association’s 2013 resolution asking the 
federal government and state governments to ban the use of gay and trans panic 
defense strategies. It then provides an overview of the existing legislative bans on 
gay and trans panic defenses. Next, it analyzes two proposed legislative bans that 
are significantly different from the bans that have been enacted and those pending 
in other states. Finally, this Part concludes by proposing model legislation that bor-
rows the best features from the existing bans. 
In August 2013, the American Bar Association (“ABA”) passed a resolution 
urging all states and the federal government to legislatively ban the use of gay and 
trans panic defenses.352 
The ABA called upon “federal, tribal, state, local and territorial governments to take legislative action to 
curtail the availability and effectiveness of the ‘gay panic’ and ‘trans panic’ defenses.” AM. BAR ASS’N H.D. 
RES. 113A (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013), https://lgbtbar.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/Gay-and-Trans-Panic- 
Defenses-Resolution.pdf.
The ABA explained that legislatures should mandate two 
things: (1) jury instructions on bias and prejudice, and (2) a statement that neither a 
non-violent sexual advance nor the discovery of a person’s sex or gender identity 
constitutes legally adequate provocation sufficient to mitigate the crime of murder 
to manslaughter.353 Specifically, ABA Resolution 113A urged legislatures to pass 
legislation:  
(a) Requiring courts in any criminal trial or proceeding, upon the request of 
a party, to instruct the jury not to let bias, sympathy, prejudice, or public 
opinion influence its decision about the victims, witnesses, or defendants 
based upon sexual orientation or gender identity; and  
(b) Specifying that neither a non-violent sexual advance, nor the discovery 
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provocation to mitigate the crime of murder to manslaughter, or to miti-
gate the severity of any non-capital crime.354 
A. Existing Legislative Bans on Gay or Trans Panic Defenses 
Following passage of the ABA’s 2013 resolution, California became the first 
state to ban gay and trans panic defenses in 2014. Illinois followed in 2017. Rhode 
Island was the next state to ban gay and trans panic defenses in 2018. Nevada, 
New York, Hawaii, Connecticut, and Maine passed similar legislation in 2019. In 
early 2020, New Jersey and the state of Washington became the latest states to 
enact bans on gay and trans panic defenses. Similar legislation is pending in sev-
eral states and in the U.S. Congress. 
While all of these legislative bans share the goal of prohibiting criminal defend-
ants from using a gay or trans panic defense strategy to justify, excuse, or mitigate 
a murder charge, and many of the bills utilize language similar to what is in the 
California legislation, the bills differ in nuanced and important ways. I discuss 
these differences below and offer concrete suggestions to strengthen legislative 
reform in this area. 
1. California (2014) 
In 2014, California became the first state to pass a legislative ban on gay and 
trans panic defenses.355 
See Parker Marie Molloy, California Becomes First State to Ban Gay, Trans ‘Panic’ Defenses, 
ADVOCATE (Sept. 29, 2014), https://www.advocate.com/crime/2014/09/29/california-becomes-first-state-ban- 
gay-trans-panic-defenses [https://perma.cc/Z2YA-66GN].
Assembly Bill 2501 amended California Penal Code 
Section 192 by adding Subsection (f), specifying:  
(1) For purposes of determining sudden quarrel or heat of passion pursuant to 
subdivision (a), the provocation was not objectively reasonable if it 
resulted from the discovery of, knowledge about, or potential disclosure 
of the victim’s actual or perceived gender, gender identity, gender expres-
sion, or sexual orientation, including under circumstances in which the 
victim made an unwanted nonforcible romantic or sexual advance towards 
the defendant, or if the defendant and the victim dated or had a romantic 
or sexual relationship. Nothing in this section shall preclude the jury from 
considering all relevant facts to determine whether the defendant was in 
fact provoked for purposes of establishing subjective provocation. 
(2) For purposes of this subdivision, ‘gender’ includes a person’s gender iden-
tity and gender-related appearance and behavior regardless of whether 
that appearance or behavior is associated with the person’s gender as 




356. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 192(f)(1), (2) (2019). 
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In stating that provocation is not objectively reasonable if it is the result of the 
discovery of, knowledge about, or potential disclosure of the victim’s gender, gen-
der identity, or sexual orientation, Subsection (f)(1) makes a normative assessment 
about whether what the defendant claims provoked him constitutes “legal adequate 
provocation.” Such determinations are usually left to the jury in jurisdictions that 
follow the modern approach. Some might argue, as I once did, that this kind of 
assessment should be left to the jury, rather than the legislature, because reasonable 
minds can disagree as to whether it is reasonable for a defendant to be provoked 
into a heat of passion by a non-violent sexual advance or the discovery that the vic-
tim’s sex does not align with her gender identity. 
As discussed above, however, the law has always played a role in defining what 
counts as legally adequate provocation. At early common law, for example, the 
law specified a limited number of categories of actions that constituted legally 
adequate provocation.357 If one was provoked into a heat of passion by a person, 
act, or event that fell outside one of these categories, one could not receive the 
provocation mitigation. 
Even today, most jurisdictions abide by the mere words rule, which is that words 
alone, no matter how offensive or provocative, can never constitute legally 
adequate provocation.358 In putting mere words outside the scope of what consti-
tutes legally adequate provocation, the law makes a statement that it is not norma-
tively reasonable to be provoked by mere words. 
Other examples of the law defining what constitutes legally adequate provo-
cation exist. In Minnesota, for example, a defendant may not claim the provoca-
tion mitigation if what provoked him was a crying baby because the legislature 
has banned such arguments.359 Similarly, in Maryland, a defendant may not 
claim the provocation mitigation by claiming that the discovery of his or her 
spouse in the act of adultery provoked the defendant into a heat of passion 
because the Maryland legislature has decided that this does not constitute legally 
adequate provocation.360 
California’s law banning gay and trans panic defense arguments is just another 
example of the law defining the contours of what constitutes legally adequate 
357. See supra text accompanying notes 93–94. 
358. See United States v. Slager, 912 F.3d 224, 236 (4th Cir. 2019) (noting that “mere words” generally 
constitute inadequate provocation to negate a finding of malice) (internal quotations and citation omitted); 
Stevens v. McBride, 489 F.3d 883, 892 (7th Cir. 2007) (noting that “words alone cannot constitute sufficient 
provocation to give rise to a finding of sudden heat warranting an instruction on voluntary manslaughter”) 
(internal quotation and citation omitted). 
359. MINN. STAT. § 609.20(1) (2019) (“Whoever . . . intentionally causes the death of another person in the 
heat of passion provoked by such words or acts of another as would provoke a person of ordinary self-control 
under like circumstances” is guilty of manslaughter in the first-degree “provided that the crying of a child does 
not constitute provocation”). 
360. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-207(b) (2019) (providing that “[t]he discovery of one’s spouse engaged 
in sexual intercourse with another does not constitute legally adequate provocation for the purpose of mitigating 
a killing from the crime of murder to voluntary manslaughter even though the killing was provoked by that 
discovery”). 
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provocation. Subsection (f)(1) correctly focuses the factfinder’s attention on 
whether the provocation resulted from the discovery of, knowledge about, or dis-
closure of the victim’s gender, gender identity, gender expression, or sexual orien-
tation. It makes sense to preclude the provocation defense in these cases since it is 
clearly unreasonable to lose one’s self-control after learning that another person is 
gay or a transgender individual. One should not be excused for physical violence 
against another person due to their sexual orientation or gender identity. 
Subsection (f)(1) acknowledges that a defendant might have discovered that the 
victim was gay if the victim made an unwanted, non-forcible romantic or sexual 
advance toward the defendant. Likewise, the defendant might have discovered that 
the victim was a transgender woman in the course of a romantic or sexual relation-
ship. The prohibition, however, only applies if the alleged provocation resulted 
from the discovery of, knowledge about, or disclosure of the victim’s gender iden-
tity or sexual orientation. Thus, even though most people assume the opposite 
when they hear that a legislative ban on gay and trans panic defenses has been 
enacted, California’s legislation does not bar a defendant from arguing that he was 
provoked into a heat of passion by a non-violent homosexual advance. Subsection 
(f)(1) simply says that a defendant’s claimed provocation is not objectively reason-
able and therefore is not legally adequate if it stemmed from the defendant’s dis-
covery of, knowledge about, or potential disclosure of the victim’s gender identity 
or sexual orientation. 
Subsection (f)(1) also makes clear that the jury may consider all relevant facts in 
assessing whether the defendant was in fact provoked, providing that “[n]othing in 
this section shall preclude the jury from considering all relevant facts to determine 
whether the defendant was in fact provoked for purposes of establishing subjective 
provocation.”361 In other words, if the defendant claims he was provoked into a 
heat of passion by the discovery that the victim was a transgender woman, the jury 
can consider this as part of the inquiry into whether the defendant was actually pro-
voked into a heat of passion, one of the requirements for a heat of passion claim. 
This kind of information, however, cannot be used to show the defendant was rea-
sonably provoked into a heat of provocation because Subsection (f)(1) explicitly 
states that it is not reasonable to be provoked into a heat of passion by the discov-
ery of or knowledge of an individual’s gender identity or sexual orientation.362 
Even if the jury believes the defendant was actually provoked into a heat of pas-
sion, it may not return a verdict of voluntary manslaughter unless it disregards the 
law because what the defendant claims provoked him is not legally adequate prov-
ocation under the new law. 
The jury may, however, use the fact that the defendant was actually provoked to 
reduce a first-degree murder charge to second-degree murder. The “[n]othing in 
this section shall preclude the jury” language in Subsection (f)(1) enables a 
361. CAL. PENAL CODE § 192(f)(1) (2019). 
362. Id. 
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defendant charged with first-degree murder to use the fact that he was actually pro-
voked to support a second-degree murder conviction. The defendant can argue that 
because he was actually provoked into a heat of passion, he could not have 
engaged in the thoughtful premeditation and deliberation needed for a first-degree 
murder conviction.363 
2. Illinois (2017) 
In May 2017, Illinois became the second state to legislatively ban gay and trans 
panic defenses when the Illinois legislature amended its Criminal Code to disallow 
the discovery, knowledge, or disclosure of the victim’s sexual orientation as a miti-
gating factor for first-degree murder.364 
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-1(c) (2020). The Illinois ban passed unanimously. See Sophia Tareen, Activists 
to Copy Illinois ‘Gay Panic Defense’ Ban Elsewhere, ASSOC. PRESS (Dec. 28, 2017), https://apnews.com/ 
9dc24f2031c8465081d790152f6efbd8 [https://perma.cc/V9QH-CMEF] (noting that “[a]fter a lackluster attempt 
in 2016, the Illinois ban sailed through the Legislature in May with no opposition and Republican Gov. Bruce 
Rauner signed it into law without comment”); Richard Gonzales, Illinois to Ban ‘Gay Panic Defense’ In New 
Year, NPR (Dec. 28, 2017), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/12/28/574453009/illinois-to-ban- 
gay-panic-defense-in-new-year [https://perma.cc/CF52-377L] (reporting that “[o]n Monday, Illinois will become 
the second state to ban the so-called gay panic defense in cases in which a murder defendant tries to justify his 
violence as a reaction to learning that the victim was gay”); see also 2017 LGBTQ Legislative Agenda, EQUAL. 
ILLINOIS, https://www.equalityillinois.us/2017-legis [https://perma.cc/NUT6-UXQR]; Press Release, Equality 
Illinois, Governor Rauner Approves Ban on Use of LGBTQ Panic Defense, https://www.equalityillinois.us/ 
about-us/press-releases/panic-defense-ban [https://perma.cc/7W25-T7QL].
At first glance, it appears that Illinois does 
not prohibit murder defendants from asserting a trans panic defense since the legis-
lation references only sexual orientation, not gender identity.365 In fact, however, 
the legislation does prohibit the trans panic defense strategy since it incorporates 
by reference the Illinois Human Rights Act, which provides: 
“Sexual orientation” means actual or perceived heterosexuality, homosexual-
ity, bisexuality, or gender-related identity, whether or not traditionally associ-
ated with the person’s designated sex at birth. “Sexual orientation” does not 
include a physical or sexual attraction to a minor by an adult.366 
Illinois Human Rights Act, 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-103 (2020) (emphasis added), http://ilga.gov/ 
legislation/ilcs/ilcs4.asp?DocName=077500050HArt%2Eþ1&ActID=2266&ChapterID=64&SeqStart=100000& 
SeqEnd=600000. I thank Anthony Kreis, Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law, 
Illinois Institute of Technology, for assisting me with the interpretation of the Illinois ban. Professor Kreis was 
instrumental in getting the Illinois legislation enacted. 
Unlike in most jurisdictions where the provocation defense mitigates a murder 
charge down to voluntary manslaughter, in Illinois, legally adequate provocation  
363. Apparently, the California Attorneys for Criminal Justice, a group that represents the interests of the 
criminal defense bar in California, lobbied to get this language added to the California legislation so it would be 
clear that subjective provocation could help a first-degree murder defendant trying to show he lacked the specific 
intent required for conviction. Telephone Conversation with William DuBois, attorney for Jose Merel 
(November 2, 2019). 
364. 
 
365. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-1(c). 
366. 
2020]                                THE TRANS PANIC DEFENSE REVISITED                                1471 
mitigates a first-degree murder charge to second-degree murder.367 Under the 
Illinois Criminal Code, a person commits second-degree murder when he or she 
commits first-degree murder and certain mitigating factors are present.368 Relevant 
to the trans panic defense, one mitigating factor is “acting under a sudden and 
intense passion resulting from serious provocation[.]”369 
Before 2017, Illinois defined “serious provocation,” i.e., legally adequate provoca-
tion, as “conduct sufficient to excite an intense passion in a reasonable person[.]”370 
In 2017, the legislature amended its Criminal Code to ban gay and trans panic 
defenses by adding the following language to Section 9-2(b): 
[P]rovided, however, that an action that does not otherwise constitute serious 
provocation cannot qualify as serious provocation because of the discovery, 
knowledge, or disclosure of the victim’s sexual orientation as defined in 
Section 1-103 of the Illinois Human Rights Act.371 
What this means is that in Illinois, in contrast to California, neither a gay nor a 
trans panic argument can be used to mitigate a first-degree murder charge down to 
second-degree murder. 
Confusingly, while Section 9-2(a) follows the modern reasonable person test for 
provocation for defendants charged with first-degree murder seeking a mitigation 
to second-degree murder,372 another section of the Illinois Criminal Code adopts 
language from the MPC’s extreme mental or emotional disturbance defense for 
defendants charged with first-degree murder who are facing a possible death sen-
tence. Section 9-1(c)(2) lists as a mitigating factor for not elevating first-degree 
murder to capital murder the fact that “the murder was committed while the de-
fendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance, 
although not such as to constitute a defense to prosecution[.]”373 In 2017, Illinois 
added language to Section 9-1(c) barring “the discovery, knowledge, or disclosure 
of the victim’s sexual orientation” as a mitigating factor.374 Because the Illinois 
statute incorporates by reference the Illinois Human Rights Act’s definition of  
367. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-2(a)(1) (2018). In 1986, the Illinois state legislature enacted Public Act 84- 
1450, amending Section 9-2 of the Illinois Criminal Code of 1961, changing the offense of murder to first-degree 
murder and abolishing the offense of voluntary manslaughter, replacing it with the offense of second-degree 
murder. See People v. Jeffries, 646 N.E.2d 587, 590–91 (Ill. 1995). 
368. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-2(a)(1). 
369. Id. 
370. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-2(b) (2017). Confusingly, the Illinois courts still apply the early common 
law approach under which legally adequate provocation was limited to a handful of specified categories. See 
People v. McDonald, 77 N.E.3d 26, 42 (Ill. 2016) (“The only categories recognized by this court to constitute 
serious provocation are substantial physical injury or substantial physical assault, mutual quarrel or combat, 
illegal arrest, and adultery with the offender’s spouse.”). 
371. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-2(b) (2018). 
372. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-2(a). 
373. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-1(c)(2) (2020). 
374. Id. § 5/9-1(c). 
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sexual orientation, which includes gender identity,375 a defendant charged with 
capital murder in Illinois may not assert a gay or trans panic argument as a reason 
for the jury to recommend life rather than imposition of the death penalty. 
3. Rhode Island (2018) 
In 2018, Rhode Island passed legislation similar to California’s, amending 
Chapter 12-17 of the Rhode Island General Laws entitled “Trials” by adding a new 
Section 12-17-17.376 The new Section explains that provocation is not objectively 
reasonable if: 
. . . it resulted solely from the discovery of, knowledge about, or potential dis-
closure of the victim’s actual or perceived gender, gender identity, gender 
expression, or sexual orientation, including under circumstances in which the 
victim made an unwanted, non-forcible romantic or sexual advance toward 
the defendant, or if the defendant and victim dated or had a romantic 
relationship.377 
Notably, Rhode Island goes further than California since it does not simply pro-
hibit the use of gay and trans panic arguments to support claims of provocation, 
but also prohibits the use of gay and trans panic arguments to support claims of 
diminished capacity and self-defense. Newly added Section 12-17-18, entitled 
“Restrictions on the defense of diminished capacity,” provides: 
A defendant does not suffer from reduced mental capacity based solely on the 
discovery of, knowledge about, or potential disclosure of the victim’s actual 
or perceived gender, gender identity, gender expression, or sexual orientation, 
including under circumstances in which the victim made an unwanted, non- 
forcible romantic or sexual advance toward the defendant, or if the defendant 
and victim dated or had a romantic or sexual relationship.378 
Newly added Section 12-17-19, entitled “Restrictions on the defense of self- 
defense,” provides: 
A person is not justified in using force against another based solely on the dis-
covery of, knowledge about, or potential disclosure of the victim’s actual or 
perceived gender, gender identity, gender expression, or sexual orientation, 
including under circumstances in which the victim made an unwanted, non- 
forcible romantic or sexual advance toward the defendant, or if the defendant 
and victim dated or had a romantic or sexual relationship.379 
375. See text accompanying note 368. 
376. 12 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-17-17 (2018). 
377. Id. (emphasis added). 
378. 12 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-17-18 (2018) (emphasis added). 
379. 12 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-17-19 (2018) (emphasis added). 
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The Rhode Island legislature explained that its purpose in enacting these provi-
sions was not only to “restrict the use of a victim’s gender or sexual orientation as 
a defense by any defendant claiming provocation, diminished capacity or self- 
defense,” but also to “prohibit the court from allowing such information into evi-
dence.”380 In specifying that courts are prohibited from allowing such information 
into evidence, the Rhode Island legislation goes further to protect against defend-
ants trying to utilize gay and trans panic arguments than either California or 
Illinois.381 
While Rhode Island significantly limits a defendant’s ability to mount a gay or 
trans panic defense strategy, it is more helpful to defendants than the California 
legislation in one respect. In including the term “solely” in all three newly added 
provisions, Rhode Island permits a defendant to argue provocation, mental inca-
pacity, or self-defense based upon the discovery of the victim’s actual or perceived 
gender, gender identity, gender expression, or sexual expression as long as the de-
fendant can point to some other reason for his being provoked into a heat of pas-
sion (or his loss of mental capacity, or his use of force in self-defense) in addition 
to the discovery of the victim’s gender, gender identity, gender expression or sex-
ual expression.382 
It is unclear whether this was simply an oversight by the legislature or whether the legislature purposely 
included the word “solely” to give murder defendants the ability to make a gay or trans panic argument to the 
jury. There is very little legislative history on this question. See Omar T. Russo, How to Get Away with Murder: 
The “Gay Panic” Defense, 35 TOURO L. REV. 811, 835 (2019) (noting that one legislator, “Justin Price, 
expressed concerns that such a ban would be harmful because it permits the withholding of information (the 
victim’s sexual orientation or gender identity) from the jury and, thus, prevents them from making a sound 
decision”); Katherine Gregg, R.I. House Votes to End ‘Gay or Trans’ Panic Defense, PROVIDENCE J. (May 22, 
2018), https://www.providencejournal.com/news/20180522/ri-house-votes-to-end-gay-or-trans-panic-defense 
[https://perma.cc/2USR-L86E] (reporting that Rep. Justin Price was quoted as indicating his concern about 
withholding from jurors “all the information as far as what happened during an altercation, I don’t think that they 
[can] make a sound decision,” during the brief floor discussion). 
It is unclear whether this was simply an oversight or whether the 
Rhode Island legislature purposely included the word “solely” to counter criminal 
defense bar objections and ensure passage of the legislation. 
4. Nevada (2019) 
In May 2019, Nevada became the fourth state in the United States to pass legis-
lation banning gay and trans panic defenses.383 
Nevada Just Banned Gay and Trans ‘Panic’ Defenses—Which State Will Be Next?, LGBT BAR (May 17, 
2019), https://lgbtbar.org/bar-news/nevada-just-banned-gay-and-trans-panic-defenses-which-state-will-be-next 
[https://perma.cc/VH73-MSFR] (noting that SB 97 “passed in both houses, and on May 16, [2019], Governor 
Sisolak signed the bill into law”). 
Section 193.225 provides that, in 
the context of a defendant asserting a provocation defense, the alleged heat of pas-
sion or provocation is not objectively reasonable if: 
380. Id. (Explanation by the Legislative Council of an Act Relating to Criminal Procedure—Trials). 
381. In limiting the evidence that may be admitted at trial, the Rhode Island legislature may have been 
responding to calls for reform in this area. In 2015, for example, Kelly Strader and others proposed a “gay shield” 
rule of evidence that would limit the trial court’s ability to admit evidence designed to provoke homophobic and 
transphobic responses in jurors. See Strader et al., supra note 130, at 1474, 1526. 
382. 
383. 
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[I]t resulted from the discovery of, knowledge about or potential disclosure of 
the actual or perceived sexual orientation or gender identity or expression of 
the victim, including, without limitation, under circumstances in which the 
victim made an unwanted nonforcible romantic or sexual advance towards the 
defendant, or if the defendant and victim dated or had a romantic or sexual 
relationship.384 
Like Rhode Island, Nevada also prohibits a defendant from using trans panic to 
support a claim of self-defense, stating: 
A person is not justified in using force against another person based on the dis-
covery of, knowledge about or potential disclosure of the actual or perceived 
sexual orientation or gender identity or expression of the victim, including, 
without limitation, under circumstances in which the victim made an 
unwanted nonforcible romantic or sexual advance towards the defendant, or if 
the defendant and victim dated or had a romantic or sexual relationship.385 
Nevada, however, does not bar a defendant from basing a diminished capacity 
or temporary insanity defense on the discovery of, knowledge about, or potential 
disclosure of the victim’s actual or perceived sexual orientation or gender identity 
as does Rhode Island.386 
Also unlike Rhode Island, Nevada does not include the word “solely” in any of 
its new provisions, and thus prevents a defendant from making a gay or trans panic 
argument by alleging that something in addition to the discovery that the victim 
was a gay man or a transgender woman, such as an allegedly provocative sexual 
advance, provoked him into a heat of passion or caused him to reasonably believe 
he needed to use deadly force in self-defense. In this way, Nevada is not as defend-
ant-friendly as Rhode Island. 
5. New York (2019) 
On June 19, 2019, New York became the fifth state to ban gay and trans panic 
defense strategies when the New York Assembly voted to enact State Assembly 
Bill A8375.387 Governor Cuomo had a huge influence on the passage of this legis-
lative ban, publicly urging the New York legislature to pass this legislation.388  
See NY Gov. Cuomo: Eliminate ‘Gay Panic’ Defense, U.S. NEWS (June 2, 2019), https://www.usnews. 
com/news/best-states/new-york/articles/2019-06-02/ny-gov-cuomo-eliminate-gay-panic-defense [https://perma. 
cc/6BLK-VP86]; Denis Slattery, Gov. Cuomo Makes Progressive Push for LGBTQ Bills Allowing Surrogacy and 
Ending “Gay Panic” Defense as End of Legislative Session Nears, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (May 31, 2019), https:// 
www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/ny-cuomo-progressive-lgbtq-surrogacy-gay-panic-20190531-vtjnii2y25by 
7ija5iskv5ajti-story.html [https://perma.cc/EDS5-8SWZ].
384. NEV. REV. STAT. § 193.225(1) (2019). 
385. Id. § 193.225(2). 
386. See 12 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-17-18 (2018). 
387. Assemb. 8375, 2019-2020 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25 (2019). 
388. 
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The bill had stalled for years prior to this point.389 
See Dan M. Clark, Deal Is Reached to End ’Gay Panic’ Defense in NY, Cuomo Says, N.Y. L.J. ONLINE 
(June 17, 2019), https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2019/06/17/deal-is-reached-to-end-gay-panic-defense- 
in-ny-cuomo-says/?slreturn=20190815182031 [https://perma.cc/H4SG-VYW2].
New York follows the MPC’s extreme mental or emotional disturbance 
approach to provocation. Under New York law, any defendant charged with mur-
der in the second degree who acts under the influence of an extreme emotional dis-
turbance for which there is a reasonable explanation or excuse may be convicted of 
the lesser offense of manslaughter.390 The reasonableness of the defendant’s expla-
nation or excuse is “to be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the defend-
ant’s situation under the circumstances as the defendant believed them to be.”391 
Assembly Bill 8375 amended Section 125.25 of the New York Penal Code by 
dividing Section 125.25(a) into two parts and adding a new Subsection (ii) to 
Subsection (a), providing: 
It shall not be a “reasonable explanation or excuse” pursuant to subparagraph 
(i) of this paragraph when the defendant’s conduct resulted from the discov-
ery, knowledge or disclosure of the victim’s sexual orientation, sex, gender, 
gender identity, gender expression or sex assigned at birth[.]392 
In passing this legislation, New York follows the language of the preceding 
bans, focusing on whether the defendant’s claim of extreme emotional disturbance 
stemmed from the discovery, knowledge, or disclosure of the victim’s sexual ori-
entation, gender identity, or sex assigned at birth. Notable is the absence of the 
“[n]othing in this section shall preclude the jury from considering all relevant facts 
to determine whether the defendant was in fact provoked for purposes of establish-
ing subjective provocation” language found in California’s legislation.393 This is 
probably due to the fact that the extreme emotional disturbance defense utilizes a 
subjective standard of reasonableness, whereas the modern test for provocation 
requires a showing that the defendant was actually provoked and the reasonable 
person in the defendant’s shoes would have been provoked as well. 
6. Hawaii (2019) 
On June 21, 2019, Hawaii enacted a ban on the gay and trans panic defenses. 
Like New York, Hawaii follows the MPC’s approach to provocation, allowing 
defendants charged with either murder or attempted murder to assert as an affirma-
tive defense that at the time of the crime, the defendant was “under the influence of 
an extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there is a reasonable 
389. 
 
390. N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 125.20(2), 125.25(1)(a)(i) (2019). 
391. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25(1)(a)(i). 
392. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25(1)(a)(ii). Assembly Bill 8375 also amended Sections 125.26 and 125.27 of 
the New York Penal Code by adding the same language to these provisions. N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 125.26(3)(a) 
(ii), 125.27(2)(a)(ii) (2019). 
393. CAL. PENAL CODE § 192(f)(1) (2019). 
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explanation.”394 As in most jurisdictions that follow the MPC approach to provoca-
tion, Hawaii provides that “[t]he reasonableness of the explanation shall be deter-
mined from the viewpoint of a reasonable person in the circumstances as the 
defendant believed them to be[.]”395 
House Bill 711 added the following language to Hawaii’s extreme mental or 
emotional disturbance defense: 
[A]n explanation that is not otherwise reasonable shall not be determined to 
be reasonable because of the defendant’s discovery, defendant’s knowledge, 
or the disclosure of the other person’s actual or perceived gender, gender iden-
tity, gender expression, or sexual orientation, including under circumstances 
in which the other person made an unwanted nonforcible romantic or sexual 
advance toward the defendant, or in which the defendant and the other person 
dated or had a romantic relationship. If the defendant’s explanation includes 
the discovery, knowledge, or disclosure of the other person’s actual or per-
ceived gender, gender identity, gender expression, or sexual orientation, the 
court shall instruct the jury to disregard biases or prejudices regarding the 
other person’s actual or perceived gender, gender identity, gender expression, 
or sexual orientation in reaching a verdict.396 
In prohibiting the defendant from arguing that the discovery, knowledge, or dis-
closure of the victim’s gender, gender identity, gender expression, or sexual orien-
tation constitutes a reasonable explanation, the Hawaii legislation tracks the 
language used in California, Rhode Island, Nevada, and New York. Hawaii, how-
ever, goes further than these states in requiring the judge to instruct the jury to dis-
regard biases or prejudices regarding the victim’s actual or perceived gender, 
gender identity, gender expression, or sexual orientation in reaching a verdict if the 
defendant’s explanation for his extreme mental or emotional disturbance includes 
the discovery, knowledge or disclosure of any of the above.397 
7. Connecticut (2019) 
Also on June 21, 2019, Connecticut enacted its own legislation banning gay and 
trans panic defenses. New Section 53a-13(b)(2) provides: 
No defendant may claim as a defense under this section that such mental disease 
or defect was based solely on the discovery of, knowledge about or potential 
disclosure of the victim’s actual or perceived sex, sexual orientation or gender 
identity or expression, including under circumstances in which the victim made 
an unwanted, nonforcible, romantic or sexual advance toward the defendant, or 
if the defendant and victim had dated or had a romantic relationship.398 




398. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-13(b)(2) (2019) (emphasis added). 
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Section 53a-16 now includes the following language: 
Justification as a defense does not include provocation that resulted solely 
from the discovery of, knowledge about or potential disclosure of the victim’s 
actual or perceived sex, sexual orientation or gender identity or expression, 
including under circumstances in which the victim made an unwanted, nonfor-
cible, romantic or sexual advance toward the defendant, or if the defendant 
and victim dated or had a romantic relationship.399 
New Section 53a-18(b) provides: 
No person is justified in using force upon another person which would other-
wise constitute an offense based solely on the discovery of, knowledge about 
or potential disclosure of the victim’s actual or perceived sex, sexual orienta-
tion or gender identity or expression, including under circumstances in which 
the victim made an unwanted, nonforcible, romantic or sexual advance toward 
the defendant, or if the defendant and victim dated or had a romantic 
relationship.400 
In prohibiting defendants from relying on “the discovery of, knowledge about 
or potential disclosure of the victim’s actual or perceived sex, sexual orientation or 
gender identity or expression”401 as the basis for a mental defect defense, provoca-
tion, or self-defense, Connecticut follows the other states that have passed legisla-
tive bans on gay and trans panic. Connecticut follows Rhode Island in extending 
the ban beyond the defense of provocation to mental disease or defect defenses and 
the defense of self-defense.402 Connecticut also follows Rhode Island in including 
the word “solely” in each provision.403 This means that a defendant may argue 
provocation, mental disease or defect, or self-defense even if the discovery of the 
victim’s gender identity or sexual orientation was part of what motivated him as 
long as he can point to something else that provoked him, caused his mental dis-
ease or defect, or caused him to use physical force against the victim. 
8. Maine (2019) 
On June 21, 2019, Maine enacted a ban on gay and trans panic defenses, amend-
ing its insanity statute to include the following language: 
An actor does not suffer from an abnormal condition of the mind based solely 
on the discovery of, knowledge about or potential disclosure of the victim’s 
actual or perceived gender, gender identity, gender expression or sexual orien-
tation, including under circumstances in which the victim made an unwanted 
399. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-16 (2019) (emphasis added). 
400. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-18(b) (2019) (emphasis added). 
401. Id. 
402. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-13. 
403. See CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53a-13(b)(2), 53a-16, 53a-18(b). 
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nonforcible romantic or sexual advance toward the actor or in which the actor 
and victim dated or had a romantic or sexual relationship.404 
Maine also enacted the following as Section 17-A MRSA §108(3): 
A person is not justified in using force against another based solely on the dis-
covery of common knowledge about or potential disclosure of the victim’s 
actual or perceived gender, gender identity, gender expression or sexual orien-
tation, including under circumstances in which the victim made an unwanted 
nonforcible romantic or sexual advance toward the person or in which the per-
son and victim dated or had a romantic or sexual relationship.405 
Additionally, Maine amended its provocation statute to include the following 
language: 
For purposes of determining whether extreme anger or extreme fear was 
brought about by adequate provocation, the prosecution was not adequate if it 
resulted solely from the discovery of, knowledge about or potential disclosure 
of the victim’s actual or perceived gender, gender identity, gender expression 
or sexual orientation, including under circumstances in which the victim made 
an unwanted non-forcible romantic or sexual advance toward the person or in 
which the person and victim dated or had a romantic or sexual relationship.406 
In disallowing defendants from arguing that “the discovery of, knowledge about 
or potential disclosure of the victim’s actual or perceived gender, gender identity, 
gender expression or sexual orientation” constitutes adequate provocation, Maine 
follows the other states with legislative bans on the gay and trans panic defense.407 
Like Rhode Island and Connecticut, Maine’s ban extends to defendants asserting a 
mental defect defense or self-defense.408 Maine also follows Rhode Island and 
Connecticut in using the word “solely” in its ban, which means that a defendant 
may still make a gay or trans panic argument as long as it is not the sole basis for 
his claim of provocation, mental defect, or self-defense.409 
9. New Jersey (2020) 
In January 2020, New Jersey became the ninth state to pass legislation banning 
the gay and trans panic defenses.410 
See Cassandra Maas, New Jersey Passes Law Banning ‘Gay Panic’ Murder Defense, JURIST (Jan. 21, 
2020), https://www.jurist.org/news/2020/01/new-jersey-passes-law-banning-gay-panic-murder-defense/# [https:// 
perma.cc/XP4T-UUDT]. The bill was signed into law on January 21, 2020. See Tim Fitzsimons. N.J. Bans Gay and 
This legislation added the following provision 
to N.J.S. 2C:11-4: 
404. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17-A, § 38 (2019) (emphasis added). 
405. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17-A, § 108(3) (2019) (emphasis added). 
406. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17-A, § 201(4) (2019) (emphasis added). 
407. Id. §§ 38, 108, 201. 
408. Id. §§ 38, 201. 
409. Id. §§ 38, 108, 201. 
410. 
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Transgender ‘Panic Defenses’, NBC NEWS (Jan. 22, 2020), https://www.nbcnews.com/feature/nbc-out/n-j-bans- 
gay-transgender-panic-defenses-n1120416 [https://perma.cc/9EWV-Y939].
The discovery of, knowledge about, or potential disclosure of the homicide 
victim’s actual or perceived gender identity or expression, or affectional or 
sexual orientation, which occurred under any circumstances, including but not 
limited to circumstances in which the victim made an unwanted, non-forcible 
romantic or sexual advance toward the actor, or if the victim and actor dated 
or had a romantic or sexual relationship, shall not be reasonable provocation 
pursuant to this paragraph.411 
The New Jersey legislation is similar to language in California’s ban, except it 
does not provide, as California does, that “[n]othing in this section shall preclude 
the jury from considering all relevant facts to determine whether the defendant was 
in fact provoked for purposes of establishing subjective provocation.”412 Like 
California, New Jersey’s ban is limited to the heat of passion/provocation defense 
and does not extend to diminished capacity and self-defense. 
10. Washington (2020) 
On February 26, 2020, lawmakers in the state of Washington passed “[a] mea-
sure prohibiting homicide defendants from claiming a defense based on panic over 
a victim’s sexual orientation or gender identity[.]”413 
Washington Passes Ban on Gay and Trans Panic Defenses for Homicide, NBC NEWS (Feb. 28, 2020), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/feature/nbc-out/washington-passes-ban-gay-trans-panic-defenses-homicide-n1144931 
[https://perma.cc/37DG-3V92].
The following sections were 
added to chapters 9A.08 and 9A.16 RCW, respectively: 
Sec. 1. A defendant does not suffer from diminished capacity based on the dis-
covery of, knowledge about, or potential disclosure of the victim’s actual or 
perceived gender, gender identity, gender expression, or sexual orientation, 
including under circumstances in which the victim made an unwanted nonfor-
cible romantic or sexual advance towards the defendant, or in which the de-
fendant and victim dated or had a romantic or sexual relationship. 
Sec. 2. A person is not justified in using force against another based on the dis-
covery of, knowledge about, or potential disclosure of the victim’s actual or 
perceived gender, gender identity, gender expression, or sexual orientation, 
including under circumstances in which the victim made an unwanted nonfor-
cible romantic or sexual advance toward the defendant, or in which the de-
fendant and victim dated or had a romantic or sexual relationship.414 
This bill was signed into law by Governor Jay Inslee on March 5, 2020.415 In 
applying its ban to diminished capacity and self-defense (justified force), 
 
411. N.J. REV. STAT. § 2C:11-4(b)(2) (2020). 
412. CAL. PENAL CODE § 192(f)(1) (2019). 
413. 
 
414. Nikki Kuhnhausen Act, H.R. 1687, 66th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2020) (effective June 11, 2020). 
415. OFFICE OF SEC’Y OF STATE OF WASH., CERTIFICATION OF ENROLLMENT FOR ENGROSSED HOUSE BILL 
1687 (2020). 
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Washington follows Rhode Island, Connecticut, and Maine. Strangely, the express 
language of the statute does not appear to apply to the defense of provocation.416 
B. Pending Legislation 
In addition to the legislative bans discussed above, bills proposing to ban gay 
and trans panic defenses have been introduced but not yet passed in Colorado,417 
the District of Columbia,418 Georgia,419 Iowa,420 Maryland,421 Massachusetts,422 
Minnesota,423New Mexico,424 Pennsylvania,425 Texas,426 Wisconsin,427 and the 
U.S. Congress428 at least as of March 1, 2020.429 A discussion of the ways in which 
two of these bills differ significantly from the already enacted bills, rather than a 
detailed analysis of each additional bill, is below. 
416. Section 2 of the bill bars a defendant from claiming he was justified in using force against the victim. The 
provocation defense, however, is usually considered a partial excuse, rather than a justification. See supra note 
146. 
417. H.R. 1307, 72nd Gen. Assemb., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2020). 
418. Legis. Summary, D.C. Council B22-0102, 22d Council, 2017–2018 Sess. (D.C. 2017). 
419. H.R. 931, 2017–2018 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2018) (seeking to “amend Code Section 16-5-2 of 
the Official Code of Georgia Annotated, relating to voluntary manslaughter, so as to exclude the discovery or 
disclosure of an individual’s sexual orientation or gender identity as being serious provocation in the context of 
voluntary manslaughter”). 
420. H.R. 693, 88th Gen. Assemb. (Iowa 2020).  
421. H.R. 488, 2020 Gen. Assemb., 441st Sess. (Md. 2020); S. 554, 2020 Gen. Assemb., 441st Sess. (Md. 
2020). 
422. S. 870, 191st Gen. Court. (Mass. 2019) (proposing to add the following language to Section 13 of 
Chapter 265: “For the purposes of determining the presence of mitigating circumstances in the context of a 
homicide, the discovery of, knowledge about, or potential disclosure of an individual’s actual or perceived 
gender, gender identity, gender expression, or sexual orientation, including under circumstances in which the 
victim made an unwanted non-forcible romantic or sexual advance towards the defendant, or the defendant dated 
or had a romantic or sexual relationship, shall not be considered reasonable provocation”). 
423. S. 233, 2017–2018 Leg., 90th Sess. (Minn. 2018) (attempting to amend Minnesota’s provisions on self- 
defense, intoxication and manslaughter in the first-degree to provide, inter alia, that “[i]t is not a defense to a 
crime that the defendant acted based on the discovery of, knowledge about, or potential disclosure of the victim’s 
actual or perceived sexual orientation, including gender identity and expression”). 
424. S. 159, 54th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.M. 2019). 
425. S. 1244, 2017–2018 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2018) (attempting to amend the Pennsylvania 
criminal code to state that conduct sufficient to excite an intense passion in a reasonable person “does not include 
the discovery, knowledge or potential disclosure of a victim’s actual or perceived gender identity or expression 
or sexual orientation”). 
426. H.R. 3281, 86th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2019) (seeking to amend Chapter 10 of Title 2 of the Texas Penal 
Code to state, inter alia, that “[t]he use of force against another is not justified and an actor does not reasonably 
believe that the use of force is immediately necessary if the use of force occurs in response to: (1) the actor’s 
discovery or knowledge of, or the victim’s disclosure or potential disclosure of, the gender identity or sexual 
orientation of the victim; or (2) a nonviolent romantic or sexual advance made by the victim towards the actor”). 
427. Assemb. 436, 104th Leg., 2019–2020 Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2019); S. 393, 104th Leg., 2019–2020 Reg. Sess. 
(Wis. 2019).  
428. The Gay and Trans Panic Defense Prohibition Act of 2018, H.R. 6358 & S. 3188, 115th Cong. (2018). 
429. This should not be taken as an exhaustive list. There may be other pending bills not listed above. 
2020]                                THE TRANS PANIC DEFENSE REVISITED                                1481 
1. Washington, DC (pending) 
On February 7, 2017, D.C. Councilman David Grosso introduced legislation 
that would establish limits on defense arguments that seek to excuse violence on 
the basis of a victim’s identity and require the giving of jury instructions on bias 
and prejudice upon the request of either the prosecution or defense.430 Under the 
proposed legislation, initially entitled the “Secure a Fair and Equitable Trial Act of 
2017,” and reintroduced in September 2019 as the “Tony Hunter and Bella 
Evangelista Panic Defense Prohibition Act,” Chapter 1 of Title 23 would be 
amended with the purpose of: 
curtail[ing] the availability and effectiveness of defenses that seek to partially 
or completely excuse crimes such as murder and assault on the grounds that 
the victim’s sexual orientation, gender identity, or other inherent identity, is to 
blame for the defendant’s violent action and to require an anti-bias jury 
instruction in criminal trials if requested by the prosecutor or the defendant.431 
Two new sections, 23-115 and 23-116, would be added to the D.C. Code. 
Section 23-115, entitled “Limit on defenses that seek to excuse violence on the ba-
sis of a victim’s identity,” would provide that “[f]or any crime of violence, suffi-
cient or adequate provocation for a defense premised on ‘heat of passion’ shall not 
exist if the defendant’s actions are related to the discovery of, knowledge about, or 
the potential disclosure of” a number of characteristics or perceived characteristics 
of the victim.432 The bill lists “gender identity or expression” and “sexual orienta-
tion” as two of these characteristics.433 
Section 23-116 would also require the court, upon the request of either the de-
fendant or the government in a criminal proceeding, to instruct the jury not to “let 
bias, sympathy, prejudice, or public opinion influence your decision.”434 “Bias” 
includes bias against “the victim or victims, witnesses, or defendant based upon 
his or her disability, sex, national origin, race, color, religion, gender identity or 
expression, or sexual orientation.”435 
The Grosso bill would go further than any of the existing bans by expanding the 
list of protected categories beyond sexual orientation, gender, gender identity, and 
gender expression to include disability, national origin, race, color, religion, and 
sex. One risk of expanding the list of protected categories as broadly as Grosso’s 
bill does is that such extension may dilute the expressive power of the legislation.436 






436. See, e.g., Rob Kuznia, In Hate Crimes, Defining “Victim”, WASH. POST., Sept. 11, 2019, at A3 (noting that 
law professor Kami Chavis “says the continuing expansions [of who is protected under hate crime statutes] run the 
risk of diluting such statutes’ original intention: to protect historically marginalized or persecuted groups”). 
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A bill that specifically targets the use of gay and trans panic defense arguments 
sends a much clearer normative message that it is not okay to kill a gay man or a 
transgender woman and then use the victim’s sexual orientation or gender identity 
to try to avoid liability for that killing. 
In requiring D.C. courts to give an anti-bias jury instruction, the proposed legis-
lation follows California437 and Hawaii.438 The Grosso bill would thus go further 
than several of the recently enacted laws, which do not mandate anti-bias jury 
instructions upon the request of either party. 
In September 2019, D.C. Council Chair Phil Mendelson introduced another bill 
entitled, the “Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Panic Defense Prohibition 
Act of 2019,” which also attempts to ban gay and trans panic arguments.439 
Matt Baume, D.C. Moves to Ban ‘Gay Panic’ Defense Legal in 42 States, OUT (Sept. 18, 2019), https:// 
www.out.com/news/2019/9/18/DC-Moves-Ban-Gay-Panic-Defense-Legal-States [https://perma.cc/LA8L-WPFD].
Under 
Mendelson’s bill, criminal defendants charged with homicide would be barred 
from claiming they acted in a heat of passion, in self-defense, or as a result of 
reduced mental capacity based upon the discovery that the victim was gay or trans-
gender.440 More specifically, subsection (a) of the legislation would provide: 
For a crime of violence, adequate provocation for a defense premised on “heat 
of passion” shall not exist if the defendant’s actions are related to the discov-
ery of, knowledge about, or potential disclosure of the victim’s actual or per-
ceived gender identity or expression, or sexual orientation, including under 
circumstances in which the victim made an unwanted, non-forcible romantic 
or sexual advance toward the defendant, or if the defendant and victim dated 
or had a romantic relationship.441 
437. While the legislation passed by the California legislature in 2014 does not include a provision mandating 
anti-bias jury instructions, California passed anti-bias jury legislation in 2006 when it enacted the Gwen Araujo 
Justice for Victims Act. That Act provides: 
(d) It is against public policy for juries to render decisions tainted by bias based upon the victim’s 
actual or perceived disability, gender, nationality, race or ethnicity, religion or sexual orientation, 
or his or her association with a person or group with one or more of these characteristics. 
(e) “Panic strategies” are those strategies that try to explain a defendant’s actions or emotional 
reactions based upon the knowledge or discovery of the fact that the victim possesses one or more 
of the characteristics listed above or associates with a person or group with one or more of these 
characteristics. 
(f) The Legislature is concerned about the use of societal bias in criminal proceedings and the sus-
ceptibility of juries to such bias. The use of so-called “panic strategies” by defendants in criminal 
trials opens the door for bias against victims based on one or more of the characteristics listed 
above or an association with a person or group with one or more of those characteristics. 
(g) It is against public policy for a defendant to be acquitted of a charged offense or convicted of a 
lesser included offense based upon an appeal to the societal bias that may be possessed by mem-
bers of a jury.  
Gwen Araujo Justice for Victims Act, CAL. PENAL CODE § 1127h (2014). 




441. Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Panic Defense Prohibition Act of 2019, D.C. Council B23-0409, 
23d Council (D.C. 2019). 
2020]                                THE TRANS PANIC DEFENSE REVISITED                                1483 
Subsection (b) would provide: 
A defendant does not suffer from reduced mental capacity based solely on the 
discovery of, knowledge about, or potential disclosure of the victim’s actual 
or perceived gender identity or expression, or sexual orientation, including 
under circumstances in which the victim made an unwanted, non-forcible 
romantic or sexual advance toward the defendant, or if the defendant and vic-
tim dated or had a romantic relationship.442 
Subsection (c) would provide: 
A person is not justified in using force against another based solely on the dis-
covery of, knowledge about, or potential disclosure of the victim’s actual or 
perceived gender identity or expression, or sexual orientation, including under 
circumstances in which the victim made an unwanted, non-forcible romantic 
or sexual advance toward the defendant, or if the defendant and victim dated 
or had a romantic relationship.443 
The Mendelson bill follows Rhode Island, Connecticut, and Maine in barring 
defendants from claiming that the discovery that the victim was gay or a transgen-
der individual either provoked them into a heat of passion, caused them some men-
tal incapacity, or somehow justified their use of force in self-defense. Like the 
existing bans, it focuses specifically on prohibiting defendants from arguing that 
the discovery of the victim’s sexual orientation or gender identity was what pro-
voked the defendant into a heat of passion, caused mental incapacity, or justified 
their use of force in self-defense. 
2. U.S. Congress (pending) 
In July 2018, Senator Edward Markey (D-MA) and Representative Joe Kennedy 
(D-MA) introduced the Gay and Trans Panic Defense Prohibition Act of 2018.444 
This legislation would amend Chapter 1 or title 18 of the United States Code, 
Section 28, by adding the following provisions to the end of the chapter:  
(a) Prohibition. No nonviolent sexual advance or perception or belief, even 
if inaccurate, of the gender, gender identity or expression, or sexual ori-
entation of an individual may be used to excuse or justify the conduct of 
an individual or mitigate the severity of an offense.  
(b) Past Trauma. Notwithstanding the prohibition in subsection (a), a court 
may admit evidence, in accordance with the Federal Rules of Evidence, 
of prior trauma to the defendant for the purpose of excusing or justifying 
the conduct of the defendant or mitigating the severity of an offense.445 
442. Id. 
443. Id. 
444. The Gay and Trans Panic Defense Prohibition Act of 2018, H.R. 6358 & S. 3188, 115th Cong. (2018). 
445. Id. 
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The proposed federal legislation is well-intentioned. At first glance, it even 
seems progressive in using the sexual orientation-neutral term “sexual” rather than 
“homosexual” in referring to a “nonviolent sexual advance.”446 In providing that 
“[n]o nonviolent sexual advance . . . may be used to excuse or justify the conduct 
of an individual or mitigate the severity of an offense,”447 however, the federal 
legislation could have several unintended consequences. For example, it would 
prohibit a female defendant from arguing that she was provoked into a heat of pas-
sion by a man groping her breasts or pinching her buttocks because the man’s 
“non-violent”448 sexual advance could not be used to excuse the female defend-
ant’s conduct or mitigate a murder charge to voluntary manslaughter. 
The federal legislation would also prohibit some male defendants from arguing 
provocation in cases in which many of us would probably want to allow the de-
fendant to argue provocation. Think about the male teenager who was allegedly 
groped by actor Kevin Spacey at a bar where the teenager worked as a busboy in 
2016.449 
For details about the actual case, see Man Sues Kevin Spacey Over Alleged Groping Incident at 
Nantucket Bar, CBS NEWS (June 27, 2019), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/kevin-spacey-nantucket-trial-man- 
sues-over-alleged-groping-club-car-nantucket-bar-2019-06-27 [https://perma.cc/QBH6-8AB7]. In July 2019, 
prosecutors dismissed the criminal charges they had filed against Spacey after his accuser refused to testify about 
a missing cellphone that Spacey’s lawyers claimed had evidence supporting the actor’s claim of innocence. See 
Kevin Spacey: Prosecutors Drop Case Accusing Actor of Groping Teen, GUARDIAN (July 17, 2019), https:// 
www.theguardian.com/culture/2019/jul/17/kevin-spacey-charges-dropped-sexual-assault-case-groping-teen- 
nantucket [https://perma.cc/B9DE-RS72] (noting that the two time Oscar winner was charged with battery and 
indecent assault in 2018 after a young man alleged that in 2016, when he was a teenager working as a busboy at a 
bar in Nantucket, Spacey bought him several drinks after his shift and tried to persuade him to come home with 
him before unzipping the young man’s pants and groping him for about three minutes); Joey Garrison & Maria 
Puente, Judge: Kevin Spacey Groping Case ‘May Well Be Dismissed’ As Accuser Pleads the 5th, USA 
TODAY (July 8, 2019), https://www.usatoday.com/story/entertainment/celebrities/2019/07/08/kevin-spacey- 
accuser-appears-groping-hearing-his-missing-cellphone/1671779001 [https://perma.cc/LM2L-9VVG].
Imagine that the teenager had reacted differently. Instead of trying to shift 
his body and move Spacey’s hands away,450 
See Phil Helsel, Man Who Accused Kevin Spacey of Sexual Assault May Have Filmed Alleged Groping, 
NBC NEWS (Dec. 26, 2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/pop-culture/pop-culture-news/alleged-victim-kevin- 
spacey-sexual-assault-may-have-filmed-groping-n952176 [https://perma.cc/KTC5-9JPK] (noting that “police 
documents say the alleged victim ‘tried to shift away with his body’ and move Spacey’s hands away, ‘but Spacey 
kept reaching down his pants’”). 
let’s say our hypothetical teenage boy 
had grabbed a sharp knife from the counter and flailed about, trying to stab Spacey 
to try to avoid the unwanted groping. Imagine further that upon being stabbed in 
the arm, Spacey fell back, hit his head on the sharp bar counter, and died. Imagine 
further that this incident occurred at a restaurant bar in a national park, so the fed-
eral government had jurisdiction over the case. If our hypothetical teenage boy 
446. Id. 
447. Id. 
448. Even though the average layperson might think that having one’s breasts groped or buttocks pinched 
constitutes a “violent” sexual advance, the law generally views such actions as “non-violent.” See, e.g., United 
States v. Watts, 798 F.3d 650, 652 (7th Cir. 2015) (describing “groping” a woman or child as “sexually offensive 
but not violent physical contact”); United States v. Bayes, 210 F.3d 64, 69 (1st Cir. 2000) (noting that “defendant 
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were to be charged with murder in federal court with legislation like the proposed 
federal legislation, he would be prohibited from using the fact that Spacey had tried 
to grope him to try to mitigate the charge from murder to manslaughter.451 
Although reasonable minds might disagree about whether our hypothetical teen-
age boy reacted reasonably, most of us would agree that he should at least be per-
mitted to make the argument that he was reasonably provoked into a heat of 
passion. The federal legislation, however, would bar him from even posing such an 
argument because a nonviolent sexual advance cannot be used to excuse or justify 
the conduct of a defendant or mitigate the severity of an offense. 
The focus should be on prohibiting defendants from trying to excuse or justify 
their behavior by claiming that discovery of the sexual orientation or gender iden-
tity of the victim caused them to behave violently, as is the case with the existing 
bans.452 Instead, the proposed federal legislation bars defendants from arguing that 
a nonviolent sexual advance provoked the defendant into a heat of passion. While 
the existing bans include qualifying language such as “including under circumstan-
ces in which the victim made an unwanted non-forcible romantic or sexual 
advance toward the defendant,”453 these bans focus—as they should—on whether 
the defendant is claiming that his discovery or knowledge about the victim’s iden-
tity as a transgender person or a gay individual was what provoked him. If the fed-
eral legislation were to delete the words “non-violent sexual advance or” and 
simply state, “No perception or belief, even if inaccurate, of the gender, gender 
identity or expression, or sexual orientation of an individual may be used to excuse 
451. A layperson might wonder whether our hypothetical teenager would have a legitimate claim of self- 
defense. A court would probably answer this question in the negative if it found that the teen used deadly force in 
response to nondeadly force. See Force, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining “deadly force” as 
“violent action known to create a substantial risk of causing death or serious bodily harm”); 2 SUBST. CRIM. L. 
§ 10.4(a) (3d ed. 2018) (defining “deadly force” as force “which its user uses with the intent to cause death or 
serious bodily injury to another or . . . which he knows creates a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury 
to the other”); MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.11 (2018) (defining “deadly force” as “force that the actor uses with the 
purpose of causing or that he knows to create a substantial risk of causing death or serious bodily injury”). The 
defendant may use deadly force only if he honestly and reasonably believed he was being threatened with deadly 
force. See 2 SUBST. CRIM. L. § 10.4(b) (3d ed. 2018) (stating that self-defense doctrine “recognizes that the 
amount of force which [one] may justifiably use must be reasonably related to the threatened harm which [one] 
seeks to avoid,” and explaining that a person may only use deadly force “if he reasonably believes that the other 
is about to inflict unlawful death or serious bodily harm upon him”); 2 WHARTON’S CRIMINAL LAW § 127 (15th 
ed. 2019) (“A defendant may kill in self-defense when he reasonably believes that he is in imminent danger of 
losing his life or suffering great bodily harm.”); Aya Gruber, Leniency as a Miscarriage of Race and Gender 
Justice, 76 ALB. L. REV. 1571, 1596 (2013) (noting that self-defense usually “allows the defendant to use deadly 
force upon reasonable fear of imminent death, serious bodily injury, or a violent felony”); see also Stuart P. 
Green, Castles and Carjackers: Proportionality and the Use of Deadly Force in Defense of Dwellings and 
Vehicles, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 5 (1999) (describing the idea that “the force used must be proportional to the 
harm threatened” as a “basic principle of self-defense”). Even if the teen in this hypothetical case could assert a 
claim of self-defense, he might want to argue provocation in the alternative in case the jury rejects his self- 
defense claim. 
452. See supra text accompanying notes 355–416. 
453. See supra text accompanying notes 356 (California), 380–381 (Rhode Island), 383–86 (Nevada), 394 
(Hawaii), 398–403 (Connecticut), 404–09 (Maine), 410 (New Jersey), 413 (Washington). 
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or justify the conduct of an individual or mitigate the severity of an offense,” it 
would better limit a defendant’s ability to use the discovery of or knowledge about 
victim’s sexual orientation or gender identity to excuse violent conduct. 
C. Model Legislation 
If a legislature wants to enact legislation curtailing the use of gay and trans panic 
defense strategies, it has many good examples to follow. Borrowing language from 
the existing legislative bans, I propose the following model legislation: 
1. For the purpose of determining the legal adequacy of an alleged provoca-
tion by a defendant charged with a criminal homicide, the alleged provoca-
tion or heat of passion shall be deemed not objectively reasonable and not 
legally adequate if based upon the discovery of, knowledge about, or poten-
tial disclosure of the actual or perceived sexual orientation or gender iden-
tity or expression of the victim. Nothing in this section shall preclude the 
jury from considering all relevant facts to determine whether the defendant 
was in fact provoked for purposes of establishing subjective provocation.  
2. The discovery of, knowledge about, or potential disclosure of the actual or 
perceived sexual orientation or gender identity or expression of the victim 
may not be used to support a claim that the defendant was suffering from 
insanity, temporary or otherwise, or diminished capacity.  
3. A person is not justified in using physical force against another person 
based solely upon the discovery of, knowledge about, or potential disclo-
sure of the actual or perceived sexual orientation or gender identity or 
expression of the victim.454 
I do not claim to be inventing completely new language with this model legisla-
tion. Rather, the model legislation takes the best from each of the existing bans and 
eliminates the unnecessary or unhelpful. No state has adopted the precise language 
in this model legislation. In this respect, the model legislation adds value to the 
existing landscape. 
Like most of the existing bans, Section 1 of the model legislation provides that 
the discovery of or knowledge about the actual or perceived sexual orientation or 
gender identity or expression of the victim does not constitute legally adequate 
provocation. It thus would bar most defendants claiming gay panic or trans panic 
from satisfying the requirements necessary to mitigate a murder charge down to 
voluntary manslaughter through the provocation defense. 
Moreover, like the legislative bans in Rhode Island, Connecticut, and Maine, the 
model legislation would apply not just to claims of provocation, but also to mental 
incapacity defenses like temporary insanity and diminished capacity and claims of 
454. I include the word “solely” in the third subsection because I think a defendant should be allowed to argue 
self-defense if the victim did something to make the defendant reasonably believe it was necessary to use deadly 
force to protect against an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury. 
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self-defense. Sections 2 and 3 make clear that the discovery of or knowledge about 
another person’s actual or perceived sexual orientation or gender identity or 
expression cannot be the basis for a claim of insanity, diminished capacity, or self- 
defense. 
Unlike most of the existing legislative bans, the model legislation does not have 
the “including under circumstances in which the victim made an unwanted nonfor-
cible romantic or sexual advance towards the defendant, or if the defendant and 
victim dated or had a romantic or sexual relationship” language for two reasons. 
First, this language is unnecessary. The model legislation, like the existing bans, 
precludes the defendant from arguing that the discovery, knowledge, or disclosure 
that the victim was gay or transgender constitutes legally adequate provocation. In 
other words, a defendant cannot base his provocation argument on the discovery 
of, knowledge about, or disclosure of the victim’s sexual orientation or transgender 
identity. It is not necessary that the defendant learned of the victim’s status as a 
gay male or transgender female through an unwanted sexual advance. It is also not 
necessary that the defendant and the victim dated or had a romantic or sexual rela-
tionship. The discovery of or knowledge about the victim’s status as a sexual mi-
nority is just not legally adequate provocation. 
Second, the “including under circumstances” language suggests that a defendant 
would be precluded from arguing that an unwanted nonviolent sexual advance pro-
voked him into a heat of passion when this is not actually the case. None of the 
existing legislative bans preclude defendants from arguing they were reasonably 
provoked into a heat of passion by a nonviolent sexual advance by the victim. The 
only thing the existing bans preclude is the argument that the discovery of, knowl-
edge about, or potential disclosure of the victim’s sexual orientation or gender 
identity or expression constituted objectively reasonable or legally adequate 
provocation. 
As is the case with all of the existing bans, a defendant who is able to show that 
he was provoked not by the discovery of or knowledge about the victim’s hetero-
sexual orientation or transgender identity, but by something the victim said or did, 
would be allowed to assert the provocation defense. Section 1 of the model legisla-
tion, however, would go further than several of the existing bans. It purposely does 
not include the word “solely” before “based upon the discovery of, knowledge 
about, or potential disclosure of the actual or perceived sexual orientation or gen-
der identity or expression of the victim” to preclude the defendant from arguing he 
was provoked both by the discovery that the victim’s gender identity did not match 
her biological sex and by something else the victim said or did. If even part of the 
defendant’s argument is that the discovery that the victim was a transgender 
woman provoked him, the model legislation would bar him from asserting a provo-
cation defense. If the word “solely” were inserted after the word “if” and before 
the words “based upon” in Section 1, this would allow a defendant to come up with 
some other reason besides the discovery that his victim was a trans woman in order 
to escape the legislative ban. By including the word “solely” in their bans, Rhode 
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Island, Connecticut, and Maine provide weaker protection to gay and transgender 
victims than the model legislation.455 
The model legislation, however, does include the word “solely” in Section 3, 
providing that “[a] person is not justified in using physical force against another 
person based solely upon the discovery of, knowledge about, or potential disclo-
sure of the actual or perceived sexual orientation or gender identity or expression 
of the victim.” If the victim did something to make the defendant reasonably 
believe it was necessary to use deadly force to protect against an imminent threat 
of death or serious bodily injury, the defendant should be allowed to argue self- 
defense. Under such circumstances, the model legislation would allow the defend-
ant to assert a claim of self-defense even if the defendant were also to claim that 
the discovery of or knowledge about the victim’s sexual orientation or transgender 
status somehow also supported his claim of self-defense. 
CONCLUSION 
Violence against the transgender community is a serious problem today. When a 
man kills a transgender woman and claims that his discovery that the victim was 
biologically male was so upsetting to him that it provoked him into a heat of pas-
sion, his trans panic argument should be rejected. Educating the jury about the ster-
eotypes that make a trans panic argument persuasive is a necessary first step 
towards encouraging the jury to reject the trans panic defense, but education alone 
is not sufficient. A legislative ban on the trans panic defense is a better way to 
ensure that jurors reject the argument that it is objectively reasonable for a man 
who discovers that his romantic interest is a transgender woman to respond with 
physical violence. 
455. Section 2 of the model legislation, which covers mental defect defenses, also omits the word “solely,” 
whereas Rhode Island, Connecticut, and Maine include the word “solely” in their sections on mental defect 
defenses. Rhode Island, for example, provides that “[a] defendant does not suffer from reduced mental capacity 
based solely on the discovery of, or knowledge about, or potential disclosure of the victim’s actual or perceived 
gender, gender identity, gender expression, or sexual orientation[.]” 12 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-17-18 (2019) 
(emphasis added). Similarly, Connecticut provides, “No defendant may claim as a defense under this section that 
such mental disease or defect was based solely on the discovery of, knowledge about or potential disclosure of 
the victim’s actual or perceived sex, sexual orientation or gender identity or expression[.]” CONN. GEN. STAT. 
§ 53a-13(b)(2) (2019) (emphasis added). Maine, too, provides, “An actor does not suffer from an abnormal 
condition of the mind based solely on the discovery of, knowledge about or potential disclosure of the victim’s 
actual or perceived gender, gender identity, gender expression or sexual orientation[.]” ME. STAT. tit. 17-A, § 38 
(2019) (emphasis added). The model legislation omits the word “solely” in Section 2 for the same reason it omits 
the word “solely” in Section 1. This omission precludes a defendant from coming up with some other reason to 
explain his mental disease or defect and thus being able to also use the discovery that the victim was a trans 
woman or gay man to support his mental defect defense. 
2020]                                THE TRANS PANIC DEFENSE REVISITED                                1489 
APPENDIX   
State Portion of Hate Crime Statute Relating 
to Gender Identity 
Statutory Provision  
California456 defining a hate crime as one “committed, in 
whole or in part, because of one or more of 
the following actual or perceived charac-
teristics of the victim: (1) Disability, (2) 
Gender, (3) Nationality, (4) Race or ethnic-
ity, (5) Religion, (6) Sexual orientation, (7) 
Association with a person or group with 
one or more of these actual or perceived 
characteristics.” (emphasis added) 
CAL. PENAL CODE 
§ 422.55(a) (2019) 
Colorado defining bias motivated crimes as those in 
which the defendant acts “with the intent to 
intimidate or harass another person because 
of that person’s actual or perceived race, 
color, religion, ancestry, national origin, 
physical or mental disability, or sexual ori-
entation” and defining “sexual orientation” 
as “a person’s actual or perceived orienta-
tion toward heterosexuality, homosexual-
ity, bisexuality, or transgender status.” 
(emphasis added) 
COLO. REV. STAT. 
§§ 18-9-121(2) & (5) 
(b) (2019) 
Connecticut providing that “[i]t shall be a discrimina-
tory practice in violation of this section for 
any person to subject . . . any other person 
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges 
or immunities, secured or protected by the 
Constitution or laws of this State or of the 
United States, on account of religion, 
national origin, alienage, color, race, sex, 
gender identity or expression, sexual orien-
tation, blindness, mental disability, physi-
cal disability or status as a veteran.” 
(emphasis added) 
CONN. GEN. STAT. 
§ 46a-58(a) (2019) 
456. California defines gender as “sex, [which] includes a person’s gender identity and gender expression. 
‘Gender expression’ means a person’s gender-related appearance and behavior whether or not stereotypically 
associated with the person’s assigned sex at birth.” CAL. PENAL CODE § 422.56(c) (2019). 
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Continued 
State Portion of Hate Crime Statute Relating 
to Gender Identity 
Statutory Provision  
Delaware providing for enhanced penalties when a de-
fendant intentionally “[s]elects the victim 
because of the victim’s race, religion, color, 
disability, sexual orientation, gender identity, 
national origin or ancestry.” (emphasis added) 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11 
§ 1304 (a)(2) (2019) 
District of 
Columbia 
noting that a “‘[b]ias-related crime’ means a 
designated act that demonstrates an accused’s 
prejudice based on the actual or perceived 
race, color, religion, national origin, sex, age, 
marital status, personal appearance, sexual 
orientation, gender identity or expression, 
family responsibility, homelessness, physical 
disability, matriculation, or political affilia-
tion of a victim.” (emphasis added) 
D.C. CODE § 22-3701 
(1) (2019) 
Hawaii defining a hate crime as “any criminal act 
in which the perpetrator intentionally 
selected a victim, or in the case of a prop-
erty crime, the property that was the object 
of a crime, because of hostility toward the 
actual or perceived race, religion, disabil-
ity, ethnicity, national origin, gender iden-
tity or expression, or sexual orientation of 
any person.” (emphasis added) 
HAW. REV. STAT. 
§ 846-51 (2019) 
Illinois457 providing that a person commits a hate 
crime if “by reason of the actual or per-
ceived race, color, creed, religion, ancestry, 
gender, sexual orientation, physical or 
mental disability, or national origin of 
another individual or group of individuals . 
. . he or she commits assault, battery, intim-
idation, stalking.” (emphasis added) 
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
§ 5/12-7.1(a) (2019) 
457. While Illinois does not explicitly state that the words “perceived . . . gender” in its hate crime statute 
would protect transgender individuals, there is case law in Illinois that could be used to support such an 
interpretation. See In re B.C., 680 N.E.2d 1355, 1360–61 (Ill. 1997) (applying the hate crime enhancement in a 
case where the victim was not an African American or perceived by the defendant to be an African American on 
the ground that the “primary focus of the [hate crime] statute was intended to be directed towards the biased 
motivation of the perpetrator, rather than towards the status of the victim” and “the victim of a hate crime need 
not be a member of one of the statute’s enumerated classes providing reason for the offense”). 
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Continued 
State Portion of Hate Crime Statute Relating 
to Gender Identity 
Statutory Provision  
Louisiana458 
Louisiana does not state that the words “perceived . . . gender” in its hate crime statute provides 
protection to transgender individuals who are perceived by their assailants to be of a different sex than their 
chosen gender identity, and it does not appear that there are any Louisiana cases interpreting this language to 
date. The question whether the Louisiana hate crime statute covers transgender individuals became pertinent in 
March 2017, when two transgender women, Chyna Gibson and Ciara McElveen, were killed in apparently 
unrelated incidents within a three-day period in New Orleans. Initially, the police suggested that if the women 
were killed because of their transgender identity, they would proceed as if these homicides were hate crimes. See 
Julia O’Donoghue, Do Louisiana Hate Crime Laws Cover Transgender People?, NOLA.COM (Mar. 4, 2017), 
https://www.nola.com/news/politics/article_23b5ab06-ff2c-5146-bbf3-383f5f86fc96.html [https://perma.cc/ 
R6J8-X6VU]. Upon further investigation, however, police were unable to find evidence that the women were 
targeted because of their status as transgender women. Emily Lane, In Recent Murders of Transgender Women, 
No Evidence of Hate Crimes: NOPD, NOLA.COM (Mar. 2, 2017), https://www.nola.com/news/crime_police/ 
article_1ba2d3d9-a9a2-5f1b-b82f-01f4e398c756.html [https://perma.cc/M69P-VF39]. It thus remains an open 
question whether Louisiana’s hate crime statute covers transgender victims. 
making it unlawful to “select the victim of 
[certain] offenses against person and prop-
erty because of actual or perceived race, 
age, gender, religion, color, creed, disabil-
ity, sexual orientation, national origin, or 
ancestry of that person.” (emphasis added) 
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 14:107.2(A) (2019) 
Maryland including in its hate crime statute “sexual 
orientation” defined as “the identification 
of an individual as to male or female homo-
sexuality, heterosexuality, bisexuality, or 
gender-related identity.” (emphasis added) 
MD. CODE ANN., 
CRIM. LAW § 10-301 
(c) (2019) 
Massachusetts making it a crime to “commi[t] an assault 
or a battery upon a person or damage[] the 
real or personal property of a person with 
the intent to intimidate such person because 
of such person’s race, color, religion, 
national origin, sexual orientation, gender 
identity, or disability.” (emphasis added) 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 
265 § 39 (2019) 
458. 
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State Portion of Hate Crime Statute Relating 
to Gender Identity 
Statutory Provision  
Minnesota459 
The Human Rights Campaign has argued that Minnesota’s hate crime statute covers transgender 
individuals, pointing to language in another part of the Code. See Minnesota Hate Crimes Law, HUMAN RIGHTS 
CAMPAIGN, https://web.archive.org/web/20110524081415/http://www.hrc.org/1068.htm [https://perma.cc/ 
EZX9-BYYW]; see also MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363A.03(44) (2019) (defining “sexual orientation” as including, 
“having or being perceived as having a self-image or identity not traditionally associated with one’s biological 
maleness or femaleness”). 
providing that “[w]hoever assaults another 
because of the victim’s . . . actual or per-
ceived race, color, religion, sex, sexual ori-
entation, disability. . ., age, or national 
origin may be sentenced to imprisonment 
for not more than one year or to payment of 





Mississippi460 providing that “[i]n order to impose an 
enhanced penalty under the provisions of 
Sections 99-19-301 through 99-19-307, the 
jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt: 
(a) That the defendant perceived, knew, or 
had reasonable grounds to know or per-
ceive that the victim was within the class 
delineated; and (b) That the defendant 
maliciously and with specific intent com-
mitted the offense because the victim was 
within the class delineated” and “(3) That 
the victim was within the class delineated 
means that the reason the underlying crime 
was committed was the victim’s actual or 
perceived race, color, religion, ethnicity, 
ancestry, national origin or gender.” (em-
phasis added) 
MISS. CODE ANN. 
§§ 99-19-305(2), (3) 
(2019) 
459. 
460. It is unclear whether Mississippi’s hate crime statute covers transgender individuals. Arguably the 
inclusion of “perceived . . . gender” means the statute provides protection for transgender individuals who are 
perceived by the defendant to be a different sex or gender than their chosen gender identity, but in February 
2019, Mississippi lawmakers introduced Senate Bill 2163, which sought to add “sexual orientation, gender 
identity, or disability” to Section 99-19-305, Mississippi’s hate crime statute. See S.B. 2163, 2019 Leg., Reg. 
Sess. (Miss. 2019). This bill died in committee, suggesting that lawmakers did not intend to protect gays and 
lesbians, transgender individuals, or disabled individuals in its hate crime statute. 
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Continued 
State Portion of Hate Crime Statute Relating 
to Gender Identity 
Statutory Provision  
Nevada providing enhanced penalties for certain 
crimes committed “because the actual or 
perceived race, color, religion, national ori-
gin, physical or mental disability, sexual ori-
entation or gender identity or expression of 
the victim was different from that character-
istic of the perpetrator.” (emphasis added) 
NEV. REV. STAT. 
§ 193.1675(1) (2019) 
New 
Hampshire 
expanding the law against discrimination 
based on gender identity to crimes where the 
defendant “[w]as substantially motivated to 
commit the crime because of hostility 
towards the victim’s religion, race, creed, 
sexual orientation as defined in RSA 21:49, 
national origin, sex, or gender identity as 
defined in RSA 21:53.” (emphasis added) 
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 651:6(I)(f) (2019) 
New Jersey providing that “[a] person is guilty of the crime 
of bias intimidation if he commits, attempts to 
commit, conspires with another to commit, or 
threatens the immediate commission of an 
offense specified in chapters 11 through 18 of 
Title 2C of the New Jersey statutes . . . (1) 
with a purpose to intimidate an individual or 
group of individuals because of race, color, re-
ligion, gender, disability, sexual orientation, 
gender identity or expression, national origin, 
or ethnicity.” (emphasis added) 
N.J. REV. STAT. 
§ 2C:16-1(a) (2019) 
New Mexico providing enhanced penalties for crimes com-
mitted “because of the victim’s actual or per-
ceived race, religion, color, national origin, 
ancestry, age, disability, gender, sexual orien-
tation or gender identity.” (emphasis added) 
N.M. STAT. ANN. 
§ 31-18B-3 (2019) 
New York defining a hate crime as the commission of 
certain crimes when the defendant “inten-
tionally selects the person against whom the 
offense is committed or intended to be com-
mitted in whole or in substantial part 
because of a belief or perception regarding 
the race, color, national origin, ancestry, 
gender, gender identity or expression, reli-
gion, religious practice, age, disability or 
N.Y. PENAL LAW 
§ 485.05(1)(a) (2019) 
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State Portion of Hate Crime Statute Relating 
to Gender Identity 
Statutory Provision  
sexual orientation of a person, regardless of 
whether the belief or perception is correct.” 
(emphasis added) 
Oregon providing that “[a] person commits a bias 
crime in the second-degree if the person . . . 
(b) intentionally subjects another person to 
offensive physical contact because of the 
person’s perception of the other person’s 
race, color, religion, gender identity, sexual 
orientation, disability or national origin.” 
(emphasis added) 
OR. REV. STAT. 
§ 166.155(1)(b) (2019) 
Rhode 
Island461 
providing for enhanced penalties when a 
defendant “intentionally selected the per-
son against whom the offense is committed 
. . . because of the actor’s hatred or animus 
toward the actual or perceived disability, 
religion, color, race, national origin or 
ancestry, sexual orientation, or gender of 
that person.” (emphasis added) 
12 R.I. GEN. LAWS 
§ 12-19-38(a) (2019) 
461. It is unclear whether Rhode Island’s use of “perceived . . . gender” language in its hate crime statute 
protects transgender individuals. In 2012, the Rhode Island governor signed the Transgender Hate Crimes 
Monitoring Bill into law, which defines a “hate crime” as “any crime motivated by bigotry and bias, including, 
but not limited to threatened, attempted, or completed acts that appear after investigation to have been motivated 
by . . . sexual orientation, gender, [or] gender identity or expression[.]” 42 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-28-46 (2019) 
(emphasis added). Under another provision: 
“Gender identity or expression” includes a person’s actual or perceived gender, as well as a per-
son’s gender identity, gender- related self image, gender-related appearance, or gender-related 
expression, whether or not that gender identity, gender-related self image, gender-related appear-
ance, or gender-related expression is different from that traditionally associated with the person’s 
sex at birth.  
11 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 11-24-2.1(i) (2009). Section 42-28-46 does not enhance penalties for those who 
commit hate crimes, but imposes on police additional monitoring and reporting requirements for incident reports 
involving hate crimes. See id. § 42-28-46. Until Rhode Island revises its hate crime statute to include “gender 
identity or expression” language, defendants can argue that the hate crime statute does not protect transgender 
individuals since the Rhode Island legislature could have but did not explicitly provide such protection for 
transgender individuals as it did in its Transgender Hate Crimes Monitoring Bill. 
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State Portion of Hate Crime Statute Relating 
to Gender Identity 
Statutory Provision  
Tennessee462 
Even though the Tennessee hate crime statute does not explicitly state that it protects transgender 
individuals, on February 8, 2019, Tennessee Attorney General Herbert Slattery issued an opinion expressly 
stating, “A defendant who targets a person for a crime because that person is transgender has targeted the person 
because of his or her gender within the meaning of § 40-35-114(17).” Herbert Slattery, Tenn. Att’y Gen., Op. No. 
19-01, Sentence Enhancement for Hate Crimes Against Transgender Individuals (Feb. 8, 2019), https://www.tn. 
gov/content/dam/tn/attorneygeneral/documents/ops/2019/op19-01.pdf.
providing enhanced penalties if “[t]he de-
fendant intentionally selected the person 
against whom the crime was committed . . . 
in whole or in part, because of the defend-
ant’s belief or perception regarding the 
race, religion, color, disability, sexual ori-
entation, national origin, ancestry or gen-
der of that person or the owner or occupant 
of that property.” (emphasis added) 
TENN. CODE ANN. 
§ 40-35-114(17) 
(2019) 
Vermont providing enhanced penalties for “[a] per-
son who commits, causes to be committed, 
or attempts to commit any crime and whose 
conduct is maliciously motivated by the 
victim’s actual or perceived race, color, re-
ligion, national origin, sex, ancestry, age, 
service in the U.S. Armed Forces, dis-
ability. . ., sexual orientation, or gender 
identity.” (emphasis added) 
VT. STAT. ANN. tit 13 § 
1455 (2019) 
Washington providing that “[a] person is guilty of a hate 
crime offense if he or she maliciously and 
intentionally commits one of the following 
acts because of his or her perception of the 
victim’s race, color, religion, ancestry, 
national origin, gender, sexual orientation, 
gender expression or identity, or mental, phys-
ical, or sensory disability.” (emphasis added) 
WASH. REV. CODE 
§ 9A.36.080(1) (2019)   
462. 
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Pennsylvania is not included in the Appendix, which lists the jurisdictions 
with hate crime statutes that include gender identity, because Pennsylvania no 
longer includes gender identity in its hate crime statute. In 2002, the 
Pennsylvania legislature initially amended their hate crime statute to include 
gender identity.463 In 2007, however, a Pennsylvania court ruled that this 
amendment was unconstitutional.464 As of the time of this writing, two bills 
attempting to amend the ethnic intimidation statute to include gender identity 
were pending before the Pennsylvania legislature.465  
463. The amended provision provided the following: 
A person commits the offense of ethnic intimidation if, with malicious intention toward the actual 
or perceived race, color, religion, or national origin, ancestry, mental or physical disability, sexual 
orientation, gender or gender identity of another individual or group of individuals, he commits an 
offense under any other provision of this article[.]  
See Marcavage v. Rendell, 936 A.2d 188, 190 n.3 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007) (quoting amended 18 PA. C.S.A. § 2710(a) 
(emphasis added)). 
464. Marcavage, 936 A.2d at 193–94 (holding that the enactment of the act amending the ethnic intimidation 
statute to include intimidation of persons based on ancestry, mental or physical disability, sexual orientation, 
gender or gender identity violated the state constitution’s prohibition against alteration or amendment that 
changes the original purpose of the bill). 
465. See 2019 PA. H.B. 635; 2019 PA S.B. 96. 
2020]                                THE TRANS PANIC DEFENSE REVISITED                                1497 
